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"Building Suburban Power" examines how suburban developers constructed a 
discriminatory housing market between the 1890s and the 1960s. It uses corporate 
records to offer a granular look at the everyday practices of firms in order to link their 
daily, seemingly mundane decisions, to the changing global circulation of people and 
capital at the turn of the century on one hand and the emergence of federal housing policy 
in the 1930s and 40s on the other. Between these two time periods, suburban developers 
turned their informal communication channels into a powerful real estate professional 
organization that they helmed to standardize a suburban housing market. Through these 
long-running attempts to become "professionals," a small group of suburban developers 
parlayed their early beliefs about desirable communities into legitimized "common 
sense." The dissertation follows the money, ideas, and practices of one firm, the Roland 
Park Company of Baltimore, Maryland, which its peer companies often held up as a 
model of suburban development operations in the United States. Utilizing a network-
oriented approach, it often enters and leaves the Roland Park Company offices in 
Baltimore to encompass a widening set of actors that ultimately codified enduring 
principles about property. These principles still in part configure uneven political, 
economic, and culture power in the United States. 
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 One fall day in 1893 Edward Bouton, the president of Baltimore's first suburban 
development company, had a question for his lawyers. Could his company, The Roland 
Park Company, legally insert a clause into its deeds to exclude African Americans from 
its developments? The attorneys replied with unequivocal “no,” calling the question "an 
embarrassment."1 Bouton initially heeded their advice. However, in 1913, with the 
opening of his subdivision targeting even more affluent buyers, he went ahead and 
inserted a racial exclusion clause into the company's deeds.2 Forty years after Bouton's 
initial inquiry, suburban developers helped the federal government turn housing 
segregation into sweeping federal policy during the New Deal and Second World War. 
Racially restricted suburbs, nearly nonexistent before the 1890s, had by the 1930s 
become a widespread strategy for developers and policymakers to protect a given piece 
of real estate’s property value.3  
 Developers like Bouton turned local experiments with discrimination into national 
housing policy. Suburban segregation—and indeed planned suburbs in general—were 
anything but a given when Bouton first queried about racial segregation in 1893. But 
beginning in that decade, a new wave of large-scale developers began to draw on 
transnational capital. While money from abroad did not replace local investment—the 
new firms used both—wealth harvested from human bondage and imperial extraction 
                                                        
1 George Whitlock and Samuel D. Schmucker to Bouton, 5 October, 1893, Roland Park Company Records 
Box 2 Folder 7 MS 504, Special Collections, Sheridan Libraries, Baltimore, MD. 
2 Guilford Deeds and Agreements RPC Box 274. 




served as an important catalyst for founding America’s first large-scale emergence of 
planned suburbs. Under pressure to generate investor returns for years on end, developers 
looked to local contexts to find ways of creating steady profits. They then experimented 
with novel methods of planning and marketing neighborhoods, where they quickly found 
success advertising “restricted” communities free from “undesirable neighbors.” 
Restrictions, reasoned Bouton, drove demand and reinforced property values.4  Financial 
backers approved by continuing to invest. 
 Backed by a large investment, the Roland Park Company mobilized local 
municipal resources and thereby began to alter Baltimore’s political process to gain 
municipal resources. Through its own development efforts, it forged connections with 
engineers and planners—who often worked with both city and company. Bouton also 
made use of an older haphazard city petition process to access city services, just as other 
property owners had done throughout the nineteenth century. Unlike those property 
owners, however, Bouton represented a development company with far more money, 
labor, and political capital at its disposal. Shifting scale, from individual property owners 
to wealthy development companies to local government, altered not only resource 
allocation but also citizen relationships with the very machinery of urban governance. 
The success of Baltimore's experiment in suburban development informed the 
creation of a national real estate industry. By 1898, the Roland Park Company doubled 
the size of its district and began to garner international attention.5 Planners, developers, 
and even municipal officials wrote to the company requesting information, including 
                                                        
4 Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property, 1919, 
Jemison Companies Miscellany, Collection #2838 Rare and Manuscript Division, Cornell University 574. 
5 C.L. Strobel to Bouton, May 22, 1911 RPC Records. 
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copies of its deed restrictions.6 The Roland Park Company considered itself to be the first 
developers in the United States who applied deed restrictions to a whole subdivision and 
not an individual property. Whether or not that is the case, its peers believed it as well. 
When disseminating or promoting restrictions in subsequent decades, they attributed the 
innovation to the Roland Park Company, cementing the company’s place as a model 
development company to emulate and Bouton a national leader to be consulted.7 
Beginning in 1908, however, the Roland Park Company and developers across the 
country established a new platform to share their successes with the founding of The 
National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB.) Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, 
suburban developers such as Edward Bouton assumed leadership roles of shaping 
standards and practices with NAREB.8 When New Deal policymakers sought to address 
the housing crisis of the Great Depression, these turned to the leaders of NAREB, who 
helped inform and implement the influential rules that underwrote the postwar suburban 
housing boom.  
From the transnational investment to local experimentations and through the 
institutional leadership of NAREB to the federal government, suburban developers 
amassed the resources and exercised the leverage to remap the American metropolis. 
*** 
                                                        
6 See, for example, Howard Turner to The Roland Park Company, June 5, 1907, F.C. Todd to Bouton, 
March 31, 1913, Richard Watrous to Bouton, January 19, 1911, RPC Records. 
7Tom Ingersoll, "'Movie' Flashes for Journal Readers," National Real Estate Journal 15.5 (May, 1917):94; 
Janet Pearl Davies, Real Estate in American History (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), 50; 
Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 85. 
8 Marc Weiss, The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land 
Planning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 57-60.  
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 “Building Suburban Power” argues that beginning in the 1890s developers of a 
new wave of planned suburbs constructed a discriminatory housing market by turning 
local experiments with creating subdivisions into institutionalized "best practices." 
Through professional real estate organizations, especially the National Association of 
Real Estate Boards, developers and their investors invented modern housing segregation 
practices and collaborated with federal officials during the New Deal to turn those 
practices into government policy.  
     That market took decades to construct. Suburban developers began with the help 
of transnational investment in the 1890s. Recent work on empire and segregation 
acknowledges Baltimore as a site where transnational capital facilitated discrimination at 
the turn of the twentieth century.9 Peter James Hudson writes about one of the Roland 
Park Company's main investors and managers, Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust, but only 
covers the period before and after their involvement with the Roland Park Company.10 
British investment allowed for the creation of development companies to outpace their 
older local competitors, building bigger projects with far more capital. Investors gambled 
that a large tract on the edge of the city would pay off. Bigger real estate projects meant 
longer time-scales for investment. Development companies in the 1890s turned to 
subdivision planning in order to guarantee steady returns over longer spans of years.  
Following the money that made Roland Park shovel-ready brings new actors into 
the historiography of the American suburb. From farmers in the western United States to 
English widows, the capital from far-flung and disparate people made Baltimore's first 
                                                        
9 Peter James Hudson, Banking on Empire: Wall Street and the West Indies, 1873-1933 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, Forthcoming); Carl Nightingale Segregation: A Global History of Divided 
Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.) 
10 N.P. Hudson was kind enough to provide a chapter draft through email. 
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planned suburb possible. Due to the fragmented nature of the Roland Park Company's 
finance, most of their money was moved by managers through financial instruments such 
as bonds, packaged with other sources of capital, sold, resold, and reinvested, ultimately 
arriving in Baltimore. Likewise, tracking capital connects the local African Americans 
that the Roland Park Company excluded—and on whose labor it depended to build 
subdivisions and provide domestic work to residents—to imperial and colonial subjects 
around the world. Along with planned suburbs, investors built their fortunes from 
displacing Native Americans and on the backs of South African diamond miners. The 
company’s planners, engineers, and financial managers also built their reputations and 
profits on sugar and financial businesses in the Caribbean.  
Transnational investment in the early twentieth century only partially accounts for 
federal housing policy. The local nuts and bolts of development also prove fertile ground 
for excavating why suburban developers created particular types of segregated spaces. On 
the surface, these daily technical and managerial problems—including how to standardize 
sales forms, vet individual buyers, craft advertising appeals, and negotiate with municipal 
government for resources—seem to pale in importance to sweeping federal legislation. 
And yet, those processes allowed developers to repeatedly hone and disseminate the 
hierarchy of property value.  
Through everyday practices, developers achieved the profitable victory of re-
positioning the suburb from an adjunct of cities to possessing the opposite aesthetic and 
social qualities of the city. In 1891, when British investors financed the Roland Park 
Company, the old oppositional relationship was country and city.11 The term “suburb” 
                                                        
11 Raymond Williams, The City and the Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.) 
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itself carried few specific connotations other than a peripheral location. Baltimore, like 
most American cities in the 1890s, lacked any comparable type of community. The 
Roland Park Company had to convince homebuyers of the merits of the winding roads 
and detached homes of its “first class suburb” in a city where rich and poor lived in 
rowhouses on the virtues of winding roads and detached homes. And though restrictive 
covenants became a central feature to Roland Park, and to planned suburbs like it over 
the first decades of the twentieth century, residents initially complained about the limits 
restrictions imposed.12 For developers to narrow the “the suburbs” from “periphery” to 
“the suburb” or “picturesque planned subdivision” took a concerted process that was by 
no means inevitable.      
 Existing work deploys the “suburb” in a broad, even trans-historical manner that 
does not account for how historical actors themselves used it in different ways over time. 
As a result, these works obscure the very decision-making processes that gave rise to 
planned suburbs. In particular, a long-standing body of scholarship has consisted of 
scholars creating typologies of suburbs.13 Rather than impose categories on spaces, it 
proves more fruitful to listen as historical actors debate and argue over what “suburb” 
means, and how, through practice and policy, one gets “properly” built. The stakes of 
these debates were high; control over the discursive creation of “suburbia” formed one 
front on which developers gained power and structured how they both standardized and 
disseminated exclusionary practices. 
                                                        
12 Bouton to George B. Ford August 11, 1911 RPC Records Box 61 Folder 10. 
13 Sam Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962); Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 
1820-1900 (New York: Pantheon, 2003). 
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As developers deployed the dichotomy to stigmatize “urban” spaces and people, 
they retooled existing real estate advertising techniques to promote a dichotomy between 
their suburb and the city in which they used concerns about race and public health to 
convince affluent white buyers to leave the heterogeneous center of Baltimore and live in 
socio-economically and racially homogenous Roland Park four miles distant. Under the 
refrains "pure air, pure water, pure sewage” and “no undesirable neighbors," they used 
the planned nature of their subdivisions to signal to buyers that the company could 
control the spaces and ensure Roland Park's social and economic stability. While based 
on Baltimore’s local geography they also tapped into emerging discourses on eugenics 
and racially based disposition to disease. 
Long before Roland Park, people of diverse classes, races, and occupations lived 
and worked on the periphery of Baltimore City. The Roland Park Company purchased a 
tract next to a long-standing African American enclave called Cross Keys. To deliver on 
its advertising that it could guarantee residents a physically separate suburban space 
through planning, the Roland Park Company built physical boundaries into its 
developments such as walls and gates in order to create homogenous subdivisions where 
affluent white buyers could imagine themselves protected and distant from "undesirable 
neighbors." The personnel who helped engineer these boundaries moved between 
Baltimore and locales abroad, importing practices they used on colonial subjects 
abroad.14 To further achieve the illusion of separateness, the company tightly controlled 
views from Cross Keys and the presence of blacks in Roland Park, even going so far as to 
disinter the graves from a family cemetery and move them far from incoming white 
                                                        




buyers.15 Examining planned suburbs, then, supplements recent literature that seeks to 
add complexity to the history of city peripheries beyond looking at planned suburbs.16 
The control developers tried to exercise over people and places on the periphery serve as 
their earliest experiments for formulating the relationships between people and property 
that they later made widespread common sense.  
Moreover, the dichotomy has far-reaching application beyond housing alone. In 
the long term, as developers promoted and entrenched the dichotomy between suburb and 
city, municipal, state, and federal officials diverted resources, such as trees, parks, and 
other infrastructure, widening disparities between places. Through its interactions with 
members of Baltimore City government, for example, the company persuaded the city’s 
Sewerage Commission to deviate from its original city-wide need-based master plan to 
build sewers first in Roland Park. As it fortified its physical and social boundaries above 
ground developers connected to and relied on city infrastructure below ground. 
The dichotomy also masked the suburb’s fundamental dependency on the city, 
from retail and commercial spaces to municipal resources like sewage or water. In the 
decades right before zoning, developers like the Roland Park Company turned the single-
use district into a prized and valuable place through the very boundaries and restrictions it 
                                                        
15 Bouton to Stuart and Young, Oct. 12 1898 RPC Records Box 5 Folder 17. 
16 Literature on unplanned suburbs, includes Mary Corbin Sies, "North American Suburbs, 1880-1950," 
The Journal of Urban History vol 27 (2001):318-1319. Richard Harris, Unplanned Suburb: Toronto's 
American Tragedy, 1900 to 1950 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) and Becky 
Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Elaine Lewinnek, A Workingman’s Reward: Chicago’s 
Early Suburbs and the Roots of American Sprawl (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.) For 
scholarship about non-white people in the suburbs see Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: African 
American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); 
Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian-Americans, Housing, and the Transformation 
of Urban California (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and N.D.B. Connolly, A World More 




created to sell its subdivisions. Discriminatory zoning affected the placement of 
commercial and industrial functions. The company circulated its deeds to planners, 
including the architect of New York’s zoning laws, who considered the Roland Park 
Company’s restrictions a model of good land use. Edward Bouton also served on 
Baltimore’s first zoning commission in 1922. Zoning achieved the same function as 
exclusionary suburban development in that it protected wealthy, often white, residential 
streets against “nuisances.”17 Consequently, poorer people and people of color (whom 
commissioners also labeled “nuisances”) often had to live in mixed-use or industrial 
districts, many of which carried potential health and safety hazards.18 Appraisers 
consistently rated residential properties in these areas poorly, further entrenching housing 
discrimination. After zoning laws became popular nationwide by the 1920s, planners and 
developers continued to adapt the Roland Park Company’s deeds as extra protection for 
new planned suburbs. They simply crossed out Roland Park, Maryland, and Negro from a 
deed restriction and replaced it with the place and group of their choice.19 
A stronger focus on developers is needed to understand how exclusionary planned 
suburbs became prominent in the United States at both the local and national levels. 
Despite what historians recently called too heavy an emphasis on housing “as the primary 
venue for Jim Crow,” much of the literature concentrates on consumers rather than 
                                                        
17 For more on discriminatory zoning and restrictive covenants see Christopher Silver, “The Racial Origins 
of Zoning in American Cities,” in Manning Thomas, June and Marsha Ritzdorf eds. Urban Planning and 
the African American Community: In the Shadows (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997.) 
18 Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 72-74. 




developers.20 Recent work on consumption connects buyers directly to the state, 
bypassing producers. These works combine bottom-up approaches where consumers 
make choices independently of developers and a more top-down approach where the state 
shaped consumer markets. In either case, work on the “politics of consumption” de-
emphasizes how the history of development was one of uneven power, where consumers 
did not have the same type of platform as certain suburban developers to construct a 
housing market.21 This is not to deny the importance of consumption nor to dismiss it as 
political tool.22  
Developers created that platform through NAREB. The association’s members 
styled themselves as experts in order to gain political leverage and achieved one of its 
founding goals when policymakers recognized its members as experts. From the outset, 
NAREB’s first president—a suburban developer—wanted the association to influence 
policy at all levels of government.23 Throughout the 1910s and 1920s it slowly 
established a body of knowledge, standardized practices, passed a code of ethics, and 
lobbied for state licensing laws and thereby assumed the role of gatekeeper to a 
                                                        
20 Andrew Highsmith and Ansley T. Erickson, “Segregation as Splitting, Segregation as Joining: Schools, 
Housing, and the Many Modes of Jim Crow,” American Journal of Education Vol. 121 No. 4 (August, 
2015):565. 
21 “We need to ask careful questions about how and in what ways the state has influenced consumer 
markets” in Meg Jacobs “State of the Field: The Politics of Consumption,” Reviews in American History 
Vol. 39 No. 3 (September, 2011):567. For examples of consumer-centered history see literature on 
unplanned suburbs, along with Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-
1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The 
Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); Meg Jacobs, 
Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University  
Press, 2005); Lawrence Glickman, Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009.) 
22 For a Baltimore example see Paul A. Kramer, “White Sales: The Racial Politics of Baltimore’s Jewish-
Owned Department Stores, 1935-1965” in Enterprising Emporiums, Avi Decter and Melissa Martens eds., 
(Baltimore: The Jewish Museum of Maryland, 2003), 37-65. 
23 For connections between first NAREB president W.W. Hannan’s subdividing business and his advocacy 
for restrictive covenants see Davies, 66. For early policy thrust on “matters affecting real estate interests,” 
see Davies, 59. 
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nationwide real estate industry.24 Political recognition never became the sole goal of the 
professionalization project—controlling who could practice real estate gained members a 
myriad of business advantages—but it remained part and parcel of why Realtors sought 
credibility and respect. NAREB slowly gained federal recognition through its 
collaboration with various agencies such as the War Department in 1917 and made its 
first foray into federal lobbying in 1920.25 The Department of Labor sought NAREB’s 
assistance to run the Own Your Own Home program in the early 1920s,26  a campaign 
that engaged a large group of businessmen in a government sponsored program to sell 
homes.  The Department’s rationale for realtor involvement gained traction when the 
sympathetic Herbert Hoover courted Realtors as an ally for the Department of 
Commerce.27 By the end of the decade, however, NAREB leveraged the additional image 
of businessmen who possessed the technocratic expertise to enable its leaders to consult 
on and implement housing policy. 
Though developers had the disproportionate ability to construct the housing 
market, they never fully reached a consensus on how different people affected value. In 
the 1910s the country’s top ten leading developers of planned suburbs met annually under 
the name, The Developers of High-Class Residential Property, where they asked each 
                                                        
24 Realtors professionalized by establishing what Andrew Abbott calls “professional jurisdiction” in 
relation to other groups, such as city planners, who established a national association one year after 
NAREB in 1909. Throughout the same period of Realtor professionalization, NAREB’s relationship with 
other professional groups varied from close allies that held joint conferences to more divergent. Andrew 
Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), 154, 164. For more on how realtors and planners established jurisdiction see, Jon A. 
Peterson, “The Birth of Organized City Planning in the United States, 1909-1910,” Journal of the American 
Planning Association Vol. 75 No. 2 (Spring, 2009):123-133. 
25 Jeffrey Hornstein, A Nation of Realtors: Cultural History of the Twentieth-Century American Middle 
Class (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 132-135. 
26 Hornstein, 120-133; LeeAnn Lands, "Be a Patriot, Buy a Home: Re-Imagining Home Owners and Home 
Ownership in Early 20th Century Atlanta," Journal of Social History (Summer: 2008):947-949. 
27 Hornstein,139; Weiss, 28. 
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other about how to deal with Jews, single women, and foreign-born buyers. They also 
disagreed on whether to sell to Jews, for example, and even among those who refused, 
had different reasons for their decisions. Through these conversations, developers created 
flexible formulas not shared with the public. They then applied these formulas as a 
routine part of doing business. The Roland Park Company, for instance, retained files 
stamped “Exclusion” where sales staff terminated purchases based on a mix of attributes, 
including religion, gender, appearance, occupation and the local geography of Baltimore. 
All the members of the Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property 
also belonged to NAREB where they all held various executive positions. NAREB 
promoted these practices by advertising technologies for organizing and maintaining the 
files. 
 Illuminating that tension between codifying national real estate standards and 
working out daily, local practices shifts focus from debating the merits and failures of a 
“New Deal order” to questions of process, namely how suburban developers helped to 
reshape the border between city and suburb and turned existing discriminatory practices 
into public policy.28 Between 1923 and 1934 eight of eleven NAREB presidents were 
large suburban developers.29 By 1934, NAREB had a special room in the Capitol 
Building to lobby for the National Housing Act. When the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) compiled editions of its Underwriting Manual between 1934 and 
1938, it repeatedly took provisions from the NAREB Code of Ethics and the restrictive 
                                                        
28 Michael Katz “Narratives of Failure? Historical Interpretations of Federal Housing Policy” City and 
Community vol. 9 no. 1 (2010):15. For the importance of implementation and administration of policy in 
addition to the body of laws and statues that codify it see Andrew Highsmith, Demolition Means Progress: 
Flint, Michigan, and the Fate of the American Metropolis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 8-
9. Highsmith cites redlining as a prime example of “administrative segregation.” 10 
29 Weiss, 47. 
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covenants of suburban developers—language immediately recognizable on a Roland Park 
Company deed from forty years earlier.30  
At the time when the federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) began 
making color-coded security maps in 1935, giving rise to the term “redlining,” Roland 
Park Company employees served as chief appraisers and map consultants in Baltimore, 
with realtors arranging similar setups throughout the country. The HOLC also adopted 
flexible formulas that led it to redline predominantly native-born white areas on the 
peripheries of cities and not just majority black or central city neighborhoods. 
Nevertheless, when appraisers used ostensibly “neutral” measures like the “quality and 
upkeep of homes” they made value judgments laden with ambiguous racial, class, and 
gender assumptions much in the same way as the Roland Park Company.31 In spite of 
applying multi-faceted criteria, the HOLC redlined any area where blacks comprised 
more than twenty percent of the population in Baltimore. The federal government did not 
exclusively redline black neighborhoods, but blacks could not escape redlining.32 Since 
Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier scholars have been noting these parallels, but the 
question remains of how suburban developers gained political capital between the “rise of 
                                                        
30 For content of the Underwriting Manuals see Memorandum from Richard Stearns to Jenkins File “Racial 
Content of FHA Underwriting Practices” (Sept. 12, 1983) (PL034638-50) Exhibit 48 Box 2 Thompson v. 
HUD American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Collection, Series 3, University of Baltimore Langsdale 
Library Special Collections. 
31 James Greer cites “quality and upkeep of homes” as “the biggest correlate” of risk grade. Greer treats this 
as a neutral “empirical” term separate from the explicit demographic assessments, including race, that 
appraisers used. James Greer, “The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and the Development of the 
Residential Security Maps,” Journal of Urban History Vol. 39 No. 2 (2012):292. For examples of similar 
analysis of HOLC practices see Amy E. Hillier, “Residential Security Maps and Neighborhood Appraisals: 
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and the Case of Philadelphia,” Social Science History Vol. 29 No. 2 
(Summer, 2005):210 and Price Fishback, Alfonso Flores-Lagunes, William C. Horrace, et. al., "The 
Influence of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation on Housing Markets During the 1930s," The Review of 
Financial Studies Vol. 24 no. 6 (2011):1782-1813. 
32 Two neighborhoods home to Baltimore’s black professionals received a B rating, but the area description 
lists them as white areas. 
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the Community Builders” like the Roland Park Company in the 1890s, why they chose to 
deploy it in the service of housing segregation, and what accumulating and exercising 
that power looked like on a daily basis. 
Through helping to craft the New Deal state and carry it out on a local scale, 
developers shaped the political economy of New Deal housing. For example, between 
1938 and 1940, Bouton’s successor in the Roland Park Company, John Mowbray, 
directed an HOLC-led project to raise property values in the Waverly neighborhood of 
Baltimore where the HOLC owned foreclosed houses on which mortgagees had 
defaulted. Mowbray gained federal attention through his prominence in NAREB. As an 
employee of the Roland Park Company, he used HOLC security maps made by another 
Roland Park Company employee and invested in property near the project site.  
When realtors like Mowbray collaborated with federal policymakers they applied 
the same hierarchy of property value found in the HOLC security maps and FHA 
underwriting standards. For the project, the HOLC assembled a coalition of municipal 
and federal partners along with developers around the goal of “neighborhood protection.” 
Coalition members aligned with earlier NAREB assumptions about neighborhood 
protection: that the white property owners of Waverly needed to be saved, not just from 
the economic ravages of the Great Depression that shook most American homeowners, 
but from “invading” black renters brought in my landlords. They proposed to “stabilize 
values” by converting Waverly, an unplanned neighborhood of rowhouses and wood 
frame dwellings, into something that looked more like the planned suburb of Roland 
Park. It worked with property owners to create a neighborhood master plan, arranged 
access to home repair credit, and recommended racially restrictive covenants to control 
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future use and occupancy. The HOLC judged the project successful because it sold its 
foreclosed properties and removed them from the company’s ledger of debts. For 
Mowbray, the project had the added benefit of turning Waverly into a buffer zone 
between poorer, more mixed race rental neighborhoods and the Roland Park Company’s 
subdivisions. Developers and federal workers used a body of real estate knowledge, 
including the hierarchy of property value, to neutralize the racial heterogeneity they 
thought threatened their investments.33 From the level of the individual lot to the city of 
Baltimore, through the institutional leadership of NAREB and to the federal government, 
suburban developers amassed federal resources and forged connections with New Deal 
personnel.  
 Despite developers’ importance, there is currently a dearth of scholarly literature 
which utilizes developer records in the first half of the twentieth century to explore. Often 
such records prove difficult to locate or access. At times the records simply did not 
survive after a firm went out of business. The Roland Park Company left an unusually 
complete set of records, consisting of over four hundred boxes of material related to the 
daily operations of the company and to the lives of its personnel. Documents like maps, 
correspondence, and confidential interoffice memos reveal the intricate, numerous, and 
varied interactions developers had with the state, including through groups like NAREB. 
So, too, did the Roland Park Company save trade publications, scrapbooks, newspaper 
articles, photographs and ephemera from other developers as well as copies of forms it 
requested and disseminated. Some of these document types have not been used in 
existing scholarship and offer revisions of assumptions about the practices of suburban 
                                                        
33 Arthur Goodwillie, Waverly: A Study in Neighborhood Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, 1940.) 
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developers.34 Log books recording daily updates of field staff labor conditions and letter 
books capture its daily relationships with Baltimore and its people. Ledgers and stock 
records, not replicated elsewhere since the company was never publically traded, round 
out the company’s financial and economic activity. Taken as a whole the Roland Park 
Company records reveal the ways in which developers shaped politics, space, and culture 
in the United States from street-level to Capitol Hill. Together with policymakers, 
developers helped to build suburban power around the model of the segregated, planned 
suburb. 
Each of the following chapters traces how Roland Park Company helped 
construct the housing market between its founding in 1891 and its liquidation at the end 
of 1959. Chapter one examines the company’s transnational origins and how developers 
mapped investment onto local Baltimore geography. Chapter two looks at the nuts and 
bolts of how the Roland Park Company began to create the suburban/urban dichotomy 
through planning, advertising, and deed restrictions. Chapter three highlights the ways 
planning and investment capital helped it change Baltimore’s political economy and gain 
municipal resources. In chapter four, the Roland Park Company joined NAREB and 
worked with other developers to both institutionalize company practices and debate the 
formulas of exclusion. Chapter five focuses on the Waverly project to evaluate the extent 
to which suburban developers collaborated with policymakers to codify and implement 
“common sense” notions of property value during the New Deal. The conclusion 
                                                        
34 As a case in point, see Garrett Power, "The Residential Segregation of Baltimore's Jews: Restrictive 
Covenant or Gentleman's Agreement?" Generations (Fall, 1996.) Before the Roland Park Company 
Records were fully available, scholars had no way of proving that Baltimore's most prominent suburban 
developer had a policy excluding Jews. It was a widely held belief but was left to speculation. With the full 
opening and processing of the records, there is now a cache of documents confirming the company 
explicitly excluded Jews. 
17 
 
discusses the legacy of developers’ work and traces the continuation of exclusionary 




International Investment and Local Places 
 
 In 1892 a Yorkshire widow named Emma Dixon received a dividend check from 
the Lands Trust Company Limited on her five-pound investment in overseas land. That 
same year, Member of Parliament Jacob Bright took the floor of the House of Commons 
as a Lands Trust Company accountant wrote out his check across town in London's 
financial district. And over in Lancashire, cotton spinner John Hurst Hayes decided to 
invest in land speculation with the Lands Trust Company after reading an advertisement 
in the local newspaper. They were not alone. More and more British subjects sought out 
overseas investments as the British Empire neared its apex in the 1890s. They opted to 
invest in limited liability firms like The Lands Trust Company, an increasingly common 
vehicle for channeling the money of hundreds of small shareholders into what were 
considered safe investments: colonial land, railways, and securities. Dixon, Bright, and 
Hurst joined two railway ticket printers, a schoolmistress, and a butler—along with four 
hundred others—who sent part of their savings to London. From there, the Lands Trust 
Company directed it Baltimore, Maryland where real estate firm The Roland Park 
Company employed English capital the development of the city's first planned suburb. 
 This chapter uses origins of the Roland Park Company to examine the ways 
transnational capital facilitated the development of planned, segregated suburbs in the 
United States in the 1890s. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, large suburban 
developers began to compete with the previously dominant type of urban firm—the local 
builder. These new developers introduced a vision of community and prioritized an 
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affluent, white clientele—though not the very rich, as had been the case in the few 
famous suburbs that came before.1 The next chapter will focus on the specific techniques 
developers employed to plan, advertise, and segregate subdivisions. 
 Housing discrimination in the United States must therefore be understood not just 
in a national context but in a longer history of race and empire, with roots beyond 
America’s borders. It was through these connections that American planned suburbs 
helped usher in particular forms of residential segregation that Carl Nightingale identifies 
in his global history of segregation. The very connectedness of capital, he argues, made 
sites of colonial power like the British Himalayan “hill station” of Simla possible.2 The 
same company directors and managers that introduced the planned suburb to Baltimore 
also invested in British colonialism, the violent displacement of Native Americans in the 
west, and staples like cotton and sugar that had previously fuelled slavery. Given the 
dense transnational origins of the first major wave of planned suburbs and the ways that 
transnational capital shaped developers’ decisions to segregate them, planned suburbs 
also become key sites linking the rise of residential Jim Crow to a larger history of white 
supremacy. 
 The planned suburbs of the 1890s, of which Roland Park was just one, thus 
marked the creation of a suburban colonialism in the United States. Suburban colonialism 
combined financial processes, marketing, and development decisions centered on a 
guiding principle: identify and profit from places where white settlement increased land 
                                                        
1 These most famously include Riverside, Illinois; Llewellyn Park, New Jersey; and Tuxedo Park, New 
York, which counted some of America's wealthiest citizens such as JP Morgan and William Waldorf Astor 
among them. Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820-1900 (New 
York: Pantheon, 2003), Chapter 4. 
2 Carl Nightingale, "The Transnational Contexts of Early Twentieth-Century American Urban 
Segregation," Journal of Social History vol. 39 no. 3 (2006):668, Carl Nightingale Segregation: A Global 
History of Divided Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 113-134. 
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value. The Lands Trust Company did not consider investment in American land to be 
different from that in British colonial territory so long as white settlement drove profits 
from the land. It identified land in Baltimore in the general path of the city’s growth and 
supplied the capital to found the Roland Park Company for development. The Roland 
Park Company used the capital to displace an older community of black residents, clear 
the land for whites to buy property. It also ushered in new local labor regimes where 
nearby people of color became day laborers for the company and servants for the first 
residents. In further hallmarks of colonialism, the company imposed new modes of 
surveillance on nearby black residents, often under the pretense of assuring Roland 
Park’s health and safety. Once established, the company also founded and supported 
institutions of local governance: volunteer police and fireman, neighborhood protective 
associations, and housing committees that patrolled established boundaries and imposed 
their vision of Roland Park's social order with company-sanctioned violence against 
black neighbors.3 Finally, as the Roland Park Company became more established in 
Baltimore, it gained the political power to work with municipal and state governments to 
divert resources from the general population to company subdivisions. 
 American suburbs were never uniquely American places but a single stop in a 
global circuit of capital—a circuit that the Lands Trust Company and its hundreds of 
investors illuminate. A wide cross section of the British population invested in American 
land speculation through the Lands Trust Company. The types of investments they could 
make in colonial lands in the 1890s were those often marketed to the novice investors as 
safe: land itself, railways, and other infrastructure, American land speculation, too, 
                                                        




encompassed these things. As a result, a wide swath of British investors—including the 
cotton spinner Hayes at one end of the spectrum, and the Member of Parliament Bright at 
the other— did not heavily distinguish between overseas land speculation in Baltimore 
and in areas formally colonized like India.  
 British shareholders included one of the fastest growing demographics of British 
investors: women. Women comprised fifteen percent of Lands Trust Company investors. 
British women had long been some of the main drivers of colonial investment, and 
played an increasingly important role in the late nineteenth century. Through the Lands 
Trust Company, they became a force for ushering in suburban colonialism. 
The Roland Park Company's finance came from remarkably fragmented sources that 
reflect the high degree of financialization of the late nineteenth century. The investors’ 
money did not always go directly into Baltimore, nor was it the only source of Lands 
Trust capital. On that circuit of capital money from Dixon, Bright, and Hayes joined 
Kansas farm mortgages, South African diamond mining, New England banking 
institutions, Wall Street firms, and an Antiguan sugar plantation. Most of their money 
was moved by middle men associated with the Lands Trust Company and Roland Park 
Company through financial instruments such as bonds, packaged with other sources of 
capital, sold, resold, and reinvested, ultimately arriving in Baltimore. 
 Once concentrated in Baltimore, transnational investment changed competition 
between developers and led to desirability of planned suburbs segregated by race and 
class. The Lands Trust Company provided the backing for the Roland Park Company, 
which purchased the land and made the daily decisions about how to develop the tract. 
They acquired an initial tract of several hundred acres. Prior to their arrival on the 
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Baltimore real estate scene, local builders manipulated financial ground rent 
arrangements to build lots quickly. As with the Roland Park Company, turnover time 
depended on the nature of finance. The Roland Park Company did not need to develop a 
lot quickly and move on to remain solvent because it had land and capital at its disposal. 
The Roland Park Company’s founding in 1891 also marked a fundamental shift in 
American housing development in which a growing wave of subdividers eschewed the 
practice of building a few houses at a time in favor of planning entire communities. The 
Roland Park Company’s transnational share-holding structure thus created the incentives 
to make a planned suburb where controlling for the race and class of occupants lowered 
the risk of long-term profits for shareholders. 
 Despite the power transnational capital gave to the Roland Park Company, it still 
had to conduct business based on local understandings of political and social geography. 
Baltimore came of age after the American Revolution, the border city in a slave-owning 
state that Seth Rockman calls "the southernmost city in the North and the northernmost 
city in the South.”4 It was in Baltimore, with its domestic slave market and complex 
urban and maritime labor arrangements, that deeply divided loyalties sparked some of the 
earliest outbreaks of violence in the Civil War. By 1891, Baltimore was a growing 
industrial city, a regional employment hub, an immigrant port, and a center of global 
trade. Residents faced chronic housing shortages, which black residents felt most acutely 
in its dense rowhouse neighborhoods. There, most could only obtain small rowhouses in 
the city’s alleys, while wealthier whites lived in close proximity on the main streets.5 As 
                                                        
4 Seth Rockman,Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009), 14. 
5 Garrett Power, "Apartheid, Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913,"  The 
Maryland Law Review vol. 42 (1983):289-290. 
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Baltimore grew outward from its old center near the harbor, the Roland Park Company 
transformed the scale of segregation from the street to the subdivision. 
 
The Roland Park Company and Baltimore 
 On July 30, 1891 five men signed the papers incorporating the Roland Park 
Company. The next day a judge made it official. With a one-million-dollar capitalization, 
the company was open for business. Its charter gave no indication that it would be 
anything but a local operation; it only had the power to operate in Maryland and its 
principal office would be in Baltimore City. In fact, the company's full official name was 
The Roland Park Company of Baltimore City. The two purposes named in its charter—to 
deal in lands and supply any town in Maryland with water and light, hinted at the 
development to come.6 
 The company's founders and directors also fit a seemingly local profile. Four of 
the five people who signed the incorporation papers listed Maryland addresses in 
compliance with state law that the majority of signatories be residents. They consisted of 
Roland R. Conklin of Kansas City, President of the Merchant's National Bank Douglas 
H. Thomas, land owner Michael Jenkins, real estate dealer Richard Capron, and Edward 
Bouton, who had recently moved to Baltimore from Kansas City to helm daily operations 
of the Roland Park Company. The charter named ten directors, four of whom owned land 
adjacent to what became the Roland Park Company district. Two of them, Joseph Jenkins 
Jr. and Charles O'Donnell Lee each bought one share of stock in the company.7 Lee 
                                                        
6 Bound Meeting Minutes, 1891-1903 Roland Park Company Records MS504 Special Collections, The 
Sheridan Libraries Box 178 Folder 1 p1-2. The company legally gained the power to supply anywhere in 




hoped to see his property value appreciate in value and eventually sold it to the Roland 
Park Company. The third, Hiram Woods, a sugar-refiner-turned-real-estate-dealer was 
already selling "villa sites" in the vicinity.8 The fourth director and also one of the 
founders, Richard Capron, proved to be the most active of the local landowners. Capron 
subscribed to 267 shares of Roland Park Company stock for $26,700.9 His shares 
exceeded those of everyone else except for those jointly owned by Samuel Jarvis and 
Roland Ray Conklin. But Jarvis and Conklin managed money on behalf of British clients 
through their firm, Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust. Local investors, therefore, played 
second fiddle to British investors from the outset in terms of company ownership. 
 Capron, along with his wife Laura Lee, played the largest role on the ground 
assembling Roland Park Company land. In the months before the Roland Park 
Company's incorporation, the Caprons began purchasing parcels of land five miles north 
of City Hall, on a high hill beyond Baltimore’s grid and its booming population. The land 
belonged to what Baltimoreans called "country estates." These farms and mansions 
located atop one of the city's high hills were formerly run with slave labor. <Figure 1.1> 
Some of the slave-owning families had left, but the descendants of slaves remained 
scattered on the hillside and in a majority-black village called Cross Keys along a nearby 
river, the Jones Falls. 
 The Caprons became the most prominent locals in the Roland Park Company. 
They lived most of their lives in Baltimore and seem to have conducted business 
exclusively in Maryland. Richard Capron appears in public records listed as a real estate 
                                                        
8 "Classified Ad no. 44," Baltimore Sun (April 30, 1891):5. 
9 Bound Meeting Minutes, 1891-1903 RPC Records Box 178 Folder 1. 
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dealer.10 Together, he and Laura held and flipped property in the corridor of Baltimore's 
northward affluent white growth: including along the city’s elite Mount Royal Avenue 
and nearby North Avenue, two areas where prospective residents of Roland Park lived. 
Three years prior to the founding of the Roland Park Company, Richard supported a large 
municipal annexation in 1888 that, once passed, moved the city line two miles north, 
from North Avenue to just south of Cold Spring Lane, a stone's throw from the Roland 
Park Company's earliest land acquisitions which the Caprons purchased. <Figure 1.2> 
Richard Capron became a prominent enough voice in the annexation debates that he was 
invited to Maryland's capitol to lobby the State Senate to pass the bill.11 His pro-growth 
dealings also shaped his civic life; he helped found the Citizen's Improvement 
Association to advocate for better-developed roads in the new annex, roads which would 
have improved access to his holdings. Already in 1888, three years before the company's 
founding, the Caprons tied their real estate business to channeling affluent white growth 
into the northern central corridor of Baltimore City. However, to get people to move 
northward, they supported municipal policies that increased real estate speculation city-
wide; the new annex encompassed socio-economically, religiously, and racially disparate 
area to the west, east, and north of the old city boundaries. 
 Both Richard and Laura Lee Capron mixed their business lives with their social 
lives: the Caprons took up residence in the new Annex after 1888 on Huntingdon 
Avenue. They also spent summers on a tract of land that likely drew them into the Roland 
Park Company's orbit. Almost twenty years prior to the Roland Park Company’s 
                                                        
10 RPC meeting minutes, "MRS. R. J. CAPRON DEAD: Wife Of Real Estate Dealer Was Miss Lee, Of 
Kentucky," Baltimore Sun (July 18, 1911):14. 
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founding they purchased a country estate, Woodlawn, where they lived for part of the 
year. Woodlawn formed the majority of the first portion of the district the company 
platted and developed. It had formerly belonged to fellow board member and shareholder 
Hiram Woods. 
 As the Caprons invested in the Roland Park Company and acquired its land, Laura 
felt the effects of how it changed Baltimore's real estate practice. Laura Lee Capron had 
always assumed a prominent role in the family real estate business. She flipped property 
to other women or married couples, sometimes initiating a string of transactions over a 
few days where property would change hands multiple times.12 Her name appeared either 
alone or jointly with her husband’s on deeds. It is possible that Laura purchased property 
in her name to protect her husband’s assets, but she also appeared alone in court to 
litigate business disputes. For the Caprons, as well as the husbands and wives with whom 
they conducted business, spousal relations formed a visible component of Baltimore's 
real estate speculation in the late nineteenth century that was common enough to go 
unremarked upon in recordings of real estate transactions, court records, or the newspaper 
social pages. With the coming of the Roland Park Company, Laura Lee Capron was shut 
out of a formal position in the organization, unlike her husband. She never attended the 
board or shareholder meetings her husband did, nor did she play any recorded role in the 
daily business operations which were largely delegated to the general management of 
Edward Bouton. 
 Both Caprons, however, played a crucial role in facilitating British investment as 
the main real estate dealers for the Roland Park Company in Baltimore. Beginning in 
                                                        
12 "Real Estate Transaction 1" Baltimore Sun (July 9, 1891):4; "Untitled," Baltimore Sun (May 9, 1892):4. 
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January, 1891—seven months before incorporation—the Caprons purchased the first of 
three tracts of land, the biggest of which was a former country estate called Oakland. 
Each tract surrounded Woodlawn, the property the Caprons acquired from Woods in the 
1870s. Laura Lee Capron, whose sole name appeared on the deeds, then sold Jarvis and 
Conklin—the American managers of British funds— fifty-five percent stakes in the land 
throughout May and June. At the first company meeting on July 30, 1891 in the offices, 
as the Roland Park Company's very first order of business, Jarvis and Conklin "offered" 
to sell this land to the company in exchange for stock.13 The deal had been pre-arranged 
by all parties involved, which was all the more evident when Jarvis and Conklin included 
in the deal their fifty-five percent interest in a tract of land Bouton had purchased in early 
May.14  Through the transaction, the Roland Park Company officially took hold of the 
property and began to develop a suburb. Meanwhile, Jarvis and Conklin came to own—
on paper—7527 of the company's 10,000 shares valued at $752,700.00. In actuality, 
British investors gained a seventy-five percent stake in the company.15 
 The company's shareholder structure differentiated it from other real estate 
enterprises in Baltimore, which tended to finance land costs through manipulating ground 
rent arrangements. Local builders with limited capital reserves leased small plots of land 
in and around the city, improved them, and sold them quickly in order to turn a profit 
before ground rent was due.16 This required turnover in as little as a few months, 
                                                        
13 Bound Meeting Minutes, 1891-1903 RPC Records Box 178 Folder 1. 
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15 Jarvis and Conklin to Bouton, February 18, 1892 RPC Records Box 2 Folder 27. 
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Ellen Hayward and Charles Belfoure, The Baltimore Rowhouse (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 
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depending on the arrangement between developer and holder of the ground rent. In some 
cases, builders purchased the rights to ground rent, along with the land on which the 
ground rent applied, and then sold them to one party while the house went to another. 
Even Baltimore's largest subdividers who broke up estates throughout the nineteenth 
century funded operations through ground rents, with the attendant pressure to make 
profits quickly. It was an enduring business model but also a short-term one, where the 
quickest work yielded the most profit. The Roland Park Company had a different 
business model stemming from their dependence on British shareholder capital: they 
needed a long-term plan for their property where they could guarantee returns for years 
on end. Financing shaped builders' decisions over where and how to conduct business.  
 Once the Roland Park Company established a long-term investment in the land, 
they turned to a planned tract—and a large one at that. Only forty builders constructed 
one hundred or more houses in the last third of the nineteenth century. A mere eight, 
including the Roland Park Company, built or oversaw the construction of more than two 
hundred houses in that time span.17 As was typical, the company limited its work to one 
part of Baltimore and specialized in one type of real estate—though they also did some 
commercial development in addition to residential development.18 However, most 
builders developed land adjacent to already existing built-up blocks and "extended 
patterns more than they created new ones."19 The Roland Park Company leapfrogged 
built-up sections of northern Baltimore and broke with the rowhouse construction that 
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had reached as far as Peabody Heights (present-day Charles Village.) Form, at least in 
part, followed finance for Baltimore's real estate entrepreneurs. The Roland Park 
Company accelerated the pace of Baltimore's northward growth and introduced into the 
mix new types of spaces. 
 Though the company reinforced the northern-central trajectory of affluent WASP 
migration, in the immediate vicinity, however, a variety of classes, races, and housing 
types surrounded the company's land. The mill village of Hampden and the Melvale 
distillery to the southwest were closer than Peabody Heights. The predominantly black 
village of Cross Keys and properties of the descendants of slaves bordered the company's 
holdings on the west while the white workers of Evergreen lived in semi-detached 
rowhouses that directly touched Roland Park's first divided lots on the east. Unlike Cross 
Keys, not even a hill divided Evergreen from the backyards of these properties. <Figure 
1.3>  
 The hill was on Jarvis and Conklin's mind as they urged Bouton to quickly set up 
the Roland Park Company offices. They had wanted to incorporate the company earlier in 
the year, but the Caprons had faced delays purchasing land.20 The height of the summer 
was approaching and they knew that would not bode well for generating interest among 
potential buyers or investors in Baltimore.21 Affluent Baltimoreans, their target 
demographic, often left the city for the season. They told Bouton to hurry so that they 
could "make this thing public" and "take off the bushel that is hiding the candle."22 Jarvis 
                                                        





and Conklin had to know the rhythms of Baltimore business even though they had not 
conducted business there prior to 1891. 
 Geography and climate set those rhythms. Baltimore's summer heat and humidity 
sent those who could afford it fleeing for the cool air further north. There, cutting just 
below the Roland Park Company's holdings, lay the fall line separating the hills and 
breezes of the piedmont from the flatter, more humid coastal plain. The future Roland 
Park and the country estates to its north benefitted not just from the higher elevation, but 
also from Baltimoreans' perceptions, accurately, that those areas would be healthier. Real 
estate agents followed suit, offering property "entirely free of malaria."23 They were right, 
though the cholera and typhus had as much to do with patterns of growth, geographies of 
race and class, and a lack of adequate infrastructure as it did with the fact that the fall line 
meant that the effluent from every leaky cesspool in the growing city flowed downhill 
toward the harbor. 
 Jarvis and Conklin sought to establish pools of local investors and potential 
buyers—who often fit the same demographic of affluent white businessmen and 
professionals. They wanted Bouton to get the word out as soon as possible that "Roland 
Park is going to be laid out in a manner worthy of the city." Using the same pro-growth 
logic of the Caprons in 1888, Jarvis and Conklin promised that "the steps we take, and 
the notice and attention that Baltimore will receive from investors will give a great 
impetus to real estate movements all over the city."24  
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To this end, the company set up its first offices in the brand new Blackstone Building, 
diagonally across from City Hall at Lexington and North Streets (present day Guilford 
Avenue.)  Company officials choose for their location the heart of Baltimore's financial 
and government district where dozens of banks and firms mingled with the customs 
house and courthouse in the surrounding streets. The Baltimore Real Estate Exchange 
was a block away at 122 East Fayette Street. Lawyers, financiers, bankers, looking for an 
investment opportunity or a new house could easily visit the Roland Park Company's 
offices.25 But a mere five blocks from the Roland Park Company Offices, City Hall, and 
the real estate exchange, raw sewage spilled into the harbor. 
 The company's offices cultivated an image of prestige before the company had 
broken ground and created product to show. Potential investors or homebuyers entered 
the arched stone front of Blackstone building into a lobby adorned with polish oak and 
marble. After taking an elevator they entered to the company's suite, which a decorative 
tile and marble fire place and a street view. Upon establishing its offices, the Roland Park 
Company began to shape its relationship with Baltimore. It benefit from proximity to the 
financial and political institutions in the blocks around its offices, where its target 
demographic worked. Prospective investors could step out of the noise and stench that 
permeated downtown and into well-appointed rooms to inquire about the planned 
development five miles away, above the fall line. The company tied its fate to offering an 
escape from Baltimore's health and environmental issues before they placed their first ad 
in the newspapers. 
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 Pressures from outside Baltimore also made Jarvis and Conklin "anxious" to see 
the Roland Park Company begin operations. British investors, via Jarvis-Conklin 
Mortgage Trust, were "closing a deal for some other real estate" outside of Maryland and 
required a large sum of money. Because of this other deal the British officers of the 
former needed the Roland Park Company to "sell a large amount of property" by January 
1, 1892 so that Jarvis and Conklin could shift money between projects.26 In moving 
money between projects, the British investors were not adopting a new strategy to 
balance their investments. Rather the geographic and temporal scale they needed differed 
from most previous builders in Baltimore. Local builders worked on multiple projects 
simultaneously, each with different ground rent arrangements. If they shifted funds from 
one project to another, like, for instance, a block of rowhouses in Northwest Baltimore to 
five lots in North Baltimore, they often still walked a fine line between developing a 
successful lot and insolvency.  
 The Roland Park Company survived because of how transnational investment 
worked on land: its investors had enough money to buy up hundreds of acres of land. 
When the company failed to turn a profit in 1891, Jarvis and Conklin floated it on loans 
secured on the company's property, the largest of which was sixty-five thousand dollars.27 
The British investors supplied the extra money. Because the Roland Park Company had 
Lands Trust capital from other enterprises, it had a cushion to run even when 
unprofitable. With a development scheme they knew would be realized slowly over time, 
financial backers remained committed to a multi-year investment, holding out for the 
possibility of long-term profits. 
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 This was not to say that the main British investors were happy with daily 
operations in Baltimore. After 1891, the loan officers of the English speculation company 
demanded Bouton report more frequently on company progress and employed a British 
auditor to review the company's books.28 They also started to make more aesthetic and 
marketing suggestions. Englishman Alfred Fryer, the largest British investor, wrote to 
Bouton advising that the Roland Park Company emphasize the relationship between 
sewers, "pure air" and health.29 The company soon made "pure drainage" one of its main 
selling points, equating the cleanliness it afforded with the health of the "desirable 
neighbors."30 Fryer also repeatedly suggested that the company build smaller, cheaper 
houses along Roland Park's periphery.31 Bouton also adopted this tactic and used it to a 
specific end: whenever company property abutted areas with less affluent or less white 
demographics, the company built small homes as a buffer between them and larger 
houses deeper in his sub-divisions. Bouton retained the wide berth of creative control the 
company by-laws afforded him.32 He heeded Fryer's advice but also filtered it through his 
understanding of local geographies of class and race.  
 
Following the Money 
 The Roland Park Company owed its existence to the London-based Lands Trust 
Company and its American managers, the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust. Jarvis and 
Conklin focused their early business on the booming market for western U.S. land 
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mortgages in the 1880s where they made money through a string of transactions that 
packaged capital, re-packaged it, and reinvested it through different parties across wide 
geographic distances. It began in a place like Kansas or Iowa when a farmer went into 
debt by mortgaging their farm through the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust. From there 
Jarvis-Conklin did one of several things with the mortgage. It might have sold the 
mortgage outright to an investor, likely a bank in New England or in Britain. Or, it might 
bundle mortgages into the portfolios of the British firms and profit from service fees, 
which the Trust would re-invest in suburban development projects. As an additional line 
of business, it grouped together farm mortgages and issued bonds against them, either 
selling the securities to investors or adding them to the portfolios of British clients.33 
Through investment firms like Jarvis-Conklin, when a farmer in Kansas went into debt, 
segregated suburbs gained capital. 
 Jarvis-Conklin managed money for British firms other than the Lands Trust 
Company. They channeled $3,252,206 in farm loans to the Yorkshire Investment and 
American Mortgage Company Limited, earning British investors an average of six 
percent returns even through the collapse of farm mortgages in the mid-1890s.34 At least 
forty other firms directed British money into rural America during the same time 
period.35 By the end of the 1880s, Jarvis and Conklin expanded into land development, 
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utilities, banking, and railways. Preceding Roland Park by five years, Jarvis-Conklin 
Mortgage Trust financed the planned, segregated suburb of Hyde Park in Kansas City. 
They also helped finance a similar development in Euclid Heights, outside of Cleveland, 
as they pursued work in Baltimore.  
 The Lands Trust Company Limited, founded in London in 1888, pooled capital 
from shareholders in order to purchase land and to fund land speculation abroad. The 
Lands Trust focused on "the more newly settled parts of the United States or in the 
[British] Colonies where from the influx of population they are rapidly enhancing in 
value." Baltimore fit this description. As the Roland Park Company evicted the 
descendants of slaves on the hill, it sparked a migration of affluent white residents 
northward from downtown Baltimore. In both cases the Lands Trust business plan 
depended upon the displacement of people of color. 
 Colonialism played a central role in Lands Trust Company operations. In the first 
sentence of its memorandum of association company officials set eyes on "The United 
States of America, the United Kingdom and her Majesty's Colonies, and all other parts of 
the world."36 Moreover, the company's wide discretion matched its geographic scope: it 
intended to invest in "real and personal property" overseas but also in securities of any 
company formed under any "British, Indian, Colonial, or Foreign Law." To this end, the 
company could "do all acts which seem necessary or convenient for carrying on or 
transacting in any foreign country, dependency, or colony any business."37  
                                                        





 The company's officers had links to colonialism and overseas lands as well. The 
Lands Trust board member Alfred Fryer invested in the Lands Trust Company money he 
made as a sugar refiner in Manchester. Fryer's firm earned accolades from sugar 
manufacturers for purchasing sugar estates in Antigua in the 1860s, where he 
experimented with ways to make sugar more easily transportable between the West 
Indies and Europe.38 Like Hiram Woods in Baltimore, Fryer retired from sugar in his old 
age and turned to real estate. One year before the founding of the Lands Trust, Fryer 
travelled through the western United States and published his account in 1887 as The 
Great Loan Land where he found "empty" land that had been made productive through 
the investments of white settlers. The book ended with him promoting the Jarvis-Conklin 
Mortgage Trust's western mortgage business.39 In addition to Fryer, Lands Trust 
Company founder and banker Eli Lemon Sheldon also had connections to colonialism. In 
1891, just as the Lands Trust Company began investing in Baltimore, Sheldon spent 
$50,000 to fund his wife's trip through Africa. Writing under the names White Queen and 
Bebe Bwana, she published accounts of her travels, including a book entitled, From 
Sultan to Sultan: Adventures among the Masai and Other Tribes of East Africa.40 
Sheldon hosted British explorers in his London townhouse, including Henry M. Stanley, 
who famously searched for David Livingstone. 
 Both Fryer and fellow Lands Trust board member Jacob Bright (who ran a cotton-
spinning business and steamship company) were active in the British Society of Friends, 
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whose members supported similar companies. The Friends re-published The Great Loan 
Land because it “so well and completely answers most of the questions that an English 
investor asks concerning the merits and security of American Land Mortgages.”41 
Business publications sometimes labeled the Lands Trust Company a Quaker enterprise, 
citing Fryer and Bright as well as an unstated but apparently significant number of 
investors.42 The extent to which Quakers supplied the Lands Trust capital remains 
unclear, though it is likely members of local meetings invested in Lands Trust stock to 
bolster Society of Friends institutions.43 The Lands Trust Company joined other Quaker 
firms in overseas land speculation.44 Shared religious and business ties shaped the 
overseas land speculation companies and the decisions of people to supply them with 
capital. 
 Only blurry lines separated these companies, though they existed as separate 
entities on paper. Two other Quaker firms, the Colonial and United States Mortgage 
Company and Investment Guarantee Trust Company of Hull, invested widely in western 
US farm mortgages and other land securities. Five directors sat on the board of both 
companies. Even less of a distinction existed between Jarvis Conklin Mortgage Trust, the 
Lands Trust Company Limited, and the Roland Park Company. Jarvis Conklin Mortgage 
Trust managed The Lands Trust funds in Baltimore. Sheldon had worked for Jarvis and 
Conklin since the 1870s "securing British investment in American companies."45 Fryer, 
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who held the most Lands Trust shares along with Jarvis and Conklin, served as Vice 
President of the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust and managing director of the Lands 
Trust. Fryer did not have to travel far to perform his duties, however, since the Jarvis-
Conklin Mortgage Trust and The Lands Trust Company shared a building in the City of 
London. Neither Jarvis and Conklin nor Fryer purchased stock in the Lands Trust 
Company at its incorporation in 1888; in a reversal of the Roland Park Company's 
seemingly local founding, only six people listing London addresses signed the 
memorandum of association. Jarvis, Conklin, and the officers of the Lands Trust 
Company also travelled together to visit the property Lands Trust came to own in 
Baltimore, South Carolina, Georgia, Illinois, and Utah.46  
 Even as the three biggest shareholders, Fryer, Jarvis, and Conklin only owned 
about 3000 of the 50,000 shares in 1893 when the Roland Park Company sold its first 
house in Baltimore. Four hundred men and women held the rest. The amount of stock 
held varied widely, from as little as one share to over one hundred. The Lands Trust 
Company filed shareholder registers with the Board of Trade containing subscribers' 
names, addresses, occupations, number of shares held, and total price paid for the 
shares.47 There is no evidence to indicate that shareholders played an active role in the 
company. The rise of the modern corporation, with its attendant organizational structure, 
rested on separating company ownership from company control.48 This separation 
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removed the shareholder from daily corporate operations, run by directors, brokers, 
accountants, and bankers. Shareholders could, however, vote on company business and 
attend shareholder meetings that were legally required to be announced publically in 
advance. The growth of limited liability corporations like the Lands Trust Company 
provided investment opportunities for women and men across the British Isles. From 
music professors to ministers to mustard manufacturers, a wide cross-section of society 
sank their hard-earned money into suburban colonialism in the United States. Their 
contributions, sometimes as small as one pound, flowed into Baltimore. 
 The Lands Trust officers sought shareholders from all corners of Britain and 
Ireland. They published their prospectus in newspapers in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and 
throughout England. Potential investors living in Skibbereen on Ireland's southern tip or 
in London saw the same promise of "handsome profits" as the company bought and 
resold land and shares in land companies overseas.49 Small prospective investors relied 
on newspaper advertisements as one of their main sources to find financial information 
and opportunity.50 
 The four hundred and six investors in 1893 listed one hundred and thirty-three 
unique occupations. They ranged across every major category of work, with shareholders 
in labor, clerical, administrative, service, religious, and professional positions. They also 
covered a wide set of social strata within single sectors. Banking-related occupations 
encompassed bankers, accountants, and tellers while both corn dealers and corn millers 
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bought stock. Government positions ranged from a member of parliament to a post office 
assistant.  Machinists invested along with company presidents and doctors with drapers.51 
 Some types of work stand out for having a single representative while others 
appeared disproportionately. A single butler invested in the Lands Trust Company, with 
no other household service employees among the hundreds of shareholders. On the other 
hand, the textile workers outnumbered the typical investor-heavy manufacturing, legal, 
medical, and government occupations. Twenty-one investors identified as spinners, 
drapers, clothiers, tailors, bleachers, wool combers. They were rounded out by one sail 
maker and a yarn salesman. This group composed the highest numbers of investors after 
the more expected merchant, banking, and finance. Merchants, who constituted the 
second largest group of investors, also included several who listed textile-related 
specialties: stuff (a class of raw material for fabric,) wool, and dye.52 
 Investors sometimes listed occupations that denoted status rather than work. A 
case in point would be the most frequently-listed occupation, "gentleman." With forty-
nine gentlemen, it nearly doubles the second biggest category, merchants. The term 
gentleman defined lifestyle, but not necessarily lineage or membership in the gentry. In 
legal documents of the time it designated "a socially respectable person who has no 
specific occupation or profession."53 In other instances, investors listed occupations that 
denoted social status derived through relationships, such as the son of a naval officer. 
Occupations also offer the occasional glimpse at the age range of investors, who included 
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a "retired cotton spinner" among eight active. And although the company gained an 
association with Quakers, clergy from at least two different Protestant denominations also 
bought shares.54   
 Moreover, shareholder records revealed social and work networks through the 
ways they listed their occupation. One medical practitioner listed "Member of the Royal 
College of Surgeons" instead of "surgeon," while another investor simply listed "writer to 
the signet," signifying membership in a venerable private society of Scottish solicitors. 
The lone butler who invested in the company worked for a wealthy Lancashire Quaker 
woman who donated money and stock to fund Friends schools in the area, including 
through an intermediary who bought shares in the Lands Trust Company for himself and 
family members.55 The records' emphasis on individuals masked the importance of 
kinship to investors' work. Such was the case of John MacKenzie Wilson, a 
Northumberland minister who jointly purchased thirty shares for thirty pounds with Anna 
Aikman Cunningham Wilson, identified as "his wife." As a minister's wife, she likely 
performed church-related duties. 
 Women like Anna Aikman Cunningham Wilson made up fifteen percent of Lands 
Trust shareholders in 1893.56 The separation of stock ownership from company control 
allowed shareholders to be passive investors, which simultaneously made buying stocks 
more widely socially acceptable. They also faced greater barriers to gaining information 
about companies and fewer avenues to learn the ins and outs of business. As British 
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women increasingly entered the world of stock ownership, this same turn toward 
corporate hierarchy in Baltimore real estate left no place for businesswomen like Laura 
Lee Capron in the Roland Park Company. 
 Overseas and colonial investment had long been a sector of the British economy 
in which women disproportionately invested. Historians, however, are still uncovering 
the extent and nature of their involvement over time.57 As early as the 1850s, they 
composed half of the East India Company's Court of Proprietors, the body who elected 
directors.58 The directors themselves were male. High-profile British women like George 
Eliot "amassed a portfolio of colonial stocks" in the 1860s and 1870s but women of fewer 
means also bought one or two shares in a company to try and generate needed income.59 
By the 1890s two major trends emerged: women investors increased to sixteen percent of 
all British shareholders. A whopping eighty-three percent of them invested in firms that 
primarily dealt in overseas or empire assets.60 
 By the 1890s the women who opted to purchase Lands Trust Company stock did 
so in the midst of having more investment choices than ever before. Britain made it easier 
to form limited liability companies like the Lands Trust in 1856, but they proliferated in 
earnest toward the end of the nineteenth century.61 Limited liability companies carried 
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lower risk to the investor, who did not have to worry about being held accountable for the 
company's debts beyond what they invested. Women tended to seek lower risk 
investments and advice literature of the time generally characterized financial risk-taking 
as un-feminine.62 Instead of investing in the Lands Trust Company, they could have 
chosen more conservative investment opportunities where women were already well-
represented: railways, government bonds, and land (as opposed to land speculation and 
securities.)63 Nevertheless, the Lands Trust Company's operations fit within the 
conventional portfolio options, increasing its appeal. They also had other securities 
options such as purchasing debentures, which carried lower risk than stock but did not 
give them voting power in a company. The Lands Trust issued debentures—shares of 
debt—beginning in 1890, but the records of debt-holders did not survive.64 It is therefore 
possible that women played an even greater role in supporting the Lands Trust Company 
than can be assessed by stock subscriptions alone. Additionally, women often invested 
through male intermediaries, as was the case of the butler's employer who did not appear 
personally in the shareholder records. Whether through stocks or debentures, women 
invested in the Lands Trust Company at least in part because it fit the reliable profile of 
colonial and overseas land investment with limited liability. 
 Women’s investment in the Lands Trust Company still cut across age, marital 
status, class and financial circumstance. Perhaps because of the legal and social concern 
with classifying women by marriage, The Lands Trust Company's shareholder rolls 
meticulously document marital status. It was listed in the "occupation column of 
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shareholder roles." 53 men left the occupation column blank while every woman filled it 
in. The law remained "vigilant" about marital status while married women continued to 
face additional hurdles in both investing and exercising their shareholder rights.65  The 
Lands Trust Company was founded less than a decade after a comprehensive 1882 law 
that recognized wives' rights to hold property separately from their husbands.  
 Except for one schoolmistress, each female shareholder was identified as single, 
married, or widowed. Within each group the number of shares per person ranged from 
five or less to between two and three hundred. Single women constituted 47% of female 
shareholders followed by married women (40%) and widows (13%.)66 Several widowed 
shareholders functioned as "executrix" to their late husband's estates, including the 
company's largest shareholder after 1893, Anna Fryer, who came to own over one 
thousand four hundred shares, over four times as much stock as the next woman. Aside 
from Fryer, shareholder value mirrored number of shareholders, with single women 
subscribing to 1,971 shares, followed by married women with 657 shares, and widows 
with 365.67  
 One of the Lands Trust's small investors was Emma Dixon, a Yorkshire widow 
who bought five shares of company stock for five pounds. Dixon could have learned 
about Lands Trust through several different channels. She might have opened up The 
York Herald in 1889 and saw the company's advertisements. A family member might 
have alerted her to the investment opportunity; twenty-five of the sixty female 
shareholders were related to other Lands Trust shareholders.  
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 In spite of the increasingly complex and extensive networks of financiers, 
intermediaries, and widely dispersed investors, the effects of transnational capital were 
still felt on the small scale. In Yorkshire, Dixon received a check for a 3% dividend on 
her five-pound investment. Meanwhile, the sewers she helped fund in Baltimore emptied 
into a popular swimming spot for black children in Cross Keys, down the hill from 
Roland Park. As they swam in contaminated water, the children’s lives became intimately 
intertwined with Dixon’s, though they never knew she existed. 
 
Conclusion 
 Transnational capital made Baltimore's first planned, segregated suburb possible. 
Following the Roland Park Company's money makes it clear that America's new planned 
suburbs in the 1890s were integrated into wider circuits of capital that connected them 
with colonial undertakings elsewhere. 
 The structures underpinning Jim Crow finance multiplied at the end of the 
nineteenth century. By 1893 Jarvis Conklin Mortgage Trust and the Lands Trust 
Company Limited operated in eleven states. Not long after the Roland Park Company 
sold its first house, however, the farm mortgage market crashed, triggering a nationwide 
depression that bankrupted the Jarvis-Conklin Mortgage Trust. The Lands Trust 
Company survived and continued to fund its American investments, expanding its 
holdings to South African diamond mining. Meanwhile Jarvis and Conklin regrouped and 
became the first businessmen to raise the American flag in Cuba after the Spanish-
American war.68 
                                                        
68 Hudson, n.p. 
46 
 
 Meanwhile, the Roland Park Company began to change Baltimore real estate 
practice. Transnational investment jumpstarted the creation of segregated, planned 
suburbs by giving the Roland Park Company more capital than local competitors. The 
Roland Park Company turned to planning and segregation because they needed to 
guarantee long-term returns on investment on a large tract of land. In fact, if the Lands 
Trust Company had not sought American land to invest in, the Roland Park Company 




Nuts and Bolts 
 
 In the 1890s, America's new real estate development companies had their hands 
full. Increasingly, they had the money and land to make "first class suburbs." What they 
needed was the know-how. When they began their projects, few consumers could 
envision a "suburban" place. Developers set out to create a dichotomy that characterized 
a suburb as healthy and safe while labeling urban communities disorderly and dangerous. 
Developers claimed to be selling "pure air," "pure water," and even "pure sewage" They 
were aided in these efforts by specialty consultants who traveled the world applying their 
skills in Europe and North America as well as to imperialist projects throughout the 
world. By the 1910s, what developers envisioned during the 1890s could be seen 
materialized and replicated from coast to coast. 
 This chapter makes three methodological and historical arguments about the 
suburban development. First, it traces the networks of developers and their consultants to 
position American suburbs in a larger history of global investment, racism, and 
colonialism during the 1890s, just as the United States saw the rise of a new class of 
developers that included the Roland Park Company.1 Contrary to the oft-told genealogy 
of suburban design, if developers did look abroad, they did not simply turn to England for 
ideas; rather they fostered direct connections to Europe and around the world that 
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allowed them to combine aesthetic sensibilities with the changing nature of global 
segregation.2 
 Second, it treats the "suburb" as a historically constructed and contingent term 
that developers like the Roland Park Company sought to control. Much of the existing 
scholarship on suburbs, both pre-war and post-war, use the term ahistorically. Yet, at the 
heart of the Roland Park Company's project was their attempt to sell a type of space 
Baltimoreans generally had not seen. The company incorporated into its business 
decisions and early advertising tactics different strategies for attracting potential buyers. 
Prospective buyers had a variety of other options to choose from closer to downtown 
Baltimore which looked more familiar. They consisted of large row houses fronting the 
street. Smaller homes lined adjacent alleys where local laborers lived. Baltimore's 
neighborhoods were still aesthetically and socially heterogeneous in the 1890s.3 
 To do so, they hit on defining Roland Park in opposition to a pathological city. 
They combined pre-existing sales appeals with critiques of Baltimore into a dichotomy of 
urban and suburban space. Proponents of metropolitan history question the analytical 
purchase of defining suburb and city as separate and opposing places, but they primarily 
focus on post-war politics for explanations of disinvestment and capital movement. 
Though they study suburbs as sites of political, social, and cultural power, they continue 
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to use the term suburb ahistorically and, thus, ignore how developers spread narrow ideas 
about suburbs that in part account for that power.4 
 Transnational developer and consultant networks with the local processes by 
which the Roland Park Company created and controlled boundaries. In creating visions 
of a "suburban" place, developers changed how people thought about spaces and the 
people in them. The Roland Park Company linked the environmental hazards of "urban" 
areas of a rapidly industrializing Baltimore—the dirty air, the impure water, the pungent 
sewage—to specific people along race and class lines. It also came up with pull factors to 
sell Roland Park, which lay several miles from where the majority of prospective white 
buyers lived. The Roland Park Company boasted of its own provisions for water and 
sewage and advertised socioeconomically and racially homogenous developments. 
Moreover, developers also had to make good on their promise that they could guard their 
subdivisions against "urban" disorder. They quickly learned that at the heart of suburban 
place-making lay the promise of establishing and maintaining boundaries. Controlling 
boundaries became the nexus between creating push factors like racial scare tactics and 
pull factors such as private sewage. 
 The result was the narrowing of the "suburb" to denote a racially and 
socioeconomically homogenous planned tract. Baltimore already had neighborhoods 
primarily occupied by a single ethnic or racial group, but the planned nature of Roland 
Park allowed for experimentation with how to create boundaries and how to socially and 
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aesthetically control an entire subdivision. Other developers and homebuyers found the 
model worth emulating and, thanks to the Roland Park Company's networks of 
consultants, it traveled widely beyond Baltimore. 
 
Networks and Planning 
Once the Roland Park Company acquired land in 1891, it turned to careful 
planning to control its subdivisions. The Roland Park Company employed specialty 
consultants from allied professions to help plan and construct subdivisions. Over time 
company officials embedded themselves in professional networks to gain and disseminate 
technical information. Consultants, such as landscape architects or engineers, traveled 
widely to render their skills in Europe and North America as well as in the service of 
imperialist projects. The Roland Park Company subscribed to publications tracking the 
international accomplishments of their consultants and used the same print channels to 
seek advice and give advice on the technical aspects of subdividing land. As company 
officials worked closely with consultants, they received advice that extended beyond 
laying a pipe or planting a tree; developers' professional networks helped them articulate 
an exclusionary vision of the suburb. Consultants did not just move among various 
specialized high-skilled jobs, but also played key roles in spreading and executing ideas, 
including the notion that place-making itself required specialized training and 
knowledge.5 
 The company hired the Olmsted Brothers landscape architecture firm in 1898. 
The firm had a prominent reputation by the time Bouton contacted them. Its founder, 
                                                        
5 Anderson elaborates on examples of how "professional mobility" shaped American public health though 
he focuses more on government bureaucracy rather than real estate development. 229-232. 
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Frederick Law Olmsted Sr. designed New York's Central Park as well as one of the most 
famous American planned suburbs of the nineteenth century, Riverside, Illinois. His sons, 
Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. and John Charles Olmsted, took over the firm by the 1890s as 
his health declined. 
 The Olmsted Brothers firm grew as the new suburban development companies 
became more numerous and more prolific. The Olmsted Brothers saw a rapid increase in 
commissions after 1890. Between its founding in 1857 and when Bouton contacted them 
in 1898, the firm drew up plans for forty-two subdivisions. They designed all but four of 
those after 1880 and more than half after 1890, which correlated with the rise of the new 
development companies. Their work became more geographically dispersed as more 
developers turned to consultants to create planned tracts: of those 42, a third were located 
in the Olmsteds' home state of Massachusetts. After 1898, however, the firm drew up a 
total of 345 subdivisions. Their work spanned forty-nine states and several Canadian 
provinces.6  
 The Olmsteds sought to collaborate with others they thought of as peers such 
engineers and architects.7 They emphasized that experts should control the knowledge of 
place-making and that they, as consultants, were indispensable. To this end, the Olmsted 
Brothers fought to keep the ranks of professional landscape architects small by working 
to professionalize landscape architecture based on models of related fields. The Olmsteds 
helped found the American Society of Landscape Architects in 1899, while they worked 
on Roland Park. John Charles Olmsted served as its first president. Prior to that, the 
                                                        
6 Figures compiled using The Master List of Design Projects of the Olmsted Firm 1857-1979, Lucy 
Lawliss, Caroline Loughlin and Lauren Meier, eds. (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Olmsted 
Parks, 2008.) 
7 "Circular as to Professional Methods and Charges," Box 6 Folder 26A RPC Records.  
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Olmsteds drew from American Institute of Architects "Schedule of Minimum Charges of 
the American Institute of Architects to define the terms they used in their Methods 
circular.8 ASLA began to establish uniform training principles for landscape architects in 
the aesthetic principles of design and planning. ASLA later released its "Methods of 
Charges and Recommended Minimum Charges."9 The Olmsteds' work to professionalize 
and promote landscape architecture increased just as developers were more likely to hire 
landscape architects. Consequently, they would draw from a limited pool of professionals 
with similar ideas about what constituted suburban places, ideas the Olmsted firm 
popularized. 
 The firm outlined a comprehensive process in which they inserted the landscape 
architect into every step of laying out a place, both by enumerating the services they 
offered and by the strict, detailed routines by which they wanted their work to be 
implemented. As landscape architects, they offered to collaborate "concerning the placing 
of buildings, the laying out of roads, the grading of surfaces, and the treatment of old and 
new plantations."10 Their general plan could be "carried out by any one possessed of 
suitable technical training, but [its] designed results in detail are rarely to be attained 
without occasional visits and more or less other assistance from the designers."11 
 The Olmsted Brothers had other ways of limiting who could participate in 
suburban development. They charged, at minimum one hundred dollars (or about 
$4,280.00 in 2013) for a preliminary visit and fifty dollars for preliminary plans. Prices 
                                                        
8 Ibid. 






then increased considerably depending on the scope of the job commissioned.12 Their 
high fees put the Olmsted Brothers out of reach for many builders and developers in the 
1890s, who still operated with very little capital and whose profits depending on quick 
sales of small lots. Conversely, the Olmsted Brothers achieved visibility because they 
linked their reputation to developers who had the most resources to publicize their work. 
As the individual lot builder gave way to big development companies, even those firms 
that were smaller and less-well capitalized than the Roland Park Company tried to hire 
consultants to emulate the Olmsteds' designs, even if that emulation happened unevenly 
and in the most superficial respects such as naming the streets in similar styles.  
 The Olmsteds had strong ideas about what constituted "suburban" landscape 
design. They developed a typology of spaces for which they rendered their services and 
which included "private grounds and gardens, public parks and squares, suburban 
neighborhoods, town sites, streets, and parkways."13 Whereas streets or parkways could 
be designed on a smaller, more piecemeal scale, they treated suburbs as consisting of 
entire tracts. As astute businessmen they considered suburbs as planned units, likely to be 
subdivided by the development companies that hired them. In the 1890s, they advertised 
their services in a way that wrote off the possibility of piecemeal suburbs. 
 The Olmsteds believed one of the key duties of professional landscape architects 
was to help a site fully achieve its unique potential. Drawing on the nineteenth century 
romantic tradition of the picturesque, they included "graceful" curving streets, naturalistic 
landscaping, and took advantage of the site's topography—a steep hill cut by ravines that 
                                                        
12 Ibid. Real 2013 values of Olmsted fees found using the calculator on "Measuring Worth," 
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php 
13 "Circular," RPC Records, Box 6 Folder 26A. 
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steeply sloped down to the Jones Falls river valley.14 <Figure 2.1> They planned streets 
to intersect at triangles which allowed them to add additional trees and shrubs that 
highlighted the area's "naturalistic beauty."15 When combined, they envisioned sweeping 
vistas of the valley with winding roads that invited leisurely contemplation.  
 The Olmsteds created a discernible international "suburban" form through their 
acts of replication. They repeated names throughout the United States and Canada if the 
topography was "entirely appropriate."16 Roland Park in addition to other Olmsted 
planned tracts featured an "Upland Road" while one of their projects in Atlanta contained 
both Deepdene Park and Ridgewood Drive. The Olmsteds also planned Uplands in 
Victoria, British Columbia. They also suggested names that linked landscape features 
with affluence such as "Many Mansions Hill," "Comfort Hill," and "Fortune Hill." Names 
like "Many Mansions Hill" accurately reflected both the social and topographical 
landscape and signaled that suburban landscapes were wealthy ones, thus equating 
desirable aesthetics with desirable residents. They suggested Bouton name a new section 
of Roland Park "Braehurst," because "'hurst' has been used in other combinations both for 
private places and for first class real estate sub-divisions" which would "bring up only 
agreeable associations."17  Bouton agreed with the Olmsteds that "suburban" streets 
should be called roads, lanes, or paths rather than streets or, as the Olmsteds put it: "it 
would be proper to avoid citified designations such as street and avenue and use instead 
the word road."18   
                                                        
14 Olmsted Brothers to Bouton, Feb 25, 1898 and September 17 1898, RPC Records, Box 6 Folder 26A. 
15 Olmsted Brothers to Bouton September 171898 RPC Records, Box 6 Folder 26A 
16 Ibid. 
17 Olmsted Brothers to Bouton, Dec. 20, 1898 RPC Records, Box 6 Folder 26A. 
18 Olmsted Brothers to Bouton, Dec. 20, 1898 RPC Records, Box 6 Folder 26A 
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 Prior to hiring the Olmsteds, Bouton employed George Kessler, who designed the 
oldest portion of Roland Park. Kessler's early career took him throughout the world and 
enmeshed him in networks that were changing the nature of the suburb in the 1890s. The 
German-born and –educated Kessler first brought his landscaping skills to New York 
after completing a grand tour of Europe. Once settled he sent various letters to the 
Olmsted firm to gain employment. Failing that, he managed to take commissions in 
Kansas, Michigan, and Missouri, where he likely first encountered Jarvis and Conklin. 
Jarvis and Conklin hired him to design Euclid Heights near Cleveland, Ohio and Roland 
Park.19 Kessler provides another early example of how the consultant replicated 
landscape across the United States just as developers began to define suburban places. He 
devised similar plans for Roland Park and Euclid Heights. Both centered on a golf club, 
used deed restrictions to maintain social and aesthetic control over the subdivision, and 
contained thematically named curving streets. 
 In the early 1890s, however, developers had barely begun to create "suburban" 
places. Consultants had not yet replicated their work nor had enough time passed for 
developers to establish good reputations. Kessler provides insight into how the very 
experts helping to define suburbs did not necessarily think of them as oppositional to 
urban places at first, even if the new developers did. Kessler himself did not talk about 
Roland Park using the term suburb. As he designed his portion of Roland Park in 1891 
and 1892 and corresponded with Bouton about the latter's vision for a "first class suburb" 
                                                        
19 William S. Worley, “Kansas City Architects George Kessler, Henry Wright, and Sid and Herbert Hare,” 
Kansas History Vol. 20 No. 3 (Autumn, 1997):196; Jarvis and Conklin to Bouton, May 30, 1891 RPC 
Records Box 2 Folder 26. Euclid Heights was eight miles south of and unrelated to the plaintiffs in the 
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Kessler approved and hoped "Roland Park would be built up into a great city."20 Kessler 
seemed to find the distinction between city and suburb unimportant in the early 1890s, 
when the Roland Park Company was just beginning to create a sales strategy around the 
urban/suburban dichotomy. 
 However, Roland Park was one of Kessler's first commissions for a developer. 
After designing Roland Park in 1891 he changed his methods for Euclid Heights to align 
with emerging trends. Whereas Kessler named Roland Park's streets after the company 
directors, including Grasty Avenue and Capron Avenue, for Euclid Heights he opted for a 
British and topographical names like Derbyshire Road, Edgehill Road, and Overlook 
Road.  Kessler adhered to the pattern for subsequent projects, including British-inspired 
names like "Braewick Road," reminiscent of the Olmsteds' "Braehurst," and landscape-
appropriate names like "Old Orchard Road," described in promotional literature as "very 
delightful as it curves through old orchards."21  
 Another consultant, Sanitary Engineer Colonel George Waring Jr. designed the 
Roland Park Company's sewer system. Like the Olmsteds, Waring had already 
established a reputation by the time Bouton contacted him. He first made a name for 
himself working on Central Park's drainage with Frederick Olmsted Sr., which he 
parlayed into a career as a consultant and author. He worked throughout Europe, 
including in Paris and The Hague, where he was made one of the five honorary members 
                                                        
20 George Kessler to Bouton, May 17, 1891 RPC Records, Box 1 Folder 24. 
21 "Brendonwood" Promotional Booklet, American Planning and Civic Association Records Collection 
#2777 Box 8, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University. 
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of the Royal Institute of Engineers of the Netherlands.22 Waring's European and 
American accolades secured him jobs on imperial projects.  
Both Waring and the Olmsteds moved between projects in the Caribbean. Waring 
selected camp sites for American troops during the Spanish American War and a wrote 
reports on sanitation conditions to help make Havana safer for incoming Americans. As 
one of Waring's colleagues put it, their job was to "make clean and wholesome a city 
which has so frequently transmitted yellow fever to our shores."23 The Olmsted Brothers 
too traveled to the Caribbean where they designed a gated community for white 
American expatriates, complete with features that would have fit in Roland Park: 
landscaped, curving streets and a private golf club.24 
 Waring and the Olmsteds did more than create the company's infrastructure; they 
also provided Bouton the crucial connections to create company deed restrictions. When 
the company was a year old, he wrote "a memorandum of points" for Bouton to "include, 
in proper legal phraseology, in [the] deeds."25  Two weeks later, he named several people 
for Bouton to write in order to receive "instructive" information about deed restrictions. 
They included a New Jersey mayor, the manager from the very affluent Tuxedo Park, 
New York, and a resident of Sudbrook Park, a contemporary Olmsted-planned 
development seven miles northwest of Roland Park where Waring thought at least one 
house "had recently been put on the market, with restrictions drawn up."26 Bouton 
                                                        
22 James H. Cassedy, "The Flamboyant Colonel Waring: An Anti-contagionist holds the American Stage in 
the Age of Pasteur and Koch," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 36 (1962):170. 
23 William J. Clark quoted in "Will Complete Waring's Report," The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Oct. 31, 1898: 
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24 Job #7032, Bermuda Development Company, Tucker's Town, Bermuda, The Master List of Design 
Projects. 
25 George Waring to Bouton, Jan 6, 1892. RPC Records Box 2 Folder 15. 
26 Waring to Bouton, Jan 18, 1892 RPC Records Box 2 Folder 15. 
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followed his advice. Had he not talked to Waring, Bouton may have ultimately gotten the 
terms of Roland Park Company deed restrictions from another source, but he turned to 
one of the country's leading sanitary engineers to learn about deed restrictions. Waring 
possessed his knowledge of restrictions because of the networks in which his work 
enmeshed him. Through working with developers and governments, seeing the 
interactions between American officials and Cuban locals, and working frequently in 
places where sanitation, poverty, and racial discrimination went hand and hand, Waring 
could not only endorse the use of deed restrictions for Roland Park, but actually cite 
people who could help the company. Through his work and his endorsement of deed 
restrictions Waring formed a physical link in the circuit of global segregation and one of 
its American forms: tying high property value to all-white planned suburbs. 
 The company informally disseminated them in the course of their daily 
correspondence, but it is often unclear how developers learned about the company.27 By 
the 1910s, developers and consultants requested restrictions because they had heard the 
company mentioned in talks or at conventions.28 The latter signified the importance of a 
concurrent phenomenon to be discussed in subsequent chapters: developers spread deed 
restrictions at a time when consultants and, indeed, developers themselves established 
associations as part of larger organized professionalization efforts. These networks 
formed traceable paths by which scholars can follow where deed restrictions originated 
and how they spread. Sometimes the examples proved especially concrete: famed planner 
                                                        
27 See, for example, Howard Turner to The Roland Park Company, Jun 5, 1907 and F.C. Todd to Bouton, 
March 31, 1913, RPC Records. 
28 George B. Ford to Bouton, Jul. 21, 1911 RPC Records Box 61 Folder 10. 
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and landscape architect John Nolen requested a copy of a Roland Park deed, crossed out 
the company's name in pencil and replaced "Maryland" with "Florida."29 
 When the company first began to use them, Bouton saw fit to explain what they 
were and ads assured that they would not be too onerous to property owners.30 Other 
developers also adopted an educational tone in their ads because they shared the 
company's view that restrictions were neither widely used nor was their efficacy widely 
understood. One Euclid Heights ad assured prospective buyers that "the restrictions are a 
great safe guard."31 By the 1910s, one prominent developer J.C. Nichols, a good friend of 
Edward Bouton, claimed he could not sell houses without restrictions.32 As with Roland 
Park restrictions, Nichols placed restrictions against “nuisances.” 
 Developers relied on transnational sources of knowledge to create their local 
spaces. Consultants travelled and collected information about public health and all 
aspects of development. The Roland Park Company collected pamphlets from Germany 
and Britain. American landscape architects collected work in from around the world. 
Their own publications, in turn, were translated into languages as varied as French and 
Japanese.33 As consultants, they introduced developers to planning ideas. Bouton took a 
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grand tour of Europe took a grand tour with planners and architects to gather, following 
the tradition of well off members of those professions in the late nineteenth century.34 
 Well-capitalized developers began to use consultants as shorthand to demonstrate 
the credentials of its suburbs, including that they were well-controlled healthy 
environments. Beginning in the late 1890s many developers from across the country 
began to include in their advertisements that professionals had worked on the project. 
Developers from locales as far-flung as New York, Oklahoma, and California, touted 
how they "wisely placed" their suburbs "in the hands of a Landscape Engineer."35 
Developers coupled promoting expertise with creating healthy spaces. One Oklahoma 
City developer released a pamphlet that advertised how it employed a landscape architect 
for its suburban "residence park" to transform valleys and streambeds into "things of 
beauty" rather than allow them to go untouched by an expert's hand and risk the site 
becoming full of "shanties and poor trash, where disease, filth, and crime exist…"36 To 
live in a place that experts had not designed, even if appealing at first, ran long-term 
hazard of undesirable and unhealthy neighbors. Developers legitimized professional 
consultants as integral to "suburban" development. 
 As they helped developers construct the suburban/urban dichotomy, consultants 
began to produce places that others sought to emulate. In the words of one historian, 
"Subdivisions that lacked comprehensive planning or the benefits of sophisticated 
landscape design borrowed the park-neighborhood rhetoric and spread the expectations of 
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park-neighborhood amenities and increased their cultural value"37 Developers of planned 
suburbs positioned themselves as taste-makers who marked a narrow vision of the 
"suburb." 
 
Black Bodies and Boundaries 
The Roland Park Company dealt with a recurring tension: their image of a suburb 
implied empty land but north Baltimore was anything but empty. Just as they tried to 
create the image of the "desirable neighbor" they depended on people already in the 
vicinity for labor—people who by and large would never fit that image. The Roland Park 
Company expanded its original holdings and opened Guilford, its second development in 
1913. Guilford provided opportunities for the company to hone the strategies it used for 
Roland Park. As a case in point, Bouton refined tactics he used in Roland Park to create 
and control Guilford's boundaries: he approved more durable physical boundaries, more 
stringent deed restrictions, and a better codified architectural review process involving a 
board of consultants. 
 Black and white people of various incomes already lived in the vicinity of Roland 
Park and Guilford and their presence remained constant between 1891 and 1913 and 
after. These spaces and their inhabitants complicated developers' attempts to create a 
dichotomy. On one hand, the presence of people near Roland Park and Guilford provided 
readily available labor. On the other Bouton tried to control blacks' visibility, movement, 
hygiene, and property to make good on the suburban promise that residents would have 
healthy, desirable neighbors. He condoned violence if necessary. 
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 Predating Roland Park by at least two decades and, by some accounts, as much as 
a century, a settlement of blacks and whites clustered along the bottom of the hill where 
Roland Park was being built. Called, alternately, Cross Keys or The Falls Road for its 
main street, it was home to at least thirty-three black households, though blacks were 
likely underrepresented in census enumeration since several houses clustered within a 
single lot up the hillside, without official streets leading to them.38 Cross Keys was one of 
a line of freeborn settlements extending north up the Jones Falls valley and the area often 
garnered mention in the Baltimore Afro-American's social pages.39 
 Since the company promised a racially homogeneous environment, it had to 
control the views from its lots. The company therefore opted not to have any houses face 
out toward Cold Spring Lane between Roland Avenue and Falls Road because they 
would have faced the property of a black woman.40 This was not an isolated decision for 
Bouton, just as the unnamed black woman was not on an isolated property. According to 
a lifelong black resident and property owner Aunt Lucy Hoes, two black-owned homes 
"marred the beauty of the prospective Park" and the Roland Park Company "moved 
[them] back bodily some distance from the property line of the Park with the permission 
of the owners."41  
 In Maryland in the 1890s, Bouton had few precedents on how to sell a suburb but 
in an era before standardized appraisals or even a long history of sorted, homogenous 
neighborhoods, he assumed uncontrolled views of blacks would lower property values. 
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He preemptively purchased property he deemed "eyesores" to "protect" the Roland Park 
Company "in all directions." 42  The end result, he reasoned, would "emphasize Guilford's 
isolation" and "preserve its integrity."43 Bouton made a decision that prefigured both the 
language and logic of mid-century use of eminent domain but also played to the very 
notion of "suburb" the company wanted to create: that a planned tract would be somehow 
disconnected and disembodied from urban disorder. Black people had no place as 
residents in an orderly, healthy, homogenous retreat from city life. It did not matter to the 
Roland Park Company whether Cross Keys residents lived there prior to its arrival. 
 Not all Cross Keys residents complied with the demands of white capital. The 
Olmsteds had recommended to Bouton that he purchase a "lot in the woods belonging to 
the heirs of a Negro."44 Those heirs were the family of Charles Moonier owned a small 
tract since 1808, ninety years before the Roland Park Company eyed it. The Mooniers 
refused to sell to the company. Bouton wrote them off as "unruly and discontent 
Negroes."45  With his description of the Mooniers as “unruly” Bouton attributed their 
behaviors using to the racial stereotype of black disorderliness, a term he never used to 
describe white people when talks when property transactions broke down.  
 After a year of negotiations, the Mooniers struck a deal in which the Roland Park 
Company paid them the same amount per square foot that it paid for the large white-
owned estate that formed the core of Roland Park.46 But one last matter remained. The 
plot contained the family graveyard. Bouton "gave them six months to remove the 
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bodies."47 Feeling "relieved" by the literal removal of black bodies from the "company's" 
land, Bouton told his British investors that it would "no longer be a sore spot in the midst 
of our holdings."48 
 The Roland Park Company erased black property owners to transform the land 
into a "suburban" place for whites. The company created stronger, more impermeable 
boundaries with each neighbor it encountered. No such border characterized Roland 
Park's boundary with Evergreen. Evergreen consisted of four streets of row houses from 
the 1870s composed of white Protestants. Roland Park's streets directly abutted those of 
Evergreen and the two shared common service alleys. When the Company expanded 
Roland Park, it built a long hedge on the western perimeter of its land, obscuring it from 
Cross Keys. The hedge also ensured people would only enter along one of two roads that 
ascended the hill.  
 For Guilford in 1913, that hedge that blocked Cross Keys became a stone wall 
separating it from Waverly and Govans to the east. A company employee called the wall 
"a barrier" separating the company's "expensive type of development" from nearby 
"commercial and row house construction."49 <Figure 2.2> Adding to the wall itself, the 
company lined Guilford's eastern border with relatively small, semi-connected homes that 
functioned as a de facto wall, completing the "barrier."  
 The company hardened its physical boundaries in conjunction with stricter deed 
restrictions in Guilford, signaling their ascendance by 1913 along with acceptance among 
developers that good "suburbs" were planned and controlled homogenous tracts. For 
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older Roland Park deeds, the company enumerated examples of prohibited non-
residential uses but lengthened the list for Guilford. For instance, residents of one Roland 
Park Company development could not operate a "brewery," "slaughterhouse," "asylum," 
or "jail." For Guilford, however, the list included "brewery," "distillery," or 
"malthouse."50 No surviving correspondence indicates that any lot buyer ever tried to 
build or operate any of these in company places. The list did, however, symbolically 
reinforce the distinction between city spaces and suburban spaces. As developers made 
restrictions more comprehensive, they expanded the very features that they thought 
effectively controlled "suburban" places—especially in how it excluded undesirable 
neighbors. 
 These businesses fell under the nuisance section, a portion of the deed restrictions 
that developers structured to portray suburbs as controlled and healthful and it was to this 
portion that The Roland Park Company made one of its biggest changes between the 
opening of Roland Park and Guilford. Nuisance became a buzz word for developers as 
well as for consultants. The concept ultimately formed a cornerstone in zoning debates 
during the late 1910s and 1920s. Before then, it could be found frequently in the literature 
of housing reformers as well as institutions like the American Planning and Civic 
Association.51 The company had wanted to insert a similar clause into the Roland Park 
deeds in the 1890s. Company lawyers had advised against it based on legal precedent of 
unencumbered transfer of property, also known as alienation, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But by 1913, conditions had changed.  Locally, the segregation ordinance 
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fight in full swing and upwardly mobile blacks continued to move north as well. The 
company also faced more local competition. For the Guilford deeds, the company 
inserted a racial restriction between clauses on livestock and smoke. The company 
singled "any negro [sic] or person of negro extraction" from "occupying" the land or any 
building except as "domestic servant or other person while employed in or about the 
premises."52 The exception for servants seemed to work against the company's image of 
undesirable neighbors, in which they portrayed blacks as dirty and diseased. It makes 
more, sense, however, when read in the same context as when Bouton bristled at the 
Moonier family for not acquiescing to the company's needs. Bouton only found black 
bodies, like black-owned property, detrimental when whites could not control them. 
Black employees fit within a racial order because white bosses could monitor them, 
control their visibility, and discipline them.53 
 When the company thought blacks broke that racial order, they called for 
violence. On a cold winter afternoon in 1908, "the fusillade of shots and wild sounds" 
rang out in Cross Keys as two men, with the blessing of the Roland Park Company, 
descended on Falls Road, guns drawn.54 They slaughtered every dog in sight as residents 
scrambled to hide any that escaped the initial round. The scant coverage that exists does 
not mention the many children of Cross Keys who likely witnessed the two white men 
killing their animals, but the "well-known businessman" and Roland Park's "special 
officer" had acted with a child in mind: a little boy in Roland Park who, the week before, 
                                                        
52 Deed Agreement and Restrictions for Guilford, RPC Records Box 265. 
53 Robin D.G. Kelley and Tera Hunter write extensively about white attempts to control black labor and the 
limits of that control. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1996), 35-54; Hunter, To 'Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women's Lives and 
Labors after the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 74-97. 
54 "Killed Every Dog in Town," Baltimore Sun, Feb. 9, 1908: 20, Marchant Jr. to H.P. Hynson, March 9, 
1908, RPC Records Box 32 Folder 25. 
67 
 
had been bitten by a dog and was now condemned to die from rabies.55 The little boy 
lived on the far western end of Roland Park, closest to Cross Keys, and company officials 
decided the dog must have originated down the hill. Once they took action, the company 
could be pleased that it policed its borders and controlled a health threat. 
 When the company sent people two restore order, they also affirmed the racial 
hierarchy on which they predicated suburban development. To fulfill their promise of a 
clean, safe, homogenous environment, developers had to maintain control over 
boundaries. When blacks threatened the company's boundaries by simply existing and 
moving in ways the company did not anticipate, the company expropriated their property 
and justified doing so with a perceived health threat, one that the company assumed 
originated with black people. It therefore made little difference that it was dogs rather 
than people that actually crossed the boundary into Roland Park; to the company fault 
clearly lay with black residents for allowing dogs in Cross Keys to get rabies and enter 
forbidden territory. Without whites to control the situation, the company's logic went, 
blacks clearly could not be left to control the dogs. 
 The Roland Park Company also tried to control another health threat it located 
down the hill at Cross Keys: mosquitoes. The company concerned itself with eliminating 
the swarms of mosquitoes that began "to descend on The Park every summer."56 The 
company sent white volunteers into Cross Keys to train "incredulous darkeys" how to 
eliminate standing water by using "mosquito-proof rain barrels," one volunteer described 
as creating "an impregnable barrier to the entrance of any self-reliant mosquito." One 
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volunteer, a Roland Park resident, happily described "Cross Keys has joined the march of 
progress" even though "it may have had improvement thrust upon it" thanks to "a largess 
from Roland Park." Roland Park could now look forward to a summer free from 
mosquitoes since the rain barrels were "prominent features in the Cross Keysan backyard 
landscape…"57 The company continued to blame Cross Keys residents for Roland Park's 
mosquito problem even though a year earlier they learned their state of the art sewage 
system was at fault.58  
 Dogs, mosquitoes, and black people—all "nuisances" to the company, reminded 
the developers about the permeability of their boundaries, which spurred developers to 
shore them up, be it Guilford's stone wall, more stringent deed restrictions, reordering 
Cross Keys, or disciplining its residents through education and, as with the case of the 
dogs, violence. Developers refined and consolidated tactics more than invent new ones: 
while it responded to a direct and local issue many places were waging fights against 
insects: Washington, D.C. health department initiated "The Washington Fly Crusade" 
while officials were "fighting flies in Cleveland"59 Baltimore's Women's Civic League 
had also spearheaded a "fly campaign" during the summer of 1911.60 The company 
retooled existing methods for mitigating health issues as a way to control its boundaries, 
much like they retooled preexisting advertising appeals to sell a narrow idea of the 
suburb. In both cases the company placed concerns about black bodies at the center of its 
efforts. 
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 The company remained part of the everyday lived experiences of residents of both 
Roland Park and Cross Keys: Roland Park residents flushed their waste but could not see 
the point where treated sewage emptied into the Jones Falls, right where Cross Keys 
residents swam in the summer. In fact, Roland Park sewage surrounded Cross Keys: one 
filtering field occupied a former Cross Keys picnic grove and the sewage disposal on the 
opposite bank of the river formed an "ugly marshy area" that Cross Keys adults warned 
children to stay away from.61 The Roland Park Company used coercive tactics (such as 
black property expropriation), as well as rationales from contemporary intellectual 
discourses (ideas about contagion and black bodies) to protect a large suburban land 
investment. 
 The Roland Park Company had another reason to give Cross Keys residents rain 
barrels: they facilitated the booming washing businesses along the hillside. Whereas 
black visibility and uncontrolled mobility within Roland Park drew the ire of the Roland 
Park Company, the company and residents depended on Cross Keys residents as a source 
of labor. In Cross Keys many black women took on washing and domestic work. Women 
also specialized as cooks. Cross Keys men had a wide range of outdoors work including 
working directly for the company in its stable (later a garage) as well as day laborers.  
 The Roland Park Company segregated its labor force. White men from nearby 
Evergreen served as firemen and policemen in addition to likely composing the majority 
of laborers to receive an hourly salary rather than day work. They also served as company 
superintendents. For residents in the older areas around Roland Park, the development 
also provided opportunities to conduct businesses, even competing with company labor. 
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The company paid men "from $1.75 to $2.25" for a nine-hour day of mowing lawns but, 
as Bouton told a resident during a bill dispute, "We have no doubt but that you can get 
the colored men around who cut lawns, to work for you at a less wage [sic] per hour."62  
The company assisted residents design or reconfigure homes to accommodate 
live-in servants who were often black women. Bouton was willing to use company labor 
to segregate the interiors, which included building additional bathrooms so that a white 
resident did not have to share one with his black servant (the resident emphasized the 
servant's race in the issue.)63 Over the years, the company drew its labor from a wider 
area, assisted by the expansion of the street car network and necessitated by its expanding 
operations. The affluent Roland Park ultimately introduced a new type of space to 
Baltimore, but its labor arrangements of white property owners, black servants and 
manual laborers echoed those of Reconstruction-era country estates and late-nineteenth 
century forms of labor regimes in white settler spaces. 
 The Roland Park Company extended its water and sewage to neighboring white 
areas and charged utility rentals.64 In doing so, however, they replicated race- and class-
based racial inequalities that contributed to the very urban unsanitary conditions depicted 
as "urban." in ads. The company never extended its infrastructure across York Road or to 
Cross Keys even though in the latter case Roland Park's sewage literally flowed through 
it. Hence the last reason for the Cross Keys rain barrels: Cross Keys had no running 
water, leaving residents to depend partially on rain or wells.  The company even mistook 
lack of sewage and running water for a "primitive simplicity," employing the same logic 
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as public health and racial degeneracy theorists who explained uneven development as a 
product of innate racial characteristics rather than through structural and political 
problems.65 
 Developers created boundaries and controlled older settlements in ways that both 
hardened and blurred the very dichotomy they tried to create. At the same time, 
developers began to shore up and harden boundaries by the 1910s because their tactics 
had successfully generated consumer demand over the preceding two decades. 
 
Restrictions and Advertising 
Developers changed both the definition of "suburban" as well as the frequency 
with which it was used. In the fifty years prior to 1890 "suburb" appeared 4,875 times in 
The Baltimore Sun but between 1890 and 1900 alone it appeared 6,551 times.66 Within 
the decade its use trended upwards. Appearances continued to increase rapidly, peaking 
for 1910-1920 and 1920-1930 before dropping off significantly during the Great 
Depression. The numbers correlate with the rise of the new development companies in 
the 1890s, which created and dominated a suburban housing market in the 1910s and 
1920s, before a major real estate market bust in 1926 and onset of the Depression. 
Numbers climbed again at the end of the Second World War.  
 Before 1890, "suburb" usually appeared in the plural and denoted little more than 
"periphery" in articles or classifieds. When the term was used in sales advertisements, it 
applied to almost any type of property on the outskirts of Baltimore, including farms for 
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sale.67  In the 1890s "suburb" increasingly denoted tract developments. The Sun created a 
"suburban" real estate section in 1886, but it remained relatively small compared to the 
"city" and "country" classifieds. In 1891 it was common to find less than ten ads, which 
invariably included "truck farms." If readers opened to the listings on April 30, two 
months before the Roland Park Company incorporated. On the same day in 1913, the 
year the Roland Park Company opened its second development, Guilford, they would 
find 114 ads in the same section.68 
 Developers changed their branding as "suburb" became more prominent. Just 
south of Baltimore City, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad had established Relay in the 
1830s as a "village." By the 1890s, agents in Relay placed ads in the Sun's suburban real 
estate section proclaiming it "the true ideal suburb with an established reputation" full of 
"beauty, progress, and worth."69 The "true" part may have been a direct response to the 
year-old Roland Park Company; of the four other ads in that day's suburban section, two 
mentioned Roland Park and one of those two was for an entirely different development. 
 Developers in the 1890s began to combine older selling points into a dichotomy 
in which they depicted a suburb (singular) as healthy, beautiful, homogenous, and safe. 
People had used these to advertise property prior to the 1890s, especially healthfulness 
and beauty. Even when that property was located in the suburbs (plural) before 1890 it 
was not necessarily defined in relation to its opposite, a disorderly, dirty, unsafe, or 
heterogeneous city. In ads from the 1850s and 1860s, for example, a typical classified 
listing might have highlighted acreage "in the northern suburbs of Baltimore" that was 
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"elevated and beautiful, affording a distinct view of the city and environs."70 In ads such 
as these, the seller related geographic position of center to periphery but did not explicitly 
define them as opposites. The Roland Park Company from the outset defined suburban 
qualities in relation to urban qualities. Roland Park was not just elevated, it one hundred 
and fifteen feet higher than the top of Baltimore's Washington Monument. <Figure 2.3>  
Other ads referred to pure air and pure water. In addition, summer resorts in Maryland 
and other states had long played on their pure water and healthfulness.71    
 Before a single lot was sold, the Company played up Roland Park's healthfulness 
by talking about urban disease. Pragmatically, potential buyers, most of whom lived in 
Baltimore, could more easily envision existing problems in the city than imagine a 
planned subdivision. The three most common features of Roland Park's advertising—air, 
water, and waste—all had potent sensory analogs: the smell of sewage in Baltimore's 
harbor, the soot from its factories, and rotting piles of garbage semi-hidden in its alleys. 
Even the thought of such smells inspired company financer Alfred Fryer in Britain, who 
recommended that someone write "a brief, pungent article solely on the subject of 
'Drainage'" to advertise Roland Park.72 Its sewage had "no unhealthful effect, such as 
comes from cesspools," the main waste storage method in Baltimore City. And its "pure 
water" would "never become contaminated," since the company owned the adjacent land 
and could keep the soil clean.73   
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The company had an advantage older lot builders often did not: it could employ a 
publicist. That publicist knew the local newspaper scene. Baltimore's popular press 
frequently printed topics about public health and kept tabs on the most prominent doctors 
affiliated with the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. In the best tradition of the yellow 
journalism so rampant at the turn of the century, he gladly exaggerated Baltimore's 
"urban" disorder, which he characterized by death from disease.74 In particular, he 
referenced typhoid, but he also alluded to debates about malaria and tuberculosis. 
 Developers were also uniquely positioned to exploit public health issues playing 
out in the public sphere by advertising they could build their own infrastructure. On one 
occasion the company publicist wanted to rush a particular ad into print to "make 
everybody thoroughly believe that there is some reliability in the reported dangers of 
typhoid fever and other troubles."75 He could also count on popular knowledge that 
typhoid proved especially lethal for children. Attempting to conjure a parent's worst 
nightmare, he considered adopting the theme of "sewers" and "deaths of children."76 He 
stressed urgency to ensure "the subject is fresh" so that he could most easily exploit fears 
of disorder, and loss.77 
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 The Roland Park Company did not, however, explicitly position itself in health 
debates nor did officials adopt a coherent view on how disease worked. Several 
competing theories about disease wove through popular health literature. Proponents of 
miasma (also known as anti-contagionists) remained well-respected in the 1890s, 
especially outside academic circles. Yet bacteriology or contagionism slowly gained 
traction. According to anti-contagionists, disease emanated from filth; according to 
contagionists, disease spread through people. Rather, the company appealed to both 
contagionist and anti-contagionist thought. With pure air, residents need not worry about 
sewer gases. With pure water, residents need not worry about any contamination. And 
with pure air, residents not need worry about sewer gases or germs. The publicist may 
have been exploiting recent events, but typhoid also happened to be the disease both 
contagionists and anti-contagionists often used to substantiate their position.  
 When black migrants and European immigrants arrived in Baltimore, they faced 
overcrowding, a housing shortage, and general absence of infrastructure in the few areas 
where they could live, often in alleys or over-crowded neighborhoods. Despite poor 
conditions these areas, white health officials interpreted “the general neglect of sanitary 
and other services in Baltimore's African American neighborhoods” as being due to the 
racial characteristics of residents.78 White experts in the nascent social science 
professions conducted survey after survey of living conditions in cities like Baltimore. 
They applied methods inconsistently to black and white subjects, biasing the results of 
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their studies, even when they identified similar conditions in non-black areas. These 
experts lent an air of authority to race-based explanations of disorder.79 Moreover, some 
white intellectuals used tuberculosis mortality data to conclude that blacks were naturally 
inferior. Social Darwinism and eugenics were at the height of their popularity. In certain 
iterations of those theories, mortality data signaled that the black race was unfit for 
survival and headed toward extinction. Conversely, some white intellectuals in Baltimore 
used disease rates as a warning against racial mixing since it would contaminate white 
blood and white property.80 As was often the case, they drew conclusions ignored their 
own data: in Baltimore tuberculosis mortality rates among blacks actually declined in the 
1890s.81 
 Developers created more than a dichotomy of spaces. They also attached the same 
connotations to people along racial and class lines. The Roland Park Company developed 
a euphemism it often employed in its ads—the undesirable neighbor. It linked the 
undesirable neighbor to disease and dirt. "In buying a home," it advertised, "a location 
should be chosen which is protected from unhealthful surroundings and undesirable 
neighbors."82 The company labeled as undesirable neighbors anyone who made the 
company's target demographic of upwardly mobile middle- and upper middle class 
whites uncomfortable about living in a heterogeneous environment: immigrants or poor 
people of any origin who flocked to Baltimore in the 1890s in search for jobs. More 
often, however, the company used it to refer to blacks of any socio-economic status. 
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 The Roland Park Company could assume that their target demographic 
understood to whom "undesirable neighbor" referred and that prospective residents 
shared knowledge of Baltimore's dynamic social geography. The prospective white 
Protestant buyers who read company ads in Baltimore likely knew Baltimore's social 
geography. They also knew that affluent blacks moved northwest to find new homes. 
Likewise, many European immigrants moved northeast and northwest, while second 
generation Jews generally moved westward to gain distance from incoming Eastern 
European Jewish immigrants. Native-born, white affluent Protestants already tended to 
adhere to Baltimore’s north-central corridors. The company leaped ahead of Baltimore's 
growth in this general direction. 
 Though the Roland Park Company left the “undesirable neighbor” to the 
imagination of prospective buyers, it shaped its advertising and restrictions specifically in 
response to Baltimore’s growing black population. Between 1880 and 1900 Baltimore's 
black population grew 47% from 54,000 to 79,000.83 In 1910, black attorney W. Ashbie 
Hawkins moved into one of Baltimore's most prestigious white Protestant rowhouse 
neighborhoods. A group of residents and their friends initiated a fight to codify 
residential segregation into law, arguing about the dangers of “racial degeneracy” and 
that black bodies, which they claimed were inherently more prone to disease, posed risks 
to white society and the public good.84 In response, Baltimore City passed the country’s 
first city-wide segregation ordinance.  The ordinance imposed a one-hundred-dollar fine 
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and up to a year of jail time for anyone who sold or rented housing to blacks on a street 
more than fifty percent white. 
As the segregation ordinance fight waged on, the company adapted an ad that a 
former company employee sent in. The ad featured a large picture of row house 
backyards with the caption "Photo of rear of houses on Bolton Street, renting for $35.00, 
with its unsightly fences and weeds. It is a breeding place for cats, rats, and vermin of all 
kind."85 <Figure 2.4> On the surface, the ad looked like yet another contrast between a 
dirty urban and a pristine suburban environment. The relatively cheap rent in the ad also 
constituted an appeal to class homogeneity. Bolton St, however, lay three blocks from the 
neighborhood of segregation ordinance fight and five blocks from Biddle Alley, the area 
with the highest incidence of tuberculosis death among blacks in Baltimore. 
 The Roland Park Company to have been among the first to use development-wide 
deed restrictions though Bouton drew from older sources.86 Developers use restrictions as 
tools to "enhance the beauty" of their developments. Predating zoning, they inserted land 
use controls into each restriction that prohibited all but residential uses. They could 
ensure a completely controlled space because they also controlled the layout and design 
approval. Deeds contained clauses that fulfilled both aesthetic and social functions. 
Restrictions on the minimum housing cost, for example, foreclosed on certain materials 
and stylistic decisions buyers had when building their house, but the clause also worked 
as a type of class exclusion. The company raised its minimum house costs and setback 
requirements for Guilford. Additionally, the company emphasized public health value of 
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"restricted" land. Restricted land stood in contrast to urban land, which went unrestricted 
and created a risk for health hazards and undesirable neighbors. 
 As much as developers changed the definition of "suburb" to connote a specific 
type of exclusive place, alternative uses arose or evolved from different sources. 
Beginning in 1888, Baltimore City classified all land as "rural," "urban," and "suburban" 
for tax purposes. The city determined rates by a block's "superficial square footage", how 
many of a block's adjacent streets were paved "curb to curb," the legal status of those 
streets and who controlled street lighting.87 Tax policy affected the time scale of 
developers' design decisions in ways that older piecemeal lot builders did not have to 
contend with since they turned over land quickly. Because the new development 
companies held on to land longer, they sometimes delayed paving streets or avoided 
small blocks in order to remain in the rural tax rate for as long as possible.88 While 
Baltimore County had lower taxes than Baltimore City, property owners paid higher 
insurance rates because the county did not provide comparable fire or police services.89 
The Roland Park Company made decisions based on legal conceptions of the suburb as it 
sold the urban/suburban dichotomy. The Roland Park Company initially developed its 
tract entirely in Baltimore County. By 1910 it expanded south into Baltimore City, 
creating confusion among residents about tax structure and who would provide essential 
services. The aesthetic and social image of the suburb that the company created allowed 
it to downplay the importance of the political boundary. 
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 Developers, nevertheless, never fully controlled the definition of the border 
between city and suburb. They sometimes faced unexpected challenges to their own 
concepts of urban versus suburban places. Roland Park Company President Edward 
Bouton expressed repeated frustration with telephone companies whose directories 
classified Roland Park as "suburban" since people had trouble finding residents' names 
and the company's contact information. According to Bouton, the issue became particular 
troublesome when "out-of-towners" and "business men" needed to make "a hurried call." 
Worse, still, the division seemed arbitrary with some suburbs being listed in the "regular" 
section.90 That both planned suburbs and telephones were new to Baltimore at the turn of 
the century likely did not help directory makers or people trying to use them. The 
dichotomy did not eliminate the importance to Bouton of retaining certain connections to 
the city, especially in terms of enabling new residents to conveniently continue business, 
civic, and social routines. With its distance to the central business district and spatial 
forms unfamiliar to Baltimoreans, Bouton needed to promote Roland Park as a 
convenient place to live. 
 
Conclusion 
Developers made it possible, in the words of a Roland Park Company ad, "for 
everyone who dreads the danger of diseases that are produced by lack of sewers, to 
escape the dangers and live where perfect sanitation guarantees freedom from them."91 
But when most developers said "everyone," they actually meant "a select few." And as 
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they sold more houses to affluent whites, the black "undesirable neighbors" had fewer 
and fewer options for where to live. As the ad indicates, white suburban residents gained 
their "freedom" from environmental and social dangers, it also seemed like they fulfilled 
a natural sorting out of space since they simply had earned the status Roland Park 
bestowed on them. After all, as one reporter wrote later, only "the more fastidious" 
among the population had "ideal homes" in Roland Park Company developments.92  
 Consequently, as more people, especially white government officials and public 
health experts, took the dichotomy for granted, developers rendered the very structural 
constraints they created as natural. And those structural constraints included the informal 
networks of power developers easily accessed through the very spaces and institutions 
they founded. In the ensuing decades, municipal zoning and federal housing policy would 
center on the urban/suburban dichotomy. Lending and credit policies would also be 
structured around it, in no small part because real estate appraisers would standardize 
assessment practices around it, trying to keep "urban" pathologies out of their "suburban" 
places. 
 But as developers created a dichotomy of city and suburb, they also blurred the 
line between city planning and suburban development, with long-lasting consequences. In 
fact, the Roland Park Company had already begun to avail itself of Baltimore City's 
resources, even while it continued to depict the city as somewhere from which to escape. 
                                                        




Pipelines and Power 
 
 "I hope," Edward Bouton wrote, "that there will not be any objections from the 
authorities here, to our conducting our sewage into Jones's Falls. Insomuch as down in 
the City the river is used as an open sewer, they ought not to object to our doing it to the 
limited extent that our needs will demand." They may object, Bouton noted, "and in that 
event it will be necessary for us to adopt some means of purifying our sewage until such 
a time as the sewerage system of the City shall extend far enough North for us to connect 
with it."1 Bouton's 1891 letter to British investor Alfred Fryer foreshadowed the Roland 
Park Company's relationship with Baltimore City authorities before they built a single 
house. Rather than inquire about dumping untreated sewage into the Jones Falls—
historically the city's drinking water supply—Bouton decided to dump Roland Park's 
sewage into it. Yet, at the same time he anticipated that one day Roland Park would use 
city services like sewage disposal. In fact, before the Roland Park Company could finally 
connect with Baltimore City's sewage system, Baltimore City first had to build one. 
  Baltimore City's poor sanitation benefited the Roland Park Company's sales and 
proved a source of ongoing embarrassment for the municipal government. Municipal 
boosters struggled to paint the city as a site of investment and opportunity in spite of 
press coverage of stench, disease as well as a lack of basic sanitary infrastructure. 
Throughout the late nineteenth century the municipal government began and halted two 
attempts to create systematic provisions for the nation's sixth largest city. It was only 
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after a major fire 1904, that it could begin the sewerage system it eventually saw through 
to completion.2 
 As developers like the Roland Park Company became more established after the 
early 1900s, they worked closely with local governments to ensure that their subdivisions 
received municipal resources such as sanitation and water, before other areas, even those 
that urgently in need. While the Roland Park Company tried to reify the urban/suburban 
dichotomy, it also used city services to expand its suburb. 
 By 1905, the company had expanded south into the portion of Baltimore City 
annexed in 1888. Once there, it began to reshape the local political economy to benefit 
the large residential tract developments it created. In order to track these changes, this 
chapter focuses on how the Roland Park Company convinced the Baltimore City 
Sewerage Commission to change its master plan to prioritize Roland Park houses. The 
Sewerage Commission had been designed to first serve areas most in need and did not 
count Roland Park as an urgent priority. What brought them to the negotiating table often 
revolved around the daily needs of building, maintaining, and operating infrastructure. 
 In this messy technical and managerial side of development one can recover how 
developers built power by shaping narratives.3 In David Freund's words, "Negotiating the 
nuts and bolts of city building became foundational for the stories told by developers and 
public officials to justify practices that destroyed neighborhoods, built new ones, and set 
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the exclusionary boundaries that police their use."4 In the case of Baltimore, the Roland 
Park Company built a relationship with city agencies that shaped a political narrative 
about expertise in government. 
 This chapter continues to examine the discursive and material construction of 
suburbia but does so from the perspective of political economy and resource distribution.5 
As the company tried to construct a dichotomy of urban and suburban places it also 
played an active role in exacerbating the "unhealthy" conditions it associated with 
"urban" places as opposed to its "suburban" district. As the Roland Park Company helped 
deprive people in Downtown Baltimore of a sewer system it continued to build and 
market itself to potential buyers as an escape from disease-ridden water and 
overwhelming stench of Baltimore City.   
 Scholars have long acknowledged how infrastructure that benefits one area may 
raise problems elsewhere. In his landmark Killing for Coal: America's Deadliest Labor 
War Thomas Andrews highlights another example how the infrastructure of planned 
developments contributed to downtowns seeming increasingly dirty, crowded, and 
cluttered. Andrews observed that the very streetcar lines that allowed citizens to 
commute, all led back to the downtown generating stations and powerhouses responsible 
for at least some of the smoke and sort so many wealthy and middle-class folks were 
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Conference of the Urban History Association, October 11, 2014. 
5 As with historiography of suburbs, historiography of uneven development must better look at the 
formation of the urban/suburban dichotomy in history. One recurring issue is that scholars treat suburbs as 
either placed to be incorporated or annexed or as independent municipalities. The power of the dichotomy 
lies, in part, in its cultural and economic power to sort areas into homogeneous tracts and either stigmatize 
excluded people or raise the status of residents. For an example of suburbs treated mainly in the context of 
annexation or incorporation, see Richardson Dilworth, The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.) 
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moving to the suburbs to avoid."6 The Roland Park Company had little incentive to keep 
its sewage out of the Jones Falls. A toxic Jones Falls downstream from Roland Park 
benefit Roland Park's reputation as a sanitary safe-haven from the public health problems 
that plagued downtown Baltimore, where the Jones Falls emptied into the harbor. 
 The ways the Roland Park Company and government officials worked out 
resource provisions provides insight into political power, but it also highlights the limits 
of experts to shape cities in rational ways, especially when resource equity fleetingly 
formed part of that municipal vision.7 In their ad hoc negotiations the city and the 
company worked out solutions on issues each faced for the first time, setting future 
patterns of policy-making. Historian Martin Melosi notes that the "outward growth of 
cities also exposed inequities in the delivery of services through a citywide system."8 
Scholars in history, geography, and political science have measured uneven distribution 
of resources, though fewer draw attention to how "unjust procedures can be as harmful 
and unjust as uneven distributions." of amenities across metropolitan areas.9  
 At the turn of the century, the new residential development firms like the Roland 
Park gained an advantage as city bureaucracies grew and changed. To access government 
resources, the company combined the older haphazard city petitioner process with the 
knowledge and resources that came from developing similar infrastructure to that of the 
city. They owned a large tract of land and petitioned city agencies as property owners, 
                                                        
6 Thomas Andrews, Killing for Coal: American's Dirtiest Labor War, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 68. 
7 I take a broad definition of equity to mean "fairness of distribution," as per Boone, Buckley, Grove, and 
Sister, "Parks and People: An Environmental Justice Inquiry in Baltimore, Maryland," Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers vol 99 no 4 (2009):769. 
8 Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the Present 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000):161. 
9 Boone, Buckley, Grove, and Sister, 770. 
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much like Baltimoreans had done through the nineteenth century. Unlike those property 
owners, the company had far more money, labor, and political capital at its disposal, 
which skewed the process in its favor. Here shifting scales, from individual property 
owners to wealthy development companies, altered not only resource allocation but also 
citizen relationships with the very machinery of urban governance. 
 By virtue of its planning activities and professional consultants, the Roland Park 
Company could also give city agencies knowledge and supplies. It shared personnel 
including Chief Engineer of the Baltimore Sewerage Commission Calvin Hendrick. And 
yet there was no talk of potential conflict of interest in surviving records. Much scholarly 
work has already been done on the history of urban planning and the exchanges of ideas 
between professional planners, including those who worked for municipal governments 
in the early twentieth century. Yet they tend to focus on national organizations and 
national exchange between white professionals about planning principles such as the City 
Beautiful Movement or housing reform movements. Existing historiography does not 
account for the implications of how municipal governments and development companies 
employed the same people who shared close professional relationships in the early 
twentieth century.10   
 
Standardization, Growth, and Boosterism: Crafting Political Narratives 
Baltimore's civic boosters in City Hall measured Baltimore's growth by how well 
the city could attract capital and retain competitive advantage both regionally and 
nationally. Baltimore was increasingly integrated into the international economy in an 
                                                        
10 This link is missing from such key works as Jon Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in 
America, 1870-1900 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.)  
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age dominated by the rise of corporate capitalism.11 This integration occurred across 
many sectors, including finance and manufacturing. On average the number of employees 
per firm increased from twelve to twenty-two between 1880 and 1900. It also 
experienced a six-fold increase in capital investment, which came from all over the 
world. The Chamber of Commerce and touted these facts and translated them into poems 
and songs. <Figure 3.1> One such poem assigned every letter of "Baltimore" a positive 
attribute. These included "Banks and Trust Companies" for B and "Low Freight Rate" for 
L.12 The poem formed a textual example of what one scholar has called "The city-growth 
game"13 to characterize inter-municipal competition for capital. 
 Baltimore City government occupied a prominent place in booster literature. The 
same acrostic poem overlaid an image of ionic columns supporting the phrase "Every 
letter has a meaning" inscribed in stone. Supporting the pillars are City Hall and the 
Custom House on the left and the smoke from factory smokestacks on the right. Boosters 
depicted Baltimore City's very foundations as government, commerce, and industry. They 
sent the message that the government needed to support pro-growth policies because 
without backing, Baltimore could not attract capital as well as its competitors. 
 Mayor Barry Mahool established a department to attract commercial capital called 
the Municipal Factory Site Commission in 1910. <Figure 3.2> The commission served 
as a clearinghouse for information about industrial real estate provided without charge. 
City Hall promoted the commission the first stop for potential investors "who want to 
know anything about the business possibilities of Baltimore." The commission would 
                                                        
11 Euchner, 272. All figures in this paragraph are also from here. 
12 The Municipal Journal vol.1 no 14, July 4, 1913. 
13Lee M.A. Simpson, Selling the City: Gender, Class, and the California Growth Machine 1880-1940, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 6. 
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also link investors to "the City's financial interests."14 The commission was composed of 
members from building and real estate trade associations, railroads, and the 
representative from the Baltimore Federation of Labor.15 
 Members of the commission looked toward Baltimore's competition for models of 
how to attract capital. Its promotional campaigns took an urgent tone stressing that the 
city was losing its edge to "Pittsburgh and a number of lesser Pennsylvania cities."16 
Writing to the Roland Park Company the commission asked, "Do you know why some 
cities capture new factories while Baltimore does not?"17 It ended its letter with a 
fundraising appeal on the "Pittsburgh model," a cash fund the commissioners could 
utilize to secure the "development of new factories."18 It gave examples of potential ways 
commissioners could use the fund. They might, for instance, loan an enterprise "working 
capital" or it could pay relocation expenses for a factory.19 For civic boosters even the 
models themselves became a source of competition. Baltimore needed to offer the best 
inducements for business, even if that included direct cash transfers to businesses. No 
matter how numerous Baltimore's advantages over Pittsburgh, the Municipal Factory Site 
Commission impressed upon the Roland Park Company that Baltimore had to have better 
government-backed methods for attracting businesses than competing cities.  
 The commissioners expected the Roland Park Company to help the city attract 
capital, even though Roland Park was primarily situated in Baltimore County. In general, 
                                                        
14 Wilbur Franklin Coyle, The Baltimore Book: A Resume of Commercial, Industrial, and Financial 
Resources, Municipal Activities and General Development of the City of Baltimore (Baltimore: Summers 
Printing, 1912), 23. 
15 Ibid. 
16 A.S. Goldsborough to Bouton, Nov., 24 1911, The Roland Park Company Records MS504 Box 60 
Folder 1, Special Collections Sheridan Libraries, Johns Hopkins University. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Goldsborough to Bouton, 24 Nov., 1911, RPC Records Box 60 Folder 1. 
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real estate developers were one of many "business interests" that had a stake in continued 
investment in Baltimore. The Commission framed the fund as an investment that would 
"yield a profit for every dollar" the Roland Park Company put in.20 Boosters from city 
hall, including the poem's writers sought to promote property investment to further 
economic growth. In the Baltimore acrostic poem, the "r" of Baltimore spelled out "Real 
Estate Cheap."21  
 The Roland Park Company also served an additional purpose for boosters from 
which it also benefitted: when Baltimore attracted new industry, white managers could 
live in Roland Park. The commission's secretary directed "possible out-of-town settlers" 
to Roland Park when they inquired about Baltimore's "best suburban property for 
residential sections."22 To facilitate the inquiry, Bouton sent the commission copies of 
Roland Park maps showing available lots. He made no distinction between the available 
property in the city and county portions of Roland Park. The Roland Park Company 
created residential areas that Baltimore City showcased. By considering the Roland Park 
the "best" upscale development Baltimore had to offer he made it clear that the city and 
Roland Park needed each other to market themselves as desirable.  
 Roland Park Company officials gained from the growth coalition's efforts in 
several ways, even when not directly involved in campaigns. As the size and quantity of 
Baltimore's business grew, the Roland Park Company could court middle and upper 
managers to its houses and expand its operations. Bouton scanned newspapers to learn 
about businesses relocated to Baltimore. He would then pen letters to court their upper 
                                                        
20 Ibid. 
21 The Municipal Journal vol 1 no 14, July 4, 1913: 3. 
22 Goldsborough to Bouton, Dec. 12, 1911, RPC Records Box 60 Folder 1. 
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management. Upon learning that the Citizens Fire Insurance Company would be leaving 
West Virginia for Maryland, he wrote to the firm's secretary R.W. Alexander, "Our 
development represents the best there is in suburban development in this country, and our 
prices are conservative when considering the class of property which we offer."23  By 
1910, census takers recorded white collar workers in abundance. A two block area 
included a grain exporter, factory sales agent, an auditor, two manufacturers, and a 
merchant. Each of these households also contained a black female live-in cook or maid, 
wives who did not work, and children.24  Bouton's strategy panned out; Roland Park's 
men worked in sectors that Baltimore boosters recruited while demographic profiles fit 
into the homogenous development the Roland Park Company wanted to create. 
 Both the city and the Roland Park Company tied visions of spatial expansion to 
Baltimore City's ability to attract capital. Baltimore itself would grow north, northwest, 
and northeast with affluent white Protestant Baltimoreans moving north toward Roland 
Park. If those areas indeed became built up, the company advertised, it would "guarantee 
a rapid advance of values in the whole country bordering on Roland Avenue"25 City 
growth would raise Roland Park's property values. Simultaneously the company 
expanded south into Baltimore City to meet the northward growth. It extended Roland 
Park and opened Guilford south of its original holdings. It was for these areas that Bouton 
hoped to tap municipal resources. 
 Boosters faced a problem that the Roland Park Company did not at the turn of the 
century: the Baltimore City lacked a sewage system. By 1900 Baltimore was America's 
                                                        
23 Bouton to Alexander Nov 9. 1911 RPC Records. 
24 United States Manuscript Census 1910 Series T624 Roll 551 Page 80. 
25 Copy of advertisement in RPC papers. Date prior to 1905. 
91 
 
largest city without comprehensive sanitation. Its population had grown from about 
332,000 in 1880 to over half a million.26 Since all other major cities had a sewer system, 
Baltimore faced a considerable competitive disadvantage. As factories grew they required 
more piped-in water which, as a result, produced industrial waste. Even City Hall itself 
dumped its untreated waste directly into the Jones Falls. 
 Meanwhile the large infrastructure projects the city did complete exacerbated the 
problem of not having a sewer system. An expansion of the water supply had increased 
the availability of indoor plumbing, especially in the homes of the white managerial class 
boosters tried to attract to the city. Water usage skyrocketed but that dirty water from 
houses and businesses often had nowhere to flow but into gutters and waterways. 
Baltimoreans also relied on cesspools, but they became more difficult to construct and 
maintain as land values soared, population density increased.27 
 The Roland Park Company benefitted from city booster campaigns but, as seen in 
the last chapter, greatly exploited Baltimore's lack of sewer system to depict the city as 
unsafe and unhealthy. The company could thus gain prospective homebuyers from 
outside Baltimore with the help of city booster campaigns while at the same time attract 
clientele with the pull factor of having a sewage system. 
 Baltimore City would finally vote on a sewage referendum after years of shifting 
political alliances and battles between city and state legislators. It took the 1904 fire that 
leveled Baltimore's downtown business district to finally create the political unity 
necessary to bring the issue to the ballot. The state allowed the city to put a ten-million-
dollar bond issue to vote. In the lead up to the election referendum proponents argued that 
                                                        
26 Bureau of the U.S. Census tables 11 and 13. 
27 These and additional problems of pre-sewage system Baltimore in Euchner, 273. 
92 
 
Baltimore needed the sewer system to remain competitive with other cities. They 
included some of Maryland's most prominent politicians such as Democratic Senator 
Isador Raynor who maintained that if "these loans are rejected we cut loose from every 
progressive city in the Union and proclaim not only to our own people, but to every 
stranger who visits our gates and has business interests in our midst…that we do not 
propose to take a single step that will improve our environment or promote our 
success."28 Raynor adopted an urgent tone similar to the boosters of the Municipal 
Factory Site Commission: Baltimore could not pass up any opportunity to remain 
competitive with other cities. Baltimore needed its citizens to correct one of its chief 
competitive disadvantages so that it could grow and attract capital. If they failed to do so, 
Raynor insisted, Baltimore's reputation would also suffer, in itself creating another 
obstacle to attracting capital. 
 The referendum passed with 60% of the vote.29 It allowed the city to issue ten 
million dollars in bonds, with repayment over seventy five years, with heaviest payments 





State Capacity and Developer Resources 
The Sewerage Commission began its life auspiciously just as the Roland Park 
Company began expanding south from Baltimore County into Baltimore City. With sixty 
                                                        
28 Baltimore Sun, Apr. 1, 1905 quoted in Euchner, 270. 
29 The final tally was 37,111 votes in favor to 25,253 against. Euchner, 270. 
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acres of downtown property destroyed, a clean slate now existed to coordinate city 
planning efforts, rebuilding, and any new infrastructure. A construction boom followed 
the fire and higher property assessments from a rebuilding downtown gave supporters 
confidence that the city could repay its debt and the seventy-five-year payment schedule 
also distributed the burden over the long term.30 
 The Commission was composed of businessmen and sanitary professionals, the 
mayor acting as member ex officio. The Chief Engineer Calvin Hendrick oversaw daily 
operations and helped draft preliminary plans for the system. As its first act the 
commissioners appointed a board of engineers to lend their expertise to developing 
Baltimore City's sewage system. It consisted of some of the most prominent sanitary 
experts from around United States. They included Rudolph Hering, who had helped 
reverse the Chicago River. It was no coincidence that the Sewerage Commission 
depended on the expertise of professional engineers. Such experts played key roles 
developing publicly owned and operated services.31 By the early twentieth century 
engineers in particular formed the core of professional bureaucracies in cities completing 
large public works projects and their ranks continued to grow.32 
 Despite a promising start buoyed by the referendum's large margin of victory, the 
Sewerage Commission quickly encountered obstacles. Shortly after forming in 1905, 
members had trouble even finding the old records of the previous unsuccessful sewerage 
commissions of the late nineteenth century, including "technical books," soil samples that 
had been collected "at considerable expense" and detailed maps.33 The commission 
                                                        
30 Boone, "Obstacles," 164 and Euchner, 286. 
31 Boone, 154 
32 Teaford, 134. 
33 Annual Report of the Sewerage Commission, 1905, 10-11. 
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believed the items would save it a great deal of time and money. In its first annual report 
to the mayor, members detailed their "special efforts" to find the missing materials that 
had them searching all over "the vaults of City Hall." They found some "badly mildewed 
books,"34 but not the soil samples. The incident marked the first of many delays the 
commission faced due to missing, incomplete, or inaccurate records available to them.  
  The Sewerage Commission also faced coordination issues that came with 
Baltimore City government's attempts to develop a professional bureaucracy during the 
turn of the century. Only seven years before the Sewerage Commissioners went searching 
for the old missing soil samples, a new charter reorganized its departments along 
functional lines with bureaucrats in prominent positions rather than politicians. At the 
same time, the mayor also gained more power over the City Council. The new charter 
shifted power away from the local democratic machine, which had suffered electoral 
defeats in 1895 and gave new institutionalized advantages to the city's wealthy citizens, 
as was often the case during Progressive-Era reforms.35 In fact, the wealthiest sections of 
the city most strongly supported the sewage loan referendum.36 
 The new bureaucrats tried to standardize and rationalize government procedures 
while defining the roles for their agencies. However, they faced a longer history of 
uneven state capacity across various departments, which can be tracked from surviving 
petitions for city services. Early petitions tended to be handwritten, such as one from 
1858 that consisted of a hand-written note asking permission to construct "a sewer on 
                                                        
34 Ibid. 
35 Many scholars have recognized how Progressive-Era politics was often less about reform than about 
shoring up class and race status. Among the earliest were Robert Wiebe with The Search for Order, 1877-
1920, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.) 
36 Euchner, 280. 
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Frederick Street, which will not inconvenience the use of that street."37 By 1870, some 
departments had printed generic petition forms. Those forms were rarely filled out 
without crossing out printed words and hand-writing in alternatives. Petitioners seemed 
particular dissatisfied with the one verb available to them in the sentence "Permission is 
hereby requested to construct…" Petitioners crossed out "construct" and substituted 
alternatives such as "enlarge," "reconstruct," and "suspend [a sign]."38 The same year 
certain departments used standard printed letterheads as well as generic sentences to 
respond to petitions, but those answers were entirely handwritten. The shift to standard, 
printed forms occurred earlier in other parts of city government. Some departments had 
employed standard printed forms since at least the 1850s with only rare instances of 
words being crossed out. Administrative capacity expanded unevenly across a city 
government in a fragmented structure prior to the 1898 charter. Those problems did not 
disappear with the consolidation of power under the mayor and a professional 
bureaucracy. Instead, newer bureaucrats had to adjust their ideas of rational and 
efficiently run departments to actual circumstances. 
 With the building of the sewer system in 1905 and the large government 
expansion and reorganization of the 1890s, the heads of city departments found 
themselves facing new conflicts and mandates to coordinate. From the outset, the 
Sewerage Commission had to work with other city agencies and a variety of additional 
actors to plan the sewage system. They Commission was tasked with the duty to "tap 
every house in the City" which necessitated "the laying of sewers in nearly every street or 
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alley."39 Under those streets and alleys lay a tangle of existing pipes and wires. Within its 
first year, the commission had to work with the "City Engineer, Water, Electrical, 
Harbor, Lighting and Street Cleaning Departments, with many public and private sewers 
and drains and with all property holders."40 Many of these were either newly-formed or 
reorganized since the 1898 charter. And that list did not even include "every public-
service corporation and City Department such as street railway, gas, electric light, steam 
heating, telephone, and steam railroad companies."41 The Sewerage Commission had to 
figure out how to coordinate with these agencies, but often met with frustration and 
further delays.  
 Hendrick found his attempts to create a scientifically-informed rational master 
plan for the sewage system repeatedly stymied by other agencies, including the ones he 
named. Rare was a report from Hendrick when he did not use the phrase "considerable 
expense." On one occasion he wrote that in seeking information from various city 
departments "we have found the records very incomplete. In many cases on opening up a 
street we find the actual conditions at variance with the record plans, which have caused 
us considerable expense in changing our construction."42 So frequently did Hendrick 
receive inaccurate information from other departments that he prefaced the commission's 
work with a disclaimer that "This information is gathered from various City Departments 
and corporations and placed on our contract drawings, with a note that we are in no way 
responsible for its accuracy."43  
                                                        
39 Annual Report of the Sewerage Commission, 1907, 10. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 




  Conflicts took an adversarial approach as they tried to carve out departmental 
autonomy while coordinating work. The Sewerage Commission and the City Engineer's 
Office often butted heads over how to divide the daily costs they incurred. The latter 
oversaw street paving as part of the 1898 municipal reorganization. It therefore dug 
trenches and repaved streets after the Sewerage Commission laid drains. In 1908 City 
Engineer B.T. Fendall made the case in a letter to Mayor Barry Mahool that his 
department was not responsible for payments when repaving at the Sewerage 
Commission's request. Fendall complained to Mayor Barry Mahool that his department 
was "having an interminable amount of trouble"44 He argued that the Sewerage 
Commission needed to bear a greater responsibility for the costs incurred. "So far this 
year," he wrote, "we have spent $15000 in repaving and readjusting intersections" 
because the Sewerage Commission needed to lay drains. In Fendall's opinion, the money 
was "properly chargeable to the construction of sewers and not chargeable to the Repairs 
of Roads and Streets as it has been charged."45 
 While Hendrick continued to write anxiously about losing precious time to 
departmental coordination issues, the Sewerage Commission and the City Engineer's 
office held a series of meetings mediated by Mahool, to work out who held responsibility 
for the disputed bills. At the meetings all parties tried to work out the intricacies of which 
actions fell to which department. Some issues under consideration touched on technical 
issues: Was the pavement used improved pavement? Was the sewer laid in advance of 
improved pavement or after it had already been decided to pave that area? Was the area 
                                                        
44 B.T. Fendall to Mayor Barry Mahool, Jul 20, 1908 BCA BRG 9-14-14. 
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an intersection with a storm drain? When was that drain built?46 The Sewerage 
Commission appointed a committee to resolve conflicts with other agencies. According 
to a committee member's report on the meetings with Fendall and Mahool, everyone 
agreed on five points that would dictate who incurred paving costs in the future "after a 
thorough discussion."47 Under those conditions the Sewerage Commission would pay the 
disputed bills. The minutia of street paving became the grist by which municipal actors 
worked out the mechanisms of governance. Hanging in the balance of a question about 
whether paving was improved was the larger issue: the ways in which the new city 
agencies worked out how to coordinate with one another would determine of how the city 
distributed and paid for public goods.  
 The episode was neither the first nor last time the Sewerage Commission faced 
conflicts with other agencies. Two months earlier Hendrick had been the one to lament 
the lack of coordination between the two departments. He told the Sewerage Commission 
"we wished to bring two of the manholes to the new grade, but the City Engineer 
objected, requesting they be left at the old grade. The City Engineer has now paved Pratt 
Street to the new grade and has paved over these manholes without letting us know."48 
These conflicts took up time, created delays and confusion, added to workloads and the 
costs. The Sewerage Commission also worked out cost disputes with the Electrical 
Commission and the Water Department when its work required changes to pre-existing 
water pipes or wires that often lay in the very same trenches where the Commission laid 
new sewers.49 
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 Municipal coordination problems extended beyond the Sewerage Commission. 
They could be seen in the pages of the city government's own publication, The Municipal 
Journal. The Municipal Journal was a semi-monthly newspaper that City Hall advertised 
itself as a "publication of FACTS."50  In addition to being an organ for "good 
government", The Journal also served as booster literature. Its intended audience 
included potential investors as well as Baltimore's large and varied business community. 
In its first issue, for instance, the readers were treated to the latest developments of the 
Municipal Factory Site Commission. 
 However, the Journal also printed department conflicts. One such piece, entitled 
"The Difficulties of Garbage Collectors," read, "The street cleaning department has been 
handicapped in making collections of garbage and ashes owing to streets…being torn up 
by the Sewerage and Paving Commissions."51 Most pieces had no by-lines, which 
encouraged departments to offer frank assessments of each other. In one respect, these 
stories contradicted City Hall's broad aim to attract investment since it aired the problems 
of standardization and coordination felt across municipal government. The publication 
spun these stories as positively as possible. "The Difficulties of Garbage Collectors" 
ended with "Notwithstanding this obstacle the Department has not received any larger 
number of complaints."52 Publishing complaints might have signaled a progressive 
government by way of transparency. It also depicted a resilient group of government 
employees who managed to perform their jobs effectively. 
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52 "Difficulties of Garbage Collectors," The Municipal Journal Vol 1 No 1, Jan. 7, 1913. 
100 
 
 The Journal's writers constructed a narrative of political progress by documenting 
the small actions of governance. They did this in three ways. First, they included short 
stories about how departments were becoming better equipped. A case in point was a two 
sentence piece about how the "Street Cleaning Department purchased three additional 
Squeegee washing machines during the year."53 The paper also reported successful 
instances of departmental coordination in which advanced planning and foresight 
facilitated a large public infrastructure project. One example read "In order to avoid the 
necessity of tearing up the new improved pavements the Water Department will go into 
all streets which are to be improved by the Paving Commission, the State Roads 
Commission, and the Commission for Opening Streets and will make all changes which 
the growth of the water system makes necessary, and will renew all old and worn out 
pipe." Finally, the Journal published standardized forms.54 Sometimes the form's origin 
story would accompany the forms themselves. Each instance moved the reader from a 
recent past of disorganized, fragmented government to a more rationalized present, 
allowing them to appreciate the expansion of state capacity and the bureaucratic expertise 
that informed it. The nuts and bolts of city building lay at the center of constructing a 
political narrative of progress that would attract capital. 
 The everyday acts of city building also exposed the limits of expert bureaucrats to 
implement scientific and rational plans. The Roland Park Company took advantage of the 
municipal government's coordination problems, missing supplies, and gaps in reliable 
local knowledge of land conditions. After over a decade and a half in business, the 
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company had both an experienced labor force and information about northern Baltimore's 
topography. The company had already constructed its own sewer system in the county in 
the 1890s, which had formed the cornerstone of the Roland Park Company's strategy of 
equating suburbs with health and whiteness and the city with disease and blackness. 
Through their work, they had a repository of soil samples, maps, and comprehensive 
topographical surveys of northern Baltimore, all privately paid for—and precisely the 
type of records the Sewerage Commission so often needed. 
 Various municipal departments contacted the Roland Park Company to borrow 
supplies and to share information, precisely when those departments were both fighting 
and trying to coordinate with each other. Chief among them was the Topographical 
Survey Commission, whose primary task was to distribute accurate data to other city 
agencies. Hendrick publically complained about the Topographical Survey Commission's 
shortcomings on numerous occasions. Chief Engineer of the Topographical Survey 
Commission, Major Joseph Shirley acknowledged his records remained "very incomplete 
in the vicinity" of Roland Park.55 Shirley also wrote to the company seeking to "benefit of 
the skill and method [the Roland Park Company has] used in developing your road 
plan."56 The Roland Park Company and Sewerage Commission both bypassed the 
Topographical Survey Commission once the company laid out sewers on behalf of the 
Sewerage Commission. Both parties consequently benefit from the arrangement. The 
Roland Park Company developed a position of authority and respect among the different 
municipal departments as suppliers of exclusive knowledge and elusive supplies. 
                                                        




 Other agencies also sought the company's data because of the city survey's 
incompleteness. Chief Water Engineer Alfred M. Quick wrote to the company in 1910 
requesting information on the area since his department had "laid [a 16 inch water] main 
by a profile furnished by the Topographical Survey, and while the grade had not been 
established it was practically agreed upon by all parties concerned."57  
 The confusion spanned multiple agencies since the survey's data was integral for 
departmental coordination. Colonel J.L. Wickes, Commissioner for Street Cleaning, for 
instance, requested a company employee to meet with him to help clarify the location of 
the city’s northern boundary so he would know what streets fell within his purview.58 
Additionally, Secretary-Treasurer Richard Marchant Jr. had to write multiple letters to a 
city tax assessor correcting the proportion of city and county taxes on 818 University 
Parkway, which sat directly on the line. The assessor was unaware that only one fifth of 
the house was within city limits.59  
 The Roland Park Company did not just exchange information with municipal 
government; it shared personnel. Hendrick was among them. The Roland Park Company 
wrote to him in 1909 just as it was "actively taking up" the "development of our land 
lying adjacent to and within the city limits." The company wanted Hendrick to work for it 
"professionally" since he had already gave the company "some special advice in regard to 
a proposed change in the disposal of a portion of Roland Park sewage" in 1907—the 
same year the Sewerage Commission received over one hundred suits in East 
Baltimore.60 Hendrick turned down the offer due to the "great stress" of constructing 
                                                        
57 Alfred M. Quick to Marchant Jr. Aug. 14, 1911, RPC Records Box 59 Folder 2.  
58 J.J. Wickes to the Roland Park Company, Jan. 23, 1910, RPC Records Box 41 Folder 8. 
59 Marchant Jr. to Daniel Stiefel, 1910, RPC Records Box 41 Folder 8. 
60 Sewerage Commission Meeting Minutes Baltimore Record Group 9-14-15-4 
103 
 
Baltimore City's sewer system.61 Neither the company, Hendrick, nor the rest of the 
Sewerage Commission acknowledged potential problems for employing the chief 
engineer to provide advice for a company operating within city limits. Neither did city 
officials express discomfort about negotiating with a for-profit entity on how and when to 
construct company-owned and city-owned sewers under the same streets. While he tried 
to mitigate Baltimore City's public health hazards, Hendrick had already been paid by the 
very people profiting from the creation of the suburban/urban dichotomy. Hendrick was 
not alone. The company's landscape architects, the Olmsted Brothers, planned 
Baltimore's park system. The firm worked with the company between 1898 and 1933 
with both the company's city and county property prior to the whole area being annexed 
to Baltimore City in 1918. The Olmsted Brothers worked with Baltimore City between 
1904 and about 1926.62 
 
The Roland Park Company and the Sewer System 
In spite of missing records and coordination, within a year and a half the 
Sewerage Commission drafted a plan for constructing the citywide sewer system. One 
part of Baltimore that Hendrick did not prioritize was northern Baltimore City, the exact 
area into which the Roland Park Company had expanded. The Sewerage Commission 
considered both the current conditions in Baltimore City and likely future patterns of 
density and population growth.63 It then based all subsequent estimates for the cost of 
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63 See, for example Annual Report of the Sewerage Commission, 1905, 32 and Annual Report of the 
Sewerage Commission, 1906, 43. 
104 
 
work from the 1906 master plan as well as timelines for when to begin each stage of the 
project. Hendrick did not include the northern section in initial cost estimates nor did he 
foresee when the commission would begin work there. He stressed in his annual report 
that while the population of that section was increasing and the city opened more streets 
there every year, it did "not compare with the necessity and obligation to sewer the old 
portions of the City."64 The population remained too sparse; further downtown the higher 
density of people and homes had already been creating public health hazards.  
 In addition to need-based priorities, completing sewers downtown would raise the 
property value of the city's more valuable land, thus increasing potential tax assessments 
that could fund future system construction.65 In northern Baltimore by contrast, the streets 
remained too "scattered and disconnected" to adequately add new houses to the system, 
which by its nature necessitated connecting pipes to each other under existing streets.66 
Furthermore, Hendrick still considered northern Baltimore an "outlying district."67 By all 
measures, in terms of public health, population density, property value, and actual 
engineering considerations, northern Baltimore would have to wait for municipal sewers 
if the Sewerage Commission stuck to its need-based master plan. 
 But the Roland Park Company did not want to wait. When it began to develop its 
city property in 1907 it wanted the city to lay out sewers for that section. Given the north 
part of the city's relatively sparse population and slow progress of construction, the 
company knew that it would construct houses well before the commission began work in 
the area. It wrote to the Sewerage Commission proposing to fully lie out and pay for 
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sewer pipes according to commission plans and have the city incorporate those pipes into 
the general system when it reached the area.68  At that time the municipal government 
would fully reimburse the Roland Park Company as well as pay for any "fair 
compensation." for taking private drains into the city system.69 These terms formed the 
framework for the agreement but both parties still had to work out specifics. 
 First, the city wanted to assign men to supervise the construction to which the 
company agreed. Shortly thereafter, a conflict arose between just what types of plans the 
commission would supply for the company. Hendrick opposed designing the project. 
During a routine commission meeting, he stated, "If we prepare plans for the Roland Park 
Company, as requested, it will not be possible to refuse similar requests made by other 
property owners, and our engineering department would be unable to handle the large 
number of cases."70 As a result, the commission only supplied general information on 
how it was constructing its system and some guidelines for the company to follow. This 
information was generic enough for Hendrick to feel comfortable supplying it as 
frequently as needed.71 In assenting to supply information, he still helped the Roland Park 
Company, his former employer, in his capacity as Chief Engineer.  
                                                        
68 Edward Bouton to Calvin Hendrick, 7 Feb., 1908, Baltimore City Archives, Baltimore Record Group 9-
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"location and character" of local sewers leading up to "private households" whether or not the commission 
actually built them. Private drains did not come under the purview of the commission but it facilitated the 
commission adopting them into the larger sewer system. The Roland Park Company did not have to seek 
out Sewerage Commission specifications but, in the interest of wanting city cooperation decided to 
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subscriptions from residents for road projects when a government agency could not start a project as 
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the bridge over Stony Run. 
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 Hendrick also warned the Commission that the company needed to make 
provisions to disconnect any portion of construction that included drainage from county 
houses. This provision, however, was not part of any formal agreement with the 
company.72 In 1910, the company applied for permission to connect new pipes to the 
system that would drain both city and county houses. Hendrick again cautioned against 
setting a precedent of the city "undertaking the care of houses in the county, when there 
are numerous sections throughout the City demanding and needing drainage relief."73  
Furthermore, the Sewerage Commission had doubts about the legality of servicing county 
sewage under the terms of its Enabling Act.74 
 In its letters to the Commission justifying its connections to county houses, the 
company president stated that the pipes still belonged to the company, so jurisdiction was 
not an issue. More importantly, the city was not being reasonable by forcing it to separate 
its "city interests" from its "county interests" since future company development "has 
already added considerably to the tax revenues of the City and, if successful, will in the 
future greatly increase these revenues."75 The Sewerage Commission dodged a definitive 
answer to the problem by approving the connections since the sewer belonged to the 
company. It did not comment on tax revenue.  
 In the end, the Sewerage Commission supplied the Roland Park Company with 
plans, labor, and supervision. It changed its geographic and need-based schedule at the 
request of the very company that had lent it knowledge and supplies. The houses the new 
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pipes served would have otherwise been hooked up to the Roland Park Company's nearby 
private sewage system, including houses in Baltimore County that fell outside the service 
area of the city sewer system. As a result, it added extra houses into the total number of 
residences the city's system would serve. It diverted its own budget to reimburse the 
Roland Park Company twice-over: for the cost of the construction as well as the 
condemnation costs required to officially take control of the works that it supervised in 
the first place. The commission made the arrangement knowing that condemnation costs 
would be high because the appraised value of the land under which the pipes ran would 
increase due to the added infrastructure. Taxpayer-approved bond money flowed to the 
Roland Park Company and away from the areas of Baltimore City with high morbidity 
and mortality due to poor sanitary conditions. 
 The Roland Park Company swayed the Sewerage Commission by assuming the 
role of a petitioner and then used its capital and pre-established relationships with the 
commission as leverage. In some respects, the company appeared to be entering the 
petition process that had long been a feature of Baltimore's municipal government. 
Bouton wrote letters to the Sewerage Commission to voice a desire for services. In this 
regard, it acted no differently than the hundreds of other correspondents writing to the 
Commission every year. The Sewerage Commission, as a new city agency had not made 
its original plans with a petition process in mind. Rather, the commission intended for 
their comprehensive system to be a top-down project, composed by expert engineers 
rather than a project informed by input from those being serviced.  Prior to the incident 
with the Roland Park Company, the Sewerage Commission had already responded to 
areas in a manner that differed based on money. Earlier lawsuits are a case in point. 
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Petitioners sought payment for property damaged due to insufficient sewers. In 1907 
commissioners spoke with the City Solicitor as to which areas contained the most people 
filing suits against the city. In one particular case, when the city faced more than "one 
hundred of these suits" the commission built a drain in a working class European 
immigrant neighborhood in East Baltimore "to avoid further damages from these suits."76 
It took the hundred suits for the commission to act. No single suit merited a response but 
combined petitioners created enough of an economic concern in a concentrated area that 
the commission took action.  
 As a well-financed developer initially backed by transnational capital, the Roland 
Park Company's resources increased its access to the Sewerage Commission. The 
Sewerage Commission read out the Roland Park Company's requests for Sewerage 
Commission services at meetings and entered it into official record. Hendrick responded 
quickly, and the commission decided on the merits of the company's request. One request 
from the Roland Park Company garnered more action than the first ninety-nine need-
based requests from the residents of East Baltimore. The petition process was not new 
nor was the Sewerage Commission unique as a Progressive-era reform that relied on the 
expertise of bureaucrats shielded from direct democratic processes. 
 The company set a precedent for other groups to appeal to the commission. One 
such group was the Northwest Baltimore Sewerage Association, which had been present 
at meetings of the Sewerage Commission when the commission took up the Roland Park 
Company's case. The Northwest Baltimore Sewerage Association proposed to the 
Commission to finance and lay out its own sewers under city specifications while the 
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Sewerage Commission laid a nearby sewer to which the association would connect its 
pipes. The city would then reimburse the association. Unlike the Roland Park Company, 
the association did not have funds for the entire project and requested the city to help 
finance it midway through. The Commission obliged and completed the work by 1910. 
Because it allotted resources to the Northwest Baltimore Sewerage Association, it then 
rejected a petition from two property owners requesting the Commission to construct a 
sewer in northwest Baltimore the same year. Despite acknowledging a need for sanitary 
sewers in that area, the Commissioners stated they had already spent too much money in 
the northwest "through a petition signed by a large number of the most prominent citizens 
in that section of the city."77 As with the Roland Park Company, by altering its need-
based plan, the Sewerage Commission diverted resources from less powerful people.  
 
Blurring and Reinforcing Boundaries 
That Edward Bouton avidly supported city sewer construction in Roland Park in 
1909 might at first seem inconsistent with the previous eighteen years of building the 
district's reputation on how his "suburb" was separate from the "city." Even as Baltimore 
grew northward and density inched closer, Bouton knew that Roland Park remained a 
legible, controlled space. While the company was willing to blur political boundaries and 
resources in the name of expediency and savings, it shored up its reputation by 
reinforcing its aesthetic and social boundaries. In 1910 The Roland Park Company was 
busy planning a pair of apartment buildings on their newly opened University Parkway. 
The architects and planners it hired for the job included Edward L. Palmer, who became 
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the company's architect and was heavily involved in subsequent designs. The buildings 
were to be four stories. "Anything taller," Palmer Jr. asserted, "would miss entirely the 
general character which would make [Tudor Arms] a fitting entrance to the development 
beyond, the idea being to attach these buildings to Roland Park and not to the City."78 
Palmer was not thinking of political borders since Tudor Arms and the southern portion 
of Roland Park under construction were in Baltimore City. Rather he, along with Bouton 
and the rest of the group, including the Olmsteds, envisioned a gateway, a transition area 
from urban to suburban space. They wanted to clearly signal that one was leaving the 
familiar and entering a more desirable space, a unified district. The district's political 
borders mattered little for outward effect, even though it made a big difference in Roland 
Park's underground systems. Bouton successfully accumulated the city's resources in 
order to reinforce the boundaries of a development that already thrived on its ability to 
keep out the very people who needed those resources the most. The Roland Park 
Company had the ability to preserve or blur different types of boundaries because it 
already had more land, capital, and connections. 
 The Roland Park Company used also political jurisdiction to defer 
responsibilities. This was how they handled the complaint of a Mrs. J Albert, who lived 
near Merryman Lane. The lane was a road that predated Roland Park as well as the area's 
incorporation into Baltimore City in the 1888 annexation. Though the company financed 
its transformation into University Parkway, a vestigial portion west of the new boulevard 
remained after the road was straightened. Albert wrote to the company about the disrepair 
of her street in 1910. She blamed conditions on heavy construction equipment. The 
                                                        




company dismissed her charge. He claimed to have inspected the site and found "the lane 
in the same condition… for the past ten or fifteen years."  He described the lane as having 
"a number of holes in it, which prevents the water from running off properly, and as the 
lane has never been paved, this naturally makes it muddy in wet weather."79 Aside from 
denying responsibility, the company's secretary-treasurer Richard Marchant suggested 
that the company had no control over the issue, suggesting she "could arrange with the 
city to dump ten to fifteen loads of ashes in the holes."80 While Marchant did not blame 
the city for the state of Merryman Lane, he offered a city service as a solution to a 
grievance for which the company was at least somewhat responsible. This was an option 
the Roland Park Company did not have in its county property where most streets fell 
under company control. With its ability to push through projects near the northern city 
boundary, it ultimately did not matter if Mrs. J Albert took up Marchant’s advice to fill 
Merryman Lane’s ruts; the street would soon be replaced by the southwestward extension 
of Roland Park. 
 The Roland Park Company did not end its infrastructure negotiations with the 
sewage plan. Subsequent incidents indicated that Bouton was willing to use similar 
strategies as the company expanded in scope. After the Roland Park Company 
successfully altered the sewage master plans, it used similar tactics in dealing with 
different municipal agencies—as well as individual lot owners. First, Bouton once again 
took advantage of the company's large capital reserves, both as a bargaining chip as well 
as through retaining a well-known local law firm. Along with the new drainage 
provisions, Bouton focused his attention to Roland Park's new southwest extension where 
                                                        




he was actively seeking the closure and condemnation of that stretch of Merryman Lane 
in order to develop its holdings immediately to the north along the proposed route of 
Fortieth Street. To do this the company enlisted law firm Richard Bernard and Son to 
speed up the process.81 They succeeded in opening Fortieth Street and expediting the 
lane’s closing. Perhaps because it was good for businesses, Bernard stressed the need to 
grade and pave the street to "physically open it" since the company’s "whole 
development is being held up and potential purchasers are losing interest."82 The 
company and the attorneys planned to estimate the cost of the work, submit it to the city’s 
chief engineer, and then "pressure" the Board of Estimates into including it in their 
appropriations for 1912. In the mean time, the Roland Park Company would advance the 
city the money and complete the work themselves since they would be assured of 
compensation the following year.83 
 Following a major annexation by Baltimore City in1918, which Bouton had 
supported, Baltimore City appointed its first zoning board and named him as a member. 
Bouton, by then an outspoken participant in national city planning associations, followed 
the trends of the early 1920s and advocated for single-use zoning with principles of land 
use bearing a striking resemblance to the company's deed restrictions. Not only did 
Bouton add an extra layer of protection to the boundaries of his district—now fully a part 
of Baltimore City—but he helped ensure that the very principles that  allowed the 
company to profit off exclusion would now become municipal policy.84 
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Reordering Local Networks, Redistributing Local Power 
The Roland Park Company also changed Baltimore's political economy by 
creating new sites where the city's powerful could socialize, network, and make 
decisions.85 The company also founded and controlled exclusive institutions that allowed 
residents to mingle with each other and local power brokers close to their homes. The 
company could foster political connections with these new nodes much like it did from 
sharing personnel with the bureaucracy. 
 The first institution the company created was the Baltimore Country Club, which 
became a prominent feature of the "suburb." As charted by historians, the country club 
arose out of a longer genealogy of exclusive male social clubs.86 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, some of these clubs began to emphasize sporting activities, due in 
part to the wider outdoors movement and the increasing popularity of "muscular" 
athleticism embraced, especially, in colleges and universities.87 They began to take shape 
in the 1880s in places like Newport, Rhode Island, but in the 1890s developers began to 
"put the country club idea into practice" on a wider scale.88 The new, well-capitalized 
developers spearheaded the growth of country clubs since they had the money to buy the 
acreage required, and the desire to attract a demographic that often included college-
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educated men. It also helped that country clubs already had the precedent of signaling 
status. Bouton envisioned a club from the outset and tied the general sentiment of 
athleticism and sports to the more general themes of health and fresh air, sometimes 
reflected in ads stating: "Sickly children grow strong and vigorous, and lay up vitality for 
the future as soon as they live in Roland Park."89 Bouton later attributed "a good many" 
Roland Park sales to the country club.90 
 The country club connected Roland Park residents to each other but also to 
powerful people even for those who did not live in Roland Park. As seen in the last 
chapter, Bouton used established social clubs in Baltimore City to form business 
networks. Bouton retained his club memberships, but also used the Baltimore Country 
Club to conduct business with attorneys, bankers, and politicians, many of whom also 
belonged to older men's clubs. At the Country Club, company officials could make 
decisions over lunch with a railway president but also play a game of golf with a County 
Commissioner. The club's leisure opportunities surpassed those of downtown and thus 
drew a wide range of people in addition to Roland Park residents—if the country club 
board had allowed them to join. In its early years Bouton sat on the board. The club 
counted Baltimore mayors among its members, including one who took issue with the 
mosquitoes.91 
 The company organized how people socialized in Roland Park by founding two 
additional institutions, the Civic League and the Women's Club. Through them, residents 
practiced being good neighbors in a type of community in which none had previously 
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lived. The league was a venue for both social and political activity, and it served as a link 
between residents and the company. Residents used the Civic League, "the representative 
body of the Park," to hold debates, vote for officers, and voice concerns to the 
Company.92 Bouton served as a member in a personal capacity as Roland Park resident. 
He sat on committees and used the opportunity to rally Roland Park residents to political 
causes that would benefit the company, such as when he formed a delegation of 
volunteers to lobby for a roads bill.93 Among the league's main social functions was to 
bring in speakers. Their topics ranged from local politics to international affairs to 
planning and design.94 They thus created a civic-minded, active citizenry, characteristic 
of a respectable Progressive Era bourgeoisie.  
 Residents shared links through being neighbors in a tract in addition to 
participating in associational life. Residents discussed topics including caring for trees, 
and celebrated the area's planned beauty. Before long, the Civic League became a venue 
through which residents creatively expressed concerns about their space, often using the 
themes that preoccupied the company, including one resident who penned a poem about 
nuisances.95 The Company, in turn, had the power to disregard the Civic League or to 
legitimate it, one example of both being the company employee who chastised Civic 
League members for being concerned about children spitting into Roland Park's water 
supply: "When you…wake the people of Roland Park to the contamination of their water 
supply in this way, you will of course not neglect to point out to them how much worse 
our water is than the water supplied to Baltimore City, which is largely surface water 
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containing its fair share of the excrement of men and animals; the washings from all 
kinds of rotten and decaying vegetables and animal matter, and contamination from the 
almost innumerable sources that surface water will find." Nevertheless, the employee 
promised the company would look into the issue.96 Developers did not invent 
neighborhood organizations, but the Roland Park Company imbued the Civic League 
with the legitimacy of a permanent developer-influenced institution, a departure from 
contemporary groups based on neighborly proximity that were often short-lived citizen 
initiatives and single issue such as those that began the fight for the Baltimore 
segregation ordinance. 
 Aside from the Civic League, the Roland Park Company helped found the 
Women's Club, an initiative spearheaded by Bouton's wife Luella in the late 1890s. 
Women had technically been permitted to join the Civic League but the first only applied 
in 1908.97 Most members also joined the Women's Civic League, connected local elite 
white women, both Christian and German-Jewish. The Women's' Civic League's all-male 
advisory board also read like a who's who of Roland Park residents and associates, 
including Roland Park's lawyers, an architect who built many of Roland Park's houses 
(including his own), and Decoursey Thom, the brother of HR Mayo Thom, one of the 
men who shot dogs in Cross Keys.98 Several of the advisory board members also sat on 
the Baltimore Country Club board.  
 A case in point of how local networks worked spatially could be seen through the 
company's relationship with Robert Garrett, a prominent Baltimore businessman from 
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one of Maryland's wealthiest families. As we saw in the previous chapter, Bouton and 
Garrett hashed out a deal in the Maryland Club whereby Garrett helped a local group of 
investors buy the company from its British syndicate and reorganize. At the same time 
Bouton and Garrett both served on the Baltimore Country Club's board of directors. 
Garrett had independently joined a venture interested in buying the Guilford tract prior to 
the Roland Park Company. That company consolidated with the Roland Park Company 
in 1911, forming another iteration of The Roland Park Company, of which half the eight-
member board of directors consisted of Bouton, Garrett, and three men from Garrett's 
investment firm, Robert Garrett and Sons. The consolidation was likely facilitated by one 
or more of the Roland Park Company's lawyers from firm of Steele, Semmes, and Cary, 
the latter two belonged to the Baltimore Country Club and sat on the advisory board of 
the Women's Civic League, along with Garrett himself.99 Members of this same firm 
curried political clout and occasionally volunteered to introduce legislation to the state 
legislature on Bouton's behalf.100 One of the company's original backers, Charles Grasty, 
for whom George Kessler named a Roland Park street, was also a Roland Park resident 
and Baltimore Country Club member. When he bought the Baltimore Sun in 1910, he 
became president of a restructured company that sold preferred stock to Robert Garrett.101 
Garrett had so many social connections around Roland Part in particular that a group of 
residents organized a "Robert Garrett Club of Roland Park and Vicinity" to encourage 
people to vote for him in a county election. Members organized the group a week before 
the Civic League hosted all the candidates for an evening at The Women's Club building 
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to speak to Roland Park residents about campaign issues.102 Nevertheless, Garrett 
maintained a rowhouse closer to Downtown Baltimore. While the city-suburb division 
served his political and social ambitions, in practice the divide was never sharp or 
complete. 
 Developers founded and controlled institutions as part and parcel of creating a 
suburban market in the 1890s, but by the 1910s they changed focus. In the 1890s the 
company, like a growing number of large tract developers, had in mind a relatively 
narrow socioeconomic definition of affluence. As such, it generated demand for Roland 
Park by promising to confer or maintain status. By the time the company opened 
Guilford, it no longer had to instill good "suburban" behavior or work hard to define its 
intended market share. Guilford conformed to a recognizable product type and the 
company had secured its reputation both locally and nationally. It did not establish social 
institutions.  
 The difference could be seen in priorities of each development's design. The 
company incorporated the social clubs into its plans for encoding respectability into the 
landscape. It helped the Women's Club construct a stately building on its main street, 
Roland Avenue. Whether visitors took the street car or—increasingly during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century—drove up the poorly developed roads of northern 
Baltimore, they likely passed the Women's Club on their way to the company's office 
further north on Roland Avenue. They could get to the gates of the Baltimore Country 
Club via the company's two showpiece streets, Goodwood Gardens and Club Road. The 
former featured large classical houses on a street approach that only bent as it intersected 
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Club Road, which continued a de facto formal approach to the club with uniform walls 
and fences. The monumentalism of these two streets departed from the picturesque 
landscape ideology to some extent, but most of Club Road still curved and dipped, 
following the topography per the orders of the Olmsted Brothers. The Olmsteds did not 
design a central gathering place for Guilford, though they included several parks. Nor did 
the Olmsteds design a main street or any place for commercial activity. While Roland 
Park had a designated business block and one main avenue (Roland Avenue, a version of 
which predated the development) Guilford had no main street. Instead, Guilford's layout 




The interactions of the Roland Park Company and City officials at the turn of the 
century reverberated throughout Baltimore but they also point to national significance. 
First, in Baltimore other development companies springing up at the end of the 1890s 
copied the tactics the Roland Park Company used to secure municipal resources. One 
thing these companies had in common was large capital reserves. Conversely, individuals 
or small property owners tried the same tactics with limited efficacy. The resulting 
municipal master plans privileged and actually reinforced the physical and discursive 
"suburban" boundaries so central to the Roland Park Company's success. Yet at the same 
time the process reveals the inconsistencies and contradictions of how developers tried to 
create the suburb. On one hand, the Roland Park Company marketed its dichotomy of 
                                                        




dirty, diseased cities and pristine, sanitary suburbs while on the other hand it sought to 
literally connect its houses to the same system that, presumably, those vilified areas 
would also join. The particular confluence of factors in Baltimore proved somewhat 
exceptional at the turn of the twentieth century.  
 Nevertheless, the close ties between residential developers and city planners—ties 
that transcend neat divisions between public and private sector work—were further borne 
out through the 1910s when nascent professional institutions began to hold joint real 
estate and city planning conferences. Roland Park staff attended and gave talks. 
Additionally, real estate and city planning professionals jointly had a large role in 
popularizing zoning across the country, especially in the late 1910s and 1920s. Such 
zoning was often racially exclusionary, promoted unequal resource distribution, and 
privileged areas that already delineated single-use residential districts. In other words, 
areas that looked and functioned a lot like Roland Park and Guilford. It was no 
coincidence that Edward Bouton sat on Baltimore's first zoning committee.  
 In 1924 Baltimore City purchased the Roland Park Company's water works. It had 
already incorporated the controversial sewer pipes into its system. The same year the 
Company began work on its third development, Homeland, in 1924. Homeland marked 
both a hardening and blurring of boundaries: it was the company's first development 
begun entirely in Baltimore City and the company utilized city infrastructure. Yet they 
located it squarely within the contiguous Roland Park-Guilford-Homeland district and 
thus continued to carve out a distinctly separate space free from "urban" ills. After 33 
years in business, its product proved familiar and marketable to their potential client base. 
The Roland Park Company knew of their advantageous position. Rather than improve the 
121 
 
land, they merely staked lots opened for sale on October 11. It sold eight nine in one 
day.104 
                                                        




Formulas and Standards 
 
 In 1929 Roland Park Company Sales Manager Guy T.O. Hollyday gave the 
following advice to developers in the National Real Estate Journal: "to keep out people 
who have not learned to live decently [we espouse] a sales policy against certain 
nationalities, such as the poorer south Europeans [sic] whose presence in the district 
would depreciate values."1 Hollyday would eventually become head of the Federal 
Housing Administration. At this stage in his career, he echoed company policies his boss, 
Roland Park Company President Edward Bouton, proclaimed since the 1890s. By the end 
of the 1920s both men believed what most in the business believed: racial groups affected 
property value. After nearly forty years of building up the Roland Park Company district, 
beginning in 1891, they looked around Baltimore, Maryland and claimed such wisdom 
had been hard-earned. By extension, they reasoned, all "high-class" "suburban" 
developers should followed their example if their hoped to achieve similar success.2 
Hollyday's article reflected an existing culture within the company, one that viewed the 
Roland Park Company as the industry leader and trendsetter. This view was reinforced by 
the company's peers also recognized and upheld it as such. The Roland Park Company 
knew, in Hollyday's words, how to "create and maintain a market."3  
                                                        
1 Guy T.O. Hollyday, "Making Use of the Broker in Subdivision Selling," National Real Estate Journal 
30.18 (Sept. 2, 1929):28. 
2 A name adopted by a group of developers, including Edward Bouton and used frequently beginning in 
1914. See The Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property, The Roland Park Company 
Records MS 504 Box 211 Folders 4 and 5, Special Collections Sheridan Libraries, Johns Hopkins 
University. 
3 Guy T.O. Hollyday, Draft notes for "Making Use of the Broker in Subdivision Selling, MS 504 Box 245. 
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 This chapter uses national conversations about real estate sales and development 
as well as local practices as they played out on the ground to examine how the Roland 
Park Company made the leap from constructing Baltimore's suburban real estate market 
to helping to forge a national one. It focuses on that exclusion on two scales—the ways 
developers and salesmen implemented them on the ground daily and the national debates 
around how to standardize and disseminate them through professional institutions. It was 
real estate's largest professional group, The National Association of Real Estate Boards 
(NAREB,) that made the larger conversations possible. Founded in 1908, it counted 
among its members leading suburban developers across the country. Since those 
developers, by the nature of their work, had to sell property, their sales practices offer a 
particularly fruitful window into market formation at the local and national levels. 
Developers sought and gave opinions on a huge array of topics that ranged from how to 
hire brokers to successful advertising strategies. Developers discussed in-house strategies 
for discrimination constantly, and the Roland Park Company stood among the most 
practiced companies at excluding "undesirable residents." 
 This chapter also builds on the robust scholarship about housing discrimination 
and the history of capitalism. Historians have studied how developers and policymakers 
honed residential segregation, especially through two tools: zoning and restrictive 
covenants.4 Still, few scholars address the seemingly mundane technologies of exclusion 
                                                        
4 Discussions of restrictive zoning and covenant practices include Garrett Power, "The advent of zoning," 
Planning Perspectives 4 (1989):1-13; Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian-
Americans, Housing, and the Transformation of Urban California (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009); N.D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Making of Jim Crow South Florida 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); David Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White 
Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Kevin Fox Gotham, 
Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900–2000 (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002); Kevin Fox Gotham, "Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the 
Origins of Racial Residential Segregation in a US City, 1900-1950," International Journal of Urban and 
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such as standardized sales forms, which shed light on processes of exclusion extending 
from national convention floors to street level that were completely infused with racism 
and sexism.5  
 Finally, this chapter also contributes to literature on professionalization in general 
and real estate professionalization in particular. As scholars have written, 
professionalization does not occur in a bubble within a single industry.6 Suburban 
segregation owes its forms to other areas that Realtors borrowed from in the early 
twentieth century including, credit ratings, actuarial science, and race science. Racial and 
economic understandings of risk reinforced each other across different professions, 
including real estate. Together they informed how developers helped construct the 
suburban housing market. 
 Markets, however, consist of more than structure and belief. They are also 
processes, both in the words of one economist, the result of power, and an arena of 
power."7 Throughout the early days of NAREB, real estate entrepreneurs continued to 
                                                        
Regional Research 24.3 (2000):616-633; Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in 
Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass 
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Michael 
Jones-Correa, "The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants," Political Science Quarterly 
115.4 (2000–2001):541-68; Kevin Kruse and Thomas Sugrue eds., The New Suburban History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality 
in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: 
African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.) 
5 On the importance of looking at many tools of exclusion at different geographic scales, I draw from 
Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009.)  
6 On real estate professionalization see Jeffrey Hornstein, A Nation of Realtors: A Cultural History of the 
Twentieth-Century American Middle Class (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Marc Weiss, The Rise 
of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987); Jennifer Light, "Nationality and Neighborhood Risk at the Origins of 
FHA Underwriting," The Journal of Urban History 36.5 (2010):634-671. For links between real estate 
professionalization and city planning: William Worley, J.C. Nichols and the Shaping of Kansas City: 
Innovation in Planned Residential Communities (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990). Real 
estate professionalization and academia: Jennifer Light, The Nature of Cities: Ecological Visions and the 
American Urban Professions, 1920-1960 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.) 
7Warren J. Samuels, "Markets and their Social Construction" Social Research 71.2 (2004):358. 
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debate over best exclusionary practices. Furthermore, even after the Roland Park 
Company enmeshed itself fully in formal national institutions and took a leading role in 
those debates, company salesmen applied exclusionary practices inconsistently, 
exercising uneven autonomy to make final decisions on whether to sell a given house. In 
the small, personal interactions between salesmen and prospective clients, it was often the 
salesmen who enjoyed the most discretion. Salespeople factored nationality and race, 
religion, appearance, gender, occupation, and local geography into a complex yet flexible 
calculus. Buyers, meanwhile, sometimes attempted to subvert the barriers they surmised 
(or knew) existed. As much as Bouton and other developers tried to shape the housing 
market, they were never fully in control. 
 To assume the national stage, company officials first had to create it. During the 
1890s and 1900s, developers began informal correspondence networks and forged 
relationships with professionals in nascent fields such as city planning and landscape 
architecture. Bouton, in 1908, was among the founders of NAREB, a group of American 
and Canadian men that aimed to professionalize all aspects of real estate business. He 
helped institutionalize and disseminate knowledge being shared in an ad-hoc fashion 
among developers around North America. Bouton also played active roles in an 
assortment of other new groups with national or international aspirations, including the 
National Conference on City Planning (NCCP.) Through speeches, publications, and 
meetings Bouton, Guy Hollyday, and other Roland Park Company affiliates developed 
and promulgated best practices.8 
                                                        
8Hollyday published his piece in NAREB's journal after adapting it from a speech he delivered at the 
organization's annual convention. 
126 
 
 Even though developers had already been building a suburban housing market 
prior to the establishment of NAREB, the organization offered real estate men (and, later, 
women) a more formal organ with which to communicate trade standards and project 
institutional power over great distances. Unsurprisingly, the company officials like 
Bouton assumed that good suburban developers acted like the Roland Park Company: 
they carefully built boundaries, controlled spaces, and amassed municipal resources. 
After all, since 1890 the company staked its capital on its ability to define "suburb," 
delimit the "desirable neighbor," and sell houses on a promise of safety and homogeneity. 
When Hollyday published his article, the Roland Park Company had already created 
three exclusionary developments—Roland Park, Guilford, and Homeland. Through 
NAREB, Roland Park Company men they could turn their experiments and assumptions 
from the 1890s and 1900s into national common sense by the end of the 1920s. 
 NAREB served as an institution through which developers constructed the 
American real estate market.9 Roland Park Company officials participated in transmitting 
ideas up from local experience to NAREB and vice versa. Professional organizations 
institutionalized the ideas through various means—editing publications, creating 
convention programming, holding referenda. Those ideas then filtered back down to be 
adopted by other developers.10 The housing market was thus "neither given and 
transcendental nor natural but organized to promote some interests rather than others; 
                                                        
9 Though NAREB consisted of Canadian members until the 1940s, this chapter is limited to discussing the 
United States rather than try to accommodate the different financial, legal, and socio-cultural contexts of 
Canada. For more on the ways Canadian Realtors influenced NAREB, see Janet Pearl Davies, Real Estate 
in American History (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), 48, 60-61, 74, 93. 
10 For a condensed version of the bi-directional flow of ideas in the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards see: Paige Glotzer, "Exclusion in Arcadia: How Developers Circulated Ideas about Discrimination, 
1890-1950," The Journal of Urban History 41.3 (May, 2015):479-494. 
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which interests and how they are chosen and structured, are issues to be determined."11 
With NAREB, developers could tether their ideas about housing to the project of 
professionalization. As NAREB gained power, those beliefs became national standards.  
 
National Ideas and Value 
"Come On In, Fellows, the Water's Fine!" So opened the first publication of the 
National Association of Real Estate Boards on June, 26, 1908.12 The association would 
become the most powerful real estate organization in the United States by the end of the 
1920s.  Its founding members aspired to no less.13 They believed that their jobs required 
"specialized knowledge and training" (even if they themselves had to establish the 
national training apparatus. They believed they "should be classified among the so-called 
professions."14 NAREB modeled its charter on other professional organizations.  
 Elevating a business to a profession was no easy task. Members of the association 
sought to control who could buy and sell real estate, as well as the terms on which people 
would have to conduct business to remain members of NAREB. They created barriers to 
entry in order to separate themselves from "curbstoners" or "sharks," whom they depicted 
as manipulative scam artists who bought or sold land in ways that damaged the reputation 
of anyone involved in real estate. They also coined and trademarked the name Realtor 
that only members could use.  Members sought to brand themselves and spread the term 
so as to "institutionalize the Realtor" with the general public, investors, and other 
                                                        
11 Samuels, 358.  
12 "Come On In, Fellows, the Water's Fine!," United Realty 1.1, (June 26, 1908):5. 
13 William W. Hannan, "The National Association of Real Estate Exchanges," National Real Estate Journal 
1.1 (1910):1. 
14 James G. Stafford, "Greatest Meeting Ever Held," National Real Estate Journal 5.6 (August 15, 
1912):463. Jeffrey Hornstein, A Nation of Realtors: A Cultural History of the Twentieth-Century American 
Middle Class, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 53-117. 
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businessmen. It was their hope that "people come to realize that this term [Realtor] 
distinguishes an entire class of men"15 For those admitted, a NAREB stamp of approval 
marked them as possessing business ethics, good professional standing, and expert 
knowledge of trade secrets. Unlike curbstoners, Realtors, by virtue of membership, were 
to be considered as good citizens and businessmen with a strong sense of civic duty and a 
concern about consumers and investors. The national association imbued their work and 
ideas with a sense of legitimacy. As time went on, NAREB also possessed the resources 
to ensure a competitive advantage to members who shared those principles. 
 Realtors codified beliefs about markets and ethics into official association 
platforms. They specifically adopted a relational view of property value as best practice. 
Realtors linked the character of property to group traits as well as to the merits of 
individual people, as these affected surrounding values. For developers this meant that if 
an undesirable person bought or occupied a piece of property, he or she would depreciate 
the value of that property as well as those of the surrounding lots. In a typical hallmark of 
professionalization, NAREB adopted a Code of Ethics in 1913—the same year the 
Roland Park Company inserted the racial prohibition into its deeds.16 Realtors 
unanimously approved the code's revision at the 1924 annual convention. The revised 
code's Article 34 prevented a Realtor from "introducing into a neighborhood a character 
of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individual whose 
                                                        
15 E St Elmo Lewis "Business Building Power of Advertising in Your Home Town," Annals of Real Estate 
Practice (Chicago: National Association of Real Estate Boards, 1926):212. 
16 All buyers of Roland Park Company lots signed onto a set of restrictions with their deeds. Between the 
company's founding in 1891 and the opening of its second subdivision, these deed restrictions did not 
include a race clause. Beginning with in 1913 it prohibited occupancy by "all Negroes except domestic 
servants." Roland Park Company Deeds and Agreements, MS 504 Box 271. 
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presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood."17 Realtors 
deliberately worded the article broadly and, in doing so, left wide-ranging discretionary 
powers to individual developers and salesmen, with the mandate that, as professionals, 
they use such powers. Thus, Realtors became duty-bound to "exercise their social 
responsibility" by considering how race affected the surrounding area.18 Realtors would 
follow the Code of Ethics and use their powers to enhance local property values by 
fostering residential segregation. Since NAREB sought to be the voice of a profession, 
they intended the Code of Ethics to be an "objective" statement of how to best maintain a 
market. 
  Members based the code, in part, on their understandings of how notable 
developers became successful. NAREB elevated "the most successful Realtors in 
America in the subdivision business" to the title of "experts" among experts.19 As 
NAREB worked to control who could practice real estate and how, they cemented the 
status of early developers from the 1890s as professionals to be emulated. One article in 
the main NAREB publication, The National Real Estate Journal (NREJ,) praised the 
developers of Bay City, Michigan by saying they "were almost in a class with Nichols, 
Bouton, Ninde, Thompson and other subdividers."20 That these developers of a city could 
even be compared to subdividers reflected the suburb's vaunted position as the most 
valuable type of residential property, worth replicating if possible. While subdividers in 
general occupied a respected place in NAREB, such was the reputation and respect for a 
                                                        
17 "Code of Ethics, National Association of Real Estate Boards," 1924, 7, National Association of 
REALTORS® Library and Archives, Chicago. 
18 "Code of Ethics," 1924, 4, National Association of REALTORS® Library and Archives, Chicago. 
19 Proceedings of the First Annual Convention Conferences of the Homebuilders and Subdividers Division 
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards (Chicago: National Association of Real Estate Boards, 
1923), 8 
20 Tom Ingersoll, "'Movie' Flashes for Journal Readers," NREJ 15.5 (May, 1917):94. 
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small set of top developers that NAREB expected members to know them automatically 
and writers could refer to them only by last name. All of them—JC Nichols of Kansas 
City; Edward Bouton; Lee Ninde of Fort Wayne, Indiana; and King Thompson of 
Columbus, Ohio—developed large planned tracts with a long term investment in the land, 
all created affluent single family homes. All used deed restrictions, segregated by race, 
and had policies about excluding Jews. NAREB, founded entirely by white American and 
Canadian men, wanted these suburbs and the practices of these developers to represent 
the best work in North American residential real estate.  
 The same developers, Bouton among them, became leaders of NAREB, giving 
subdividers strong voices in shaping the nascent association. The group's first president, 
William Hannan, was a developer from Detroit under whom, according to the 
organization's historian, NAREB saw "a great surge of new concepts in real estate and the 
assumption of social responsibility by real estate men for good city planning and good 
community structure."21 In other words, Hannan helped build an institution by 
prioritizing the exclusionary social and aesthetic principles of developers like the Roland 
Park Company. Nichols, Bouton, and Ninde all chaired NAREB committees and, when 
not chairing, served on them. Nichols, in particular, electrified crowds with a national 
convention speech in 1912. Entitled "Subdivisions and the Best Manner of Handling 
Them," he outlined strategies necessary to create the most valuable residential tracts: use 
deed restrictions, employee engineers and landscape architects to plan every inch, and 
beware of "encroachment or aggression of menacing conditions" that have no place in 
good residential districts. 22 Developers like Nichols, Bouton, and later the federal 
                                                        
21 Davies, 63. 
22 JC Nichols, "Subdivisions and the Best Manner of Handling Them," NREJ 4.6 (August 15, 1912):459. 
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government itself would use those terms to refer to both undesirable people and 
undesirable uses that would lower property values. 
 These developers—elites in terms of profits and reputation—repeated the same 
themes in their speeches. They reiterated that because developers controlled land values, 
they had the civic duty to improve the economy of their cities. They bettered their cities' 
economies with their subdivision practices, and, as a result, others should be copy their 
practices. At the same time, they painted their practices as so successful that they 
continued them due to consumer demand, almost as if they had no choice. Nichols stated 
"In the early time I was afraid to suggest building restrictions; now I cannot sell a lot 
without them."23 Thompson similarly suggested that when he first went into business he 
knew nothing about planning but came to understand it led to an overall improvement of 
a "community."24 The public, in turn "came to appreciate" planning "as never before." 
Realtors had to "keep pace in order to succeed."25 While the public somehow awakened 
to good planning principles, NAREB, ad Thompson reminded the audience, had 
successfully educated other subdividers to take up practices like his own.26  
 Contrary to the passive picture developers painted of themselves, they actively 
helped define which places were most valuable. In doing so they helped construct a 
market that privileged the socioeconomically homogenous, planned suburban 
subdivisions they created.27 Before, during, and after their speeches, developers like 
                                                        
23 Ibid. 




27 Developers had help promoting planned suburbs to consumers in the 1910s and 20s. David Freund 
identifies a "loose coalition of realtors, planners, and housing economists" who promoted both racially 
restrictive covenants and municipal zoning. Hornstein and others have also written about the Own Your 
Own Home Campaign during those decades, a joint-effort between the federal government, NAREB, local 
132 
 
Nichols, Thompson and Bouton actively encouraged other developers to use deed 
restrictions. They voted on the Code of Ethics and supplied sample materials to NAREB 
for other developers to use. Nichols and Thompson created the narrative that over time 
they learned what the public liked best through their own experiences but in actuality 
they waged a long campaign to familiarize residents with deed restrictions in particular 
and to homogenous planned single-use residential districts in general. While developers 
engaged in bolstering NAREB, their oft-repeated narrative served to reinforce that certain 
developers had work to be emulated and that a national institution had to educate 
subdividers on how to do so. By 1923 NAREB grew 33,895 members.28 This growth 
necessitated the creation of specialty divisions within the association. The newly-formed 
Homebuilders and Subdividers group even standardized the aesthetic that represented the 
best of suburban development: they chose as their seal a single family house surrounded 
by trees. <Figure 4.1> The house would have fit in comfortably at Roland Park. 
 Top developers like Bouton did not just join NAREB; they became members of a 
host of institutions arising simultaneously to network, discuss subdividing practices, and 
disseminate ideas. Bouton belonged to the National Conference on City Planning, 
founded a year after NAREB in 1909. As a founding member, he joined along with 
Roland Park Company associates such as Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., the company's 
landscape architect. Other founding and early NCCP members included Roland Park 
Company attorney Francis Carey, and the company architectural and planning consultant 
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Grosvenor Atterbury. In 1917, Nichols and Bouton also formed the much smaller and 
more exclusive Developers of High-Class Residential Property, a group consisting of no 
more than thirteen people in any given year. These members, however, considered 
themselves to be the country's leading lights of suburban development. 
 The members of the Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential 
Property proved especially candid discussing how they assigned value to groups and to 
different types of property. This was likely the case because the group's audience was 
composed only of themselves, with several already friends or business colleagues. In 
addition, members catered to affluent clients. Each year, for instance, conference 
members voted each on whether to sell to Jews (generally a resounding no) and then 
discussed their rationales.  In 1919 Nichols, in particular, met with disapproval upon 
explaining that his company had relaxed its policy on Jewish exclusion since the end of 
the First World War. He asked other attendees, "Can't anyone have a few kind words to 
say on my behalf?" to which Bouton responded, "I think it is a perfectly ghastly 
mistake."29  
 Another attendee was John Demarest from New York who had worked with 
Bouton on the Queens subdivision of Forest Hills Gardens. Demarest feared losing 
control over his development if he began to sell to Jews. Whereas Nichols believed he 
and his salesmen could vet clients and make exceptions for certain Jews, Demarest said, 
"When you open the door, it is gone."30 Developers believed they would lose the ability 
to strongly control their investment, as a consequence of a single mistake if they sought 
                                                        
29 Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property, 1919, 
Jemison Companies Miscellany, Collection #2838 Rare and Manuscript Division, Cornell University 574. 
30 Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property,1919, 
575 - 576. 
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to make exceptions. Other developers agreed.31 Bouton warned that residents would 
"stampede" from their homes if Jews moved in.32 Bouton's comments prefigured a fear of 
white flight. Demarest and Bouton espoused an ecological theory of succession in which 
Jews would rapidly drive out Christians, who would never return.33 Jewish affluence 
created a consistent contradiction for the group. Jews occupied an ambiguous position in 
the 1920s where developers viewed them either as a racial other or white enough to be 
dangerous infiltrators. However, the developers did not vote on other groups, including 
blacks, who were already banned by deed restriction. For developers Jews assumed one 
place in a whole hierarchy of people and property value. 
 The conversations at the Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential 
Property were permeated by allusions to popular sovereignty, the idea that whites should 
use mob violence to maintain the social order. Demarest told of how he had a homeowner 
who once insisted on selling his house to a Jew. Demarest threatened the homeowner by 
saying he would have a neighbor rent his house to a black person in retaliation, even 
violating the racial deed restriction of Forest Hills Gardens to do so. Demarest did not 
comment on whether the threat worked, but in his mind, no one could lower on property 
value more than a black renter. Bouton insisted the real test of whether Jews should be 
allowed would be if a developer polled residents and got approval. The belief at Roland 
Park was that if a Jew moved in, the next day that property and all the property around it 
might depreciate by as much as thirty-three and a third percent, a figure no one 
                                                        
31 Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property, 1919, 
576. 
32 Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property, 1919, 
577. 
33 This theory of succession pre-dated the Chicago School of Sociology's concentric zone theory urban 
succession and growth, that Robert Park and Ernest Burgess first published in 1925. 
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explained.34 Another developer, who did occasionally sell to Jews, chimed in that if he 
had tried what Demarest did down in Dallas, the next morning "he would be hanging 
from a flag pole somewhere."35 It was unclear whether Demarest himself, the black 
tenant, or the landlord would be lynched. Bouton wanted to fall back on residents' 
disapproval to strengthen his rationale for racial exclusion, with the pretense of being 
democratic. In Dallas (and likely in other places, regardless of region) residents would be 
expected to express that disapproval in violence.  
 As members of the various groups attended conferences and read publications, 
they learned new information and passed it on, spreading technologies of exclusion 
across North America. Such was the case of Emerson Chaille of Indianapolis, an attendee 
of the Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property. Chaille hoped the 
first annual meeting would help him decide on how to use deed restrictions and set prices 
of houses.  The matter was an urgent one for Chaille for he and his associates had already 
invested in the land several miles from the city center and he did not have local models to 
look at since nothing like "the highest grade subdivision" had "ever been thought of in 
Indianapolis."36  
 Chaille observed that the developers at the meeting themselves began using 
restrictions they took from specific places: Nichols modeled his deed restriction on 
Roland Park. Bouton took his from a combination of Sanitary Engineer George Waring 
who provided information about Tuxedo, New York during the 1890s and the Olmsted 
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Brothers landscape architecture firm, who helped make Roland Park Company deed 
restrictions stricter in 1913. The Olmsted Brothers in turn brought deed restrictions to 
many of their projects across the United States and Canada.37 Even when developers 
sought general samples of deed restrictions through professional organizations, they 
received specific ones submitted by other developers. For the recipient, copying a deed 
restriction was potentially as simple a matter as crossing out a company name and 
substituting a new one. Developers as well as planners in the NCCP used Roland Park 
Company deed restrictions to that effect. <Figure 4.2> Housing markets have 
genealogies that could be traced concretely. Tying the characteristics of people to the 
value of property did not gain saliency simply because it had popular consumer appeal, as 
Nichols and others proclaimed in their speeches. Rather, property value first came from 
the deliberate actions of developers who networked with each other, first informally and 
then through institutions. 
 Developers sought to standardize various strategies for selling homes under the 
purview of professionalizing real estate. To this end, they used NAREB to promote deed 
restrictions as a general tool. Developers had already been informally sharing strategies 
of exclusion since the 1890s through correspondence and visits. In keeping with the 
general professionalization project of NAREB, developers adopted an educational tone in 
which they framed strong restrictions as necessary for best subdividing practices. 
                                                        
37 Helen Monchow heavily relied on the Olmsted Brothers to provide samples for her study of deed 
restrictions. Of the 84 she analyzes, 55 came from the Homebuilders and Subdividers Division of NAREB 
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business rose with the new wave of developers in the 1890s, including the Roland Park Company. Helen 
Monchow, The Use of Deed Restrictions in Subdivision Development (Chicago: The Institute for Research 
in Land Economics and Public Utilities, 1928), 27. 
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Developers urged each other "to give this subject of restrictions our very best thought 
because…it becomes our duty to property anticipate the probable future as well as the 
present use" of their land, especially in light of growing urban populations.38 Since the 
1890s developers played upon concerns about urban demographic change to help sell lots 
and introduce homebuyers to deed restrictions. Deed restrictions also fit well with the 
NAREB Code of Ethics which mandated Realtors not mix "inharmonious" uses or 
people. 
 Developers did not just talk about deed restrictions, they used the wide audiences 
they attained through NAREB to help popularize specific kinds of residential segregation. 
In speeches—often reprinted as "textbooks"—developers interpreted state and local court 
decisions to encourage their colleagues to adapt racial restrictions.39 One summed it up 
from personal experience, "We in our contracts and deeds, have never restricted against a 
race, because of the feeling that it is unconstitutional, but [the Michigan Supreme Court] 
makes the point in this case that a violation of the 13th and 14th amendments can be 
accomplished legislative acts by the States and not by the actions of individuals."40 In the 
subsequent discussion, no one disputed that deed restrictions would impact development 
positively. If anything, according to Knight, developers needed to support all types of 
land use regulation, be it restrictions or zoning, the legality of which would not be 
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definitively decided by the United States Supreme Court until three years later 1926.41 
According to Knight, zoning, unlike deed restrictions, required state action and could be 
subject to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus the argument went that it 
was a given that restricting land use increased value, that racial separation was intrinsic to 
proper land use (especially in light of urban demographic change.) Developers needed to 
utilize racial deed restrictions whenever possible for subdivisions, regardless of how 
affluent the development might be.  
 Zoning could not hurt either since its principles were similar to deed restrictions. 
Realtors may have endorsed city planning and zoning laws, but to truly ensure Realtors 
create the best suburbs under the most ethical business practices, they needed racial deed 
restrictions. Knight found it impossible to separate ethical real estate practice from racial 
restriction. For him, and for other developers in the 1920s, the professional mission of 
NAREB included working to ensure connecting the characteristics of people with 
property value became foundational to the housing market. Such were the speeches 
developers got to read and hear through NAREB. The printed textbook version of his 
speech followed with sample forms for others to use. NAREB as a national institution 
thus provided the platform by which developers could ease any fears about legal and 
monetary concerns over explicit racial exclusion while they disseminated standard 
arguments for defending deed restrictions. Using NAREB resources, the organization 
could then package and publish such lessons along with images to facilitate others 
adopting the practices. 
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The Spaces and Strategies of Professionalization 
NAREB provided spaces through which Realtors practiced ways of seeing people 
and property. The group's annual convention included formally scheduled entertainment 
as well as business and organizational deliberations. In both capacities conventions 
enabled Realtors to affirm ideas of race, gender and good citizenship. They sang songs 
from an official booklet that included such selections as "Massa's in De Cold Cold 
Ground" from the 1914 event in Pittsburgh. Sung in dialect, it included lines such as 
"Mas-sa made de darkies love him/Cayse he was so kind." The same year Realtors also 
sang "My Old Kentucky Home," "I Want to Be in Dixie," along with patriotic numbers 
such as "America," "The Star Spangled Banner," and, because Canadian delegations were 
in attendance, "The Maple Leaf Forever."42 The next year they sang "When Greek Meets 
Greek," which lampooned Catholic Southern and Eastern European groups."43 In 1928, a 
year after Al Jolson's The Jazz Singer and fourteen years after "Massa," convention 
organizers treated delegates to "a real genuine 'treat of thrills!'" that included a Charleston 
group, along with a black face quartette, a watermelon-eating contest, and spirituals. 
<Figure 4.3> The organization also published comical drawings of attendees that 
included a Realtor dressed as a Native American "doing an Indian dance" and with a 
dialog bubble containing broken English.44 Realtors came to conventions and acted out 
their social beliefs in the same venues in which they discussed real estate their business 
practices. Realtors literally gathered in one room to watch minstrel shows and then move 
together to another room in which they discussed the value of racial restrictions in 
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subdivisions. As they did so, they could look around and see their colleagues doing the 
same, strengthening both camaraderie among "professionals" and the acceptability of 
their beliefs. Realtors constructed relationships between people and property in 
organizational settings. They worked otherness into their professional and personal 
senses of themselves and formed a sense of exclusivity based on a mix of professional 
racism and sexism. When they spoke and transacted as "experts," they did so while 
dripping with the cultural assumptions of Jim Crow.45 Then they could talk as "experts" 
about the supposedly objective best practices for selling homes and maximizing profits.46 
 Beginning with its second convention in 1909, a local real estate board took 
charge of organizing an annual convention. Members made arrangements and put 
together the program with the expectation that they would use the opportunity to show off 
the local board's work. Conventions thus provided chances to mix local boosterism with 
national professionalization efforts. The Detroit Board rose to the task with a convention 
issue of the Detroit Realtor that featured a dignified white man in classical garb, holding 
a car. <Figure 4.4> He was surrounded by scenes celebrating Realtors' positive impact 
on Detroit. Rendered in expensive color ink, the Detroit Board included a family in front 
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of a red and white suburban house with a large front yard; bustling, clean contented white 
industrial workers; and the Detroit skyline, complete with belching black smokestacks. 
The cover conveyed the industrious hard work and uplifting values of Realtors who 
literally embraced progress to turn Detroit into a thriving metropolis. As with their 
patriotic songs during the convention itself, Detroit Realtors demonstrated their good 
citizenship and, as with the songs in dialect, their citizenship took on a decidedly 
racialized and gendered edge. The ideal image of the city, constructed by the virtuous 
classically-clad Realtor portrayed the superiority of white neighborhoods, white male 
experts, and white cities. The suburban idyll was one of a white nuclear family, the clean, 
most modern factory facilities populated by white workers.  
 Detroit Realtors were not alone. Realtors also used conventions to travel through 
spaces together and craft how colleagues should experience moving through them. When 
it came time for Baltimore to host a NAREB convention, the board (with Bouton among 
the organizers) printed promotional material that equated the city's modernity and 
progress with whiteness. Every NAREB member across North America received a 
promotional pamphlet advertising the convention's leisure activities, including regional 
and local tours. Organizers promised a "general sightseeing trip around Baltimore" that 
included stops in Roland Park and "a real chummy trip around the Baltimore Harbor."47 
Baltimore organizers crafted an image of the ideal Baltimore as white Baltimore. As was 
the case with Detroit, they did not shy away from depicting the class diversity of their 
cities—factories and affluent suburbs sat side by side in the convention material and on 
itineraries, but the tours also carefully avoided any non-white areas of the city. Literature 
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for the regional tour included heavy emphasis on Civil War sights. A picture of a Robert 
E. Lee statue graced the same pamphlet Baltimore organizers sent out to participants. 
One panel over, organizers also highlighted Roland Park a second time: in an inset called 
"Homes," the Baltimore Board held up the Roland Park Company district as the very 
symbol of Baltimore's progress on the national stage: "Although retaining the charm of 
old architecture," it read, "the note of Baltimore is distinctly modern. To the north is the 
Roland Park-Guilford-Homeland development [The Roland Park Company District], 
considered the most distinguished in America."48 As with Detroit, the houses to which the 
board wanted to draw attention were those of an affluent planned suburb. Both the 
Baltimore and Detroit boards narrowed the aesthetic of best suburban developments to 
the affluent, single family planned tract, relaying the message that the most valuable 
residential property resembled places like Roland Park. Despite the organization's official 
imagery of upstanding citizens and technocrats—trustworthy experts with a monopoly on 
ethical practice—Realtors used NAREB money and space to put on performances that 
were neither scientific nor rational but rooted in particular cultural and moral context that 
blended national and local conversations about real estate, race, and value.49 
 In addition to institutional spaces, NAREB provided the institutional structures 
through which members could circulate ideas and, in the process of doing so, help form a 
market. Ideas from members filtered up by way of local real estate boards, were subject 
to the editorial hand of NAREB leaders who then disseminated back down to a national 
constituency. Once NAREB created divisions, the Homebuilders and Subdividers group 
created its own structures. Developers contributed material that the director, himself a 
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developer, then organized thematically and promoted as examples of best practices for 
subdivision selling. The head of the division called for developers to submit advertising 
materials to form a national library. Within one year the library contained "several 
thousand pieces of subdivision advertising"50 The Roland Park Company contributed 
copies of The Roland Park Company's Magazine. Once NAREB assembled the 
advertising, developers throughout North America could request copies under the 
assumption that any of the materials were association-approved. On one hand, the 
institutional structures like the library made development more egalitarian: not only could 
companies big and small have a major resource to shape their development and sales 
strategies, but small firms could gain visibility by making their materials widely available 
to peers. On the other hand, however, NAREB made it easier for developers to emulate 
the practices of their most well-known peers. Additionally, NAREB leaders had the 
ability to categorize and group submitted advertisements. This "fact assembly" process 
allowed the national organization to set priorities for developers to consider if they 
wanted to find and use materials.51 With their institutional structures, NAREB exercised a 
stronger hand in shaping standard narratives of what constituted successful suburban 
development and, in turn, property value. 
 The Homebuilders and Subidividers Division produced regular publications to 
disseminate ideas that developers then put into practice locally. One of these was Ideas 
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Services, a bulletin edited by the director of division activities himself a developer. A 
frequent theme of Ideas Services was advertising tactics. The director used NAREB 
resources to create widespread axioms about real estate. One of Ideas Services called 
"The Wife Buys the Home" contained sales letters and letterheads that the division 
commissioned to publish and sell to Realtors. He framed the subject as common sense, 
following the title underlined with "Dear Member: Everyone says she does."52 Each 
letter, addressed to hypothetical Ohio wife Mrs. Howard J. Gage, contained a colorful 
letterhead of white children, trees, pets, and rainbows. <Figure 4.5> The writer tried to 
convince the woman that she might fail to raise healthy, happy children unless she 
convinced her husband to purchase a suburban home. Developers followed the national 
example. The same year the Homebuilders and Subdivider Division of NAREB published 
"The Wife Buys the Home," The Roland Park Company began to keep scrapbooks of 
advertising from across the country that contained thematic sales appeals. They titled 
these scrapbooks "Parent and Sex Instincts," "Play Instincts," and "Constructive and 
Curiosity Instincts."53 NAREB based its specially-created sales samples on a Realtor's 
understandings of how gendered expectations of husbands and wives factored into a 
family's decision to buy a suburban house. Thanks to institutional structures, NAREB 
members could distill potential homebuyers into essentialized tropes that could serve as 
the basis for their business decisions. These tropes, such as the housewife concerned 
about her children, erased any individuality of the potential client as well as local 
contingencies developers or salesmen might have had to consider, which enabled 
members from across North America to apply the ideas across a wide range of 
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circumstances. Institutional structures thus helped developers and the salesmen they 
employed to form a national market by thinking of consumers, spaces, and value in 
specific, standardized ways. Nevertheless, developers could not create a market through 
ideas and institutions alone. 
 
The Market on the Ground 
Whereas the national activities of NAREB may have created standards and norms 
of a suburban housing market, the daily situation on the ground evinced fraught, 
complicated processes by which markets worked. To begin to track these tensions, one 
need only look at sales practices, beginning with the Roland Park Company's Exclusion 
Files. The company Sales Department maintained records on who they decided not to sell 
to. Each reject had a card with basic information and a space for salesmen to log any 
activities spent on that client. Once rejected, the salesman stamped "Exclusion file" or 
"Non-Operator" on top of each. From 1915 to 1948, salesmen investigated potential 
buyers, debated with supervisors on the potential merit of candidates, and recorded all 
interactions with the prospect before rejecting them.   
 Here local geography mixed with national debates as salesmen implemented 
company policy Bouton and Hollyday talked about in NAREB speeches. But the very 
existence of the files attests to the ambiguities salesmen had to work out; each rejected 
client had a card because a salesman had deemed them worth the time, only to determine 
later that they would make undesirable neighbors. Only non-black buyers received cards 
since they were potential clients before the salesmen learned more about them. Blacks, by 
contrast, did not receive cards and were excluded by deed restriction. 
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 In spite of limited surviving source material, the evidence suggests national 
circulation of sales practices among different professions created a demand for data-
intensive files that could be used to facilitate exclusion. About a decade after a company 
secretary filed away its earliest surviving Exclusion File, NAREB endorsed similar 
record-keeping tools called "prospect files," prospect being a common term among 
Realtors for a potential buyer. NAREB published in its nationally-disseminated Idea 
Services a pamphlet from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York that 
recommended sales managers keep cards containing information on prospective clients 
and the results of an attempted sale. Roland Park Company salesmen began to use 
standardized prospect files to keep track of unsuccessful sales in about 1927, after 
NAREB's push for standardization. Prior to the mid-1920s the categories of information 
differed from card to card. Each of the later, more standardized cards contained a form 
number and the year the form was bulk-printed, potentially signifying a growth in the 
market for prospect files. Company salesmen often used cards within one year of their 
print date. 54 These prospect files further indicate that NAREB did not professionalize in 
isolation, nor was it alone in trying to create a social scientific, empirically-based set of 
industry standards. 
 NAREB members usually coupled exclusion to standardizing to salesmen's pay 
structure. At Metropolitan Life, prospect files offered sales departments a better tool for 
fixing salesmen commissions, and the Roland Park Company put their cards to similar 
use. When Hollyday gave advice on "certain nationalities" in his markets article, he 
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loaded it with charts on commissions and sales productivity.  He brought up "south 
Europeans" as "people who have not lived to learn decently" to make the point that 
developers should educate new salesmen so as to maximize their rates of successful sales. 
The same held true for the Conference of Developers High-Class Residential Property. 
The very first topic for discussion in the first annual conference, and one frequently 
revisited, "sales and office organization."55 
 The Exclusion Files reflect the sentiment of Bouton's statements at the conference 
along with Hollyday's as salesmen recorded why they rejected such prospects, regardless 
of ability to pay. Such was the case with MT Cavacos. Cavacos owned a home and a 
business, but salesman John Mowbray judged the Greekness of the Cavacos family a 
liability. He wrote on the card, "These people are unquestionably Greeks. While they are 
neat and respectable [I] do not believe we would be justified in selling them. They…have 
evidently made a great deal of money."56 With this short notation, Mowbray wrote "don't 
sell," circled it in red, stamped "Exclusion File" on the card and filed it.  
 As the Roland Park Company standardized the Exclusion Files in the 1920s, 
immigration policy was proving a contentious issue among Realtors, forming the 
backdrop for how salesmen and developers worked on the ground. One contingent, from 
agricultural states, wanted to attract immigrants to remedy farm labor shortages. Realtors 
from rural areas of Michigan, Idaho, Montana, Minnesota and South Dakota wrote pro-
immigration pieces in the National Real Estate Journal.57 Michigan Realtors considered 
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immigration as necessary for rural settlement. They believed such settlement lagged 
because of the state's competitive disadvantage in the nation's rail system. "Most of the 
immigrants arriving from New York are carried right past this state to the farm belts of 
the west. Michigan, for this reason, never has had her share of settlers. It is hoped that the 
day will come when a representative of Michigan will be stationed in New York to meet 
new arrivals and to induce them to come to this state."58 They did not mention Detroit. 
 These pro-immigration Realtors wanted to work with state government to direct 
cheap labor into their areas. Realtors had worked with Michigan's Department of 
Agricultural Development to establish "farm colonization programs" in which Realtors 
both sold farms and placed newcomers on the farmland as tenants. The state, meanwhile, 
sought assistance from real estate brokers to place people on the land. 59 In some of these 
states, such as South Dakota, real estate boards formed directly from the efforts of state 
immigration departments.60 In addition to shaping a market through labor, these 
immigrants might be future clients one day if they wanted to buy land of their own. These 
Realtors based both their policy views and the shape of markets on local and regional 
concerns. They did not, however, specify what types of immigrants they most hoped to 
attract other than that they be "adapted to the climate."61 Given the winters of states like 
Michigan and South Dakota, they could have been expressing a preference for Northern 
European immigrants. 
 Anti-immigration Realtors, on the other hand, talked more explicitly about race 
and eugenics. Vocal opponents of immigration weighed in from coast to coast. Minnesota 
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Realtors invited a guest speaker to their state convention who espoused such sentiment. 
Professor CA Prosser of the Dunwoody Institute did not reject immigration, per se, but 
warned "that formerly the major portion of immigration to this country was from the 
Nordic countries of Europe. However, for the past several years the immigrants from the 
northern countries have dwindled."62 In light of such a disturbing change, Prosser called 
"for more stringent regulations governing immigration" since, as the NREJ quoted and 
paraphrased, "'there is no acid test of the fundamental things of blood' to determine 
whether newcomers to our shores will make good citizens."63 For Prosser, individual 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants might have been worthy of citizenship, but 
one could only generalize that Northern European groups would be suitable on the whole. 
Like the pro-immigration group of South Dakota, he thought the state had a role in 
controlling the flow of immigrant labor. Instead of directing them to the land, however, 
Prosser advocated for tighter restrictions.  Prosser's use of "Nordic" placed him squarely 
within eugenicist circles. He was not alone. One California Realtor put it more succinctly 
at the annual NAREB national convention: Realtors served to "save our land to the white 
race."64 
 Realtors attempted to standardize both the selling and buying of real estate, in part 
through immigration debates. Realtors continued to butt heads on immigration 
throughout the 1920s and, through their arguments, reached only a tenuous consensus 
about the housing market. Whether for or against stronger immigration controls, they 
agreed there was a "right type" of immigrant and a "wrong type." Get the wrong type and 
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a developer would see property values decline. One Chicagoan tried to describe this 
"right type" in search of a middle ground for pro- and anti-immigration Realtors. He 
declared each side "extremists of belief and resultant propaganda which, on the one hand, 
characterizes immigration as an influx of the 'scum of Europe'—and a contaminating 
menace to this country; and, on the other hand, the industrialist who insists that without 
constant recruiting of our non-skilled labor supply, industry will perish."65 He called for 
moderation since immigrants were more than labor. "Between these extremes, there is an 
increasingly large number of far-sighted, clear-thinking" men who knew that the United 
States must "must assimilate its foreign-born citizens…promptly, and decently."66 This 
speaker was willing to endorse any European immigrants who made themselves into 
good citizens by becoming "American." He did not clarify what he meant by assimilation 
but thought that paying a new arrival a living wage was crucial to the process. However, 
as "far-sighted" as he thought himself to be, his call for supporting assimilated 
immigrants still assumed these immigrants would be poor and hardworking. It did not 
address the problem developers like the Roland Park Company faced: what happened 
when a white immigrant became well-off enough to want to buy a suburban home? And 
what if the developer had doubts about the extent to which the prospective client was 
truly a good, assimilated American? 
 Despite pleas for a compromise, tensions boiled over at the 1923 the NAREB 
mid-winter meeting during which delegates interrupted a speaker advocating lax 
immigration controls and forced him from the stage. The NREJ recapped the incident 
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with the headline, "Oppose Further Immigration."67 Ultimately, NAREB added 
immigration quotas to the types of restrictions it endorsed, along with Jim Crow and 
covenants. Still, regardless of the official national policy platform, the federated 
organization remained fractured on how to incorporate race and nationality into a 
changing market, especially as the 1920s swung wildly between housing boom and bust. 
In lieu of strong national directives aside from the Code of Ethics, Realtors continued to 
deal with groups differently based on geography, labor, and local demographic patterns. 
 Realtors maintained that they were warriors against "the rising tide of color" in 
the United States. In a national convention speech in 1921, Charles Stern of California 
declared, "Who control[s] the land, the producing areas of this or any other state 
ultimately must dominate that state and dictate its standards, social and economic. That is 
our battle ground."68 Likening the task ahead to the "Battle of the Marne," he linked 
land's value to Realtors' ability to shape the relationship between people and private 
property. Realtors had to fight—to wage war—to control land and, with it, political and 
economic power. This, the country's most important resource, stood as the foundation of 
civilized society. For many Realtors, civilized society meant white society. 69 In 1923, 
New Orleans Realtor Meyer Eiseman emphasized people to make the same point, simply 
stating that "different races should be kept apart."70 Property transactions, as Stern said, 
became the front in a "battle ground" to control the color line so that the profits kept 
flowing. 
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 Ideas bandied about at conventions were executed in the interpersonal space of 
countless everyday transactions at street level. Such was the case with the prospective 
purchasers of a Roland Park Company lot, George Boas and his wife, Simone Brangier. 
Boas, born to Jewish parents, accepted an invitation to join the Johns Hopkins University 
faculty.71 Boas and Brangier wanted to buy a home in the company's district. Hollyday 
remained reluctant about the sale since the company had "a very strict rule against selling 
to Jews."72 Rather than an automatic rejection, however, Hollyday wrote to long-time 
resident of Roland Park and Hopkins Provost Joseph Ames. He asked Ames' opinion "as 
a resident and one personally acquainted with Dr. Boas" to help determine if Hollyday 
could make "an exception" to company policy.73 Ames replied the same day with a 
glowing recommendation: "He and his wife are both delightful people...The fact that he is 
a Jew has no bearing on the case. His associations are strictly among people whom you 
and I know."74 Boas proved exceptional because Ames judged him to have few to no 
Jewish acquaintances. Letting in one Jew, in this case, would not bring more Jews. Ames 
vouched for Boas by talking about both his character and extended networks. Hollyday, 
on the provost's word, would be able to control any risk Boas's Jewishness might present.  
 The visibility of difference seemed to determine whether one made it into Roland 
Park. Before selling to Boas, Hollyday checked with a company vice-president who 
personally got in touch with Ames again to follow up. He learned that Boas did not 
"worship at any synagogue and has no Jewish religious associations being an 
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Agnostic."75 Other residents or visitors to Roland Park would not look at Boas and know 
he was Jewish. They would not find him returning from a house of worship on the Jewish 
Sabbath or taking a walk through the neighborhood wearing Jewish clothing. Nor would 
they see a menorah through his window during Hanukkah or find him casting bread into 
the nearby creek during Yom Kippur. Boas would in no way be a visible Jew. The 
company staff could take comfort in feeling like they knew enough about his social 
networks. They could assume he would not cause alarm among residents. The company 
was willing to let Boas buy a home because he would not disrupt the social ecosystem 
they cultivated. The Cavacos family had been rejected because they were not just 
Greek—undesirable by blood— but "unquestionably Greek."76 John Mowbray, a Roland 
Park Company salesman, concluded they were unmistakably foreign the first time he met 
the family. Perhaps Mowbray noticed an accent or skin tone or, perhaps, he identified 
mannerisms that equated with stereotypes of Greekness. It did not matter that the 
Cavacos "were neat and respectable," nor that they "made a great deal of money."77 
 Salesmen rejected other buyers based on appearance of them or their family. 
While out, one "happened to see the children" of potential buyer Frank Carozza.78 After 
one look at Carozza's family he determined that their "dress and looks are very much of 
the Italian type." He decided to reject the prospect because he was "satisfied that 
neighbors would object to them." 79 Still other prospective buyers were "dropped on 
account of their name." These included people with names salesmen identified as 
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"Italian" such as Vincent DiPaula and Felice Iula.80 In these cases, the company did not 
distinguish between foreign-born or American-born. An Italian name, as determined by a 
salesman, meant one was Italian. According to Thomas Guglielmo, Roland Park 
Company officials likely classified Italians as a race, rendering their place of birth less 
important than their overall ancestry. However, these Italians were still considered white 
and, as such, were treated as potential homebuyers rather than banned outright like 
blacks.81 As with appearance or accent, names also served as visible markers of 
undesirability. If DiPaula lived in the district, people would know a Southern European 
lived there whenever they checked city directories or the phone book. 
 While the earliest surviving Exclusion File dates to 1915, the Roland Park 
Company contracted with the Union Credit Company 1908 to run checks on prospective 
purchasers as well as potential employees. As the Roland Park Company Secretary-
Treasurer explained to Union Credit, it did not seek reports to decide whether to extend 
financing to purchasers. Rather, they wanted to learn "the good standing of the parties in 
question, as well as" obtain "a general report of their financial condition." They 
"particularly" wished to know "of what extraction" they were.82 Between 1908 and 1914, 
two years before its earliest surviving Exclusion File, the company ordered 752 credit 
reports.83 In response, the Union Credit Company provided reports that detailed a 
person's moral character as well as family history and credit worthiness of members of 
the extended family. Each report also noted where the subject lived and whether they 
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81 Thomas Guglielmo, White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (New 
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possessed encumbered property. The Union Credit Company did not customize the 
features of the report for the Roland Park Company; if anything, they pared them down 
by request since the company did not extend lines of credit.84 The credit reports of the 
early 1900s contained practices Realtors employed by the 1910s and 1920s: they 
emplaced a person in local networks of kin and commerce and they kept an eye on local 
geography, potentially as an additional clue to the person's "extraction." They kept tabs 
not only on a person's individual financial obligations and character but that of family, 
exercising degree of determinism about a person's worthiness based on upbringing and 
background. They prefigured, in part, the ways Realtors linked personal worth to 
property value. 
 For the Roland Park Company, managing economic risk and managing racial risk 
reinforced each other. The Roland Park Company investigated clients in ways that 
resembled early credit bureaus, and for similar reasons. Historian Scott Sandage 
describes how the country's first bureau, the Mercantile Agency, "imposed discipline via 
surveillance: techniques and systems to monitor and classify people." as early as 1841.85 
Like bureau clerks, salesmen depended on people who "quietly watched their neighbors 
and reported to the central office."86 They would have been hard pressed to investigate 
prospects without local networks of businessmen and acquaintances to tap into. Sandage 
attributed these credit bureau actions to the overall need to "manage risk by managing 
identity."87 The Roland Park Company did the same, but the risk in question was not 
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solely a prospect's finances but rather the property values of the district that increased or 
decreased based on the identities of residents. For Realtors, the same link became evident 
when they emulated Metropolitan Life, whose actuarial practices dated to 1863. By the 
1920s, Realtors could draw on credit checks and actuarial science to inform their own 
professionalization project. The NAREB Code of Ethics reflected these influences on the 
national level, where Realtors tied property value tied to creating homogenous areas. 
 When Realtors gave talks on sample prospect files, those files contained sections 
about family and business relations with such headings as "Family Conditions." Salesmen 
using those cards would fill information about the nationality, religious affiliation, and 
data about spouses and children.88 The Roland Park Company salesmen found out this 
information through interviewing prospective buyers, making telephone calls to co-
workers and acquaintances, and doing research in local newspapers. Salesmen 
investigated any lead that might yield information, including, in one case, calling the 
local Italian consulate.89 
 Developers considered investigations so central to vetting prospects that they 
sought to hire dedicated female employees for the task. Bouton and others at the 
Conference of Developers of High Class Property had similar positions in their 
companies. Bouton laid out his criteria in a letter to Joseph Ames, the same long-time 
resident who vouched for George Boas. Bouton asked Ames if he knew anyone suitable 
for the job, "a little special work of investigation." The duties consisted "almost entirely 
of interviews" and, as such "should be done by a woman, not too young, of good address, 
                                                        
88 See, for example the illustrated samples in A John Berge, "How to Build and Use a Prospect File," New 
Selling Ideas for Real Estate Brokers, (Chicago: National Association of Real Estate Boards, 1929), 21. 
89 John Mowbray to Edward Bouton, July 27 1925, MS 504 Box 104 Folder 8. 
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education, and above all, good judgment."90 Bouton also preferred a local woman, since 
he only wanted to employ her part-time and did not want the "responsibility" of ensuring 
she had other things to do.91 Under these circumstances, Edith McHenry joined the 
Roland Park Company Sales Department as the only woman other than the secretary. It 
was McHenry who recommended Hollyday write to Ames about George Boas and her 
initials appear periodically in the Exclusion Files where she followed up on prospects.  
 Neither Bouton nor the other attendees at the Conference for Developers of High 
Class Property elaborated on why they specifically wanted female investigators. John 
Demarest pointed out that the "female investigator" formed part of the sales strategy. The 
woman "stimulates interest in the man whom she may go see as the reference or 
prospective purchaser." He continued, "If people are going to be investigated on the 
question of their character and their ability to purchase property that they have under 
consideration, then it might be a good place for him to locate, because he is going to get a 
certain protection for his investment, a certain protection for his family."92 The developer 
assumed the prospect would be male and, therefore would give male references. A 
professional and "conscientious" woman would impress those men with the tenor and 
nature of her investigations. Demarest called his female investigator "a walking 
advertisement" who generated new business when a prospective buyer's coworkers or 
acquaintances after she entered their offices "in a businesslike way." Even if the target of 
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her investigation ultimately proved unsuitable, a coworker knew he was going to fulfill 
his duty as husband and father if he bought a house with that developer.93 
 While her job ostensibly called for "investigating all references," McHenry 
conducted home visits when the racial identity was in doubt.94 In 1928, she assisted with 
the investigation of William Laukaitis, assistant city solicitor. The salesman had already 
conducted a cursory investigation that included phoning people "to get Mr. Laukaitis's 
religion."95 The salesman found he was not Jewish. For the salesmen to make the call 
hints that the salesman knew Laukaitis likely did not come from a Northwest European 
background. Perhaps it was name or even local geography. It turns out Laukaitis was 
born in Baltimore of Lithuanian descent, and his address at 851 Hollins Street put him in 
the heart of Baltimore's Lithuanian community.  The salesman did not seem to know 
about Laukaitis's Lithuanian background nor that the Hollins Street address might have 
signified it. Once he ruled out exclusion by blood, the salesman still tried to figure out if 
the company should sell a house to Laukaitis. Since he felt Laukaitis was "on the 
doubtless list in regard to respectability" he asked McHenry "to call on his wife to see 
what she thinks of them."96 McHenry recorded the results of her visit on the Laukaitis 
Exclusion File: "I do not think that Mr. Laukaitis or any of his tribe are desirable as 
residents of the District. They are foreign and not too hot! The men appear very nice but 
the women and their living quarters are something! Drop."97 
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 McHenry, as a company investigator, helped the Roland Park Company control 
their prospective buyer pool. Moreover, she helped establish the standards by which 
women and men were judged acceptable and "respectable." While Laukaitis could list his 
line of work and business references, and his character evaluated through conversations 
with the salesman, his wife's housekeeping abilities were found wanting.  Unlike other 
cases of visibility—with Boas or with the "foreign" family the salesman had seen on the 
street—a woman's domestic habits were contained to the interior of the home and thus 
not something an appraiser or perhaps even neighbors would be able to see. Men could 
not do these home inspections because any respectable wife would not let a strange man 
into the house while her husband was out. 
 As one Realtor put it, "Citizenship has its basis in the home, and citizenship is 
what we want to impress on the foreigner. Our home life has made our country the 
greatest in the world."98 McHenry judged the Laukaitises foreigners unable to assimilate 
to good, American standards based on their home. Her decision fit squarely into the 
NAREB immigration debate in spite of Laukaitis and his wife both being American-born. 
Those who took the position that immigrants could assimilate rather than the eugenicist 
position looked to the home as a basis for proving the merit of the immigrant. McHenry 
did not detail what she found off putting about the Laukaitis home, but she emphasized 
their "foreignness" and, by calling them "a tribe," paired foreignness with otherness. Even 
if the Laukaitises might have been redeemable one day (they were not Jewish or Greek or 
black), they would not be the Roland Park Company's problem in the short run.99 
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 After completing a sale, salesmen paid a follow up visit to the new home to obtain 
leads for new prospects because referrals formed one of the main ways they found future 
buyers. Suburban developer E.W. Chaille discussed strategies for the follow up at the 
Second Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property. Chaille 
suggested "that whenever you sell a house, send to the woman of the house when she 
moves in a box of candy and tell her it is your custom to do this." It is also your custom," 
Chaille continued, "to show your appreciation of any suggestions" she had about friends 
who might also be looking to buy.100 Kansas City developer J.C. Nichols was 
incredulous. "You do that with your high class people, do you?" Chaille responded: "Yes, 
no matter what class of people they are. The higher class they are; the more pounds of 
candy you buy."101 The candy provided another gendered tactic to soften women into 
providing information. Nichols doubted the candy was appropriate for high-class 
transactions, such as those in his affluent Kansas City suburbs, but Chaille's insisted that 
all women caved in to candy. And not just women, but children. Bouton liked the idea 
because in the event women did not want the candy, children would eat it. Chaille chimed 
in to add he gave "one woman a five-pound box of candy and she told me it kept her 
children quiet for two weeks."102 Chaille further revealed the ways Realtor beliefs and 
their understanding of a woman's labor (in this case the role of child-rearing) formed a 
cornerstone of developer sales practices and of the very formation of suburban housing 
markets. Developers also began to increase surveillance over prospects using credit 
reports in the early twentieth century, but both real estate and credit bureaus honed 
                                                        
100 Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of Developers of High-Class Residential Property, 1918. 
577. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Proceedings, 578. 
161 
 
similar techniques that would become industry standards in the 1960s, when a middle-
class family moved into a home, credit bureaus employed "respectable middle-class 
women" to visit the wife and present gifts to her. They hoped investigators would be to 
be invited inside where they could elicit information from women that would be added to 
the bureau's files.103Suburban developers and credit bureaus conducted similar work, and 
thus had long developer similar tools.104  
 Developers could not fully standardize the technologies of exclusion, as 
evidenced by the Exclusion Files themselves. Each card contained ambiguities. Their 
main section was simply a blank space for salesmen to record progress on a prospect, 
leaving the bulk of the content up to the subjective assessments busy salesmen. Some 
Exclusion Files thus have thoughts on appearance or note in detail interoffice interactions 
while others have a few typed lines and penciled notations. As with various NAREB 
sample cards, the company's cards were calibrated for male buyers, listing business 
address and business phone. The forms even failed to delineate a standard way to record 
the most basic of information: names. Cards only contained a general space for "name" 
and salesmen arbitrarily recorded a full name, last name and, regardless of marital status, 
one person or partners. 
 A case in point regarding the ambiguities of the cards and, by extension, the 
housing market, was that of "Mrs Mildred Wonneman also known as Mrs Bracket." 
According to their file, "She and her husband are both hairdressers, located on 
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Greenmount Avenue. Her occupation precludes her from purchasing in the district." The 
salesman gave occupation as a reason and indeed, developers had reached a national 
consensus that residents of certain occupations, such as undertaker, lowered property 
value.105 Wonneman/Bracket worked on Greenmount, which lacked businesses the 
Roland Park Company would have found prestigious, so local geography could have 
been another factor. Then there was the issue with her name. Given how mindful 
salesmen were of assigning female worth based on domesticity, the salesman might have 
been dissuaded by Wonneman's name, employment, and whatever reason she may have 
been listed on the card rather than (or along with) her husband. 
 NAREB never evolved in isolation; both developers and credit bureaus depended 
on tight control over consumers to ensure continued profits. Suburban housing markets 
and credit bureaus, as interlinked as they were, also shared similar ideas about value and 
worthiness: the same white male-headed family most likely to appeal to the Roland Park 
Company generally best fit the profile for bureaus to approve the extension of retail 
credit, usually to the male householder. In spite of the many obstacles white women faced 
in obtaining credit on the whole, there was a chance one might have qualified on an 
individual level, often after having to work harder in the application process and meet 
criteria men did not.106  
 Developers built the suburban housing markets by controlling spaces as much as 
policing people. That they would monitor both fit the idea that the traits of people 
affected property value. Consequently, they factored in their knowledge local 
geographies. Time and again, the Roland Park Company paid extra attention to the York 
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Road/Greenmount Avenue corridor precisely because it formed the one of the district's 
sharpest aesthetic, racial, and socioeconomic divides. To build the company's second 
subdivision, Guilford, near Greenmount/York, Bouton approved smaller, cheaper buffer 
houses, a stone wall, and limited through streets. By the 1920s the company had sold the 
houses, but some employees realized that the properties formed a weaker boundary 
against the outside world than initially envisioned. Salesman John Mowbray was one of 
them. He learned from a female resident that a Jew named Jacobs had moved next door to 
her on Greenmount. Mowbray referred the incident to Bouton in case it "was of sufficient 
importance to take action." It was. While there was "nothing" they "can do to Jacobs," 
they "can do something to the broker."107 The matter came to an abrupt end, however, 
when Mowbray discovered that Jacobs had not used a broker. Deed restrictions, such as 
those against black occupancy, formed a general check on exclusion, even if no broker 
was involved since all buyers signed onto them. Additionally, the Roland Park Company 
had the right to approve all sales and re-sales. They had not been prepared, however, for a 
sale by the previous owner of the house. A white resident stepped in and provided an 
additional check and balance enabling exclusion, blurring the line between the diligence 
of the company and white citizenry. 
 Shortly after the incident, Mowbray began to investigate the Guilford houses on 
Greenmount more carefully and discovered that two had been converted into multi-
family rental apartments. Mowbray also "felt confident" that the same had occurred to 
other Guilford houses on Greenmount.108 As these were some of Guilford's cheapest 
homes it made sense that of all owners they might be the ones who desired rental income. 
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From the outset Bouton intended for these attached homes to protect Guilford's much 
more expensive inner core by forming a de facto wall along Greenmount. Mowbray 
concentrated his efforts on Greenmount in part because he saw the homes as a liminal, 
suspect area whose residents were more likely to use their homes inappropriately. 
Mowbray informed Bouton because he feared the way people used the spaces both 
potentially harmed the rest of Guilford and the company itself. 
 Companies also based their beliefs about race and value, in part, on local context. 
Various scholars have noted that developers included different restrictions against groups 
depending on region.109 The same extended to sales practices. Company salesmen 
generally knew how to react to Southern and Eastern European prospects and Bouton 
began to research restrictions against blacks in the 1890s. Company officials were 
unprepared, however, for Asian prospects, when Bacon and Idella Chow applied to live 
in the district. Bacon Chow was a biochemist about to take a position with the Johns 
Hopkins School of Public Health and Hygiene. The salesman M. Rodgers noted that the 
Chows were "Chinese" and then wrote about a day of typical home visits, in which he 
took them to several houses across the company's developments.110 He also penciled in a 
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notation next to the typed notes that the Chows were "good buyers" because they were 
willing to spend 18,000 dollars. Two days later he consulted with a sales manager who 
"advised no further contact" because of "racial considerations." Idella Chow called the 
office two months later to say they were still looking and the same salesman once again 
consulted a sales manager. Even though Rodgers had been told to add the Chows to the 
Exclusion Files, Rodgers thought they were potentially sales worthy enough to reopen the 
subject. The sales manager did not tell Rodgers to drop the file a second time. Rather, he 
went to the president of Guilford's neighborhood association to get a resident's opinion 
about "selling Chinese in the district." The president consulted with other members of the 
association and replied that "he, personally, would have no objection" but the other 
resident was opposed to "a sale to such person." Only then did Rodgers move the Chows' 
prospect card to the Exclusion Files. The Chows instead moved to Lauraville in Northeast 
Baltimore. Rodgers persisted even when told to explicitly to exclude the Chows because 
of race. The sales manager seemed sure at first, but then consulted with a resident who 
turned to another resident. Salesmen may have had personal opinions on people of Asian 
descent, who occupied an ambiguous place in Baltimore's real estate market. None of the 
people involved thought of the Chows as white, but they considered them viable residents 
to varying degrees, which they would not have done had the Chows been black. In an act 
of popular sovereignty, the company abdicated control to their customers in key respects. 







By the eve of the Great Depression, thousands of Realtors had institutionalized 
the practices of suburban developers like the Roland Park Company. NAREB tethered 
those practices to its professionalization effort. As part of that effort, they made available 
developers' forms, publications, sales manuals, and advertising samples in an attempt to 
disseminate and standardize best real estate practices. On one hand, professionalizing real 
estate involved debates over the relationship between race and property value that drew 
from other professions. On the other, it drew from ways of seeing space and people that 
played out in NAREB's leisure and fraternal activities.  
 Ultimately, then, professionalization of real estate was inseparable from attempts 
to standardize the relationships between people and property. That standardization was 
neither totalizing at the national level, nor in the hometowns of Realtors where 
constructing the market on the ground remained rife with inconsistent daily practices. 
Realtors also considered race's intersections of race with gender, social networks, 
appearance, occupation, and local geography—conducting investigations on a case by 
case basis if the other criteria were in doubt. 
 Nevertheless, racial hierarchy remained central to Realtor thought. As a result, 
developers built the expectation of violence into the mechanisms of the market itself 
along with a racial understanding of how property value would affect surrounding lots. 
The particular images of violence they summoned—lynching and vigilantism, mob rule 
and policing neighborhood borders—historically disproportionately affected blacks. 
Realtors relied on popular sovereignty both as rhetoric and as business decisions: they 
had to practice exclusion to prevent violence by maintaining a social order within the 
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subdivision. These expectations became common sense right at the moment when 





Neighborhood Protection and Common Sense 
 
In 1938 Roland Park Company President John Mowbray had choices to make. A 
rising star in the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the association’s president 
offered Mowbray an appointment on the Executive Committee, where he would guide the 
overall direction of the largest real estate group in the United States. He also had the 
option to spend another year as chairman of the powerful Housing Committee, in charge 
of shaping the NAREB agenda on residential development. At that moment, Mowbray 
had an additional interest in the Housing Committee. He had recently accepted the 
directorship of a joint public-private program to bolster property values in Baltimore. 
Because of this project and, given the general repute of the Housing Committee, 
Mowbray decided to stay put. In the end, he described the decision as “selfish.” By 
remaining chair of the Housing Committee he "would be better received in Washington 
in trying to promote the housing program of The Roland Park Company."1 NAREB in 
general, and the Housing Committee in particular, thus gave Mowbray access to higher-
level officials within expanding federal bureaucracy. 
Mowbray got the chance to bolster the Roland Park Company with that public-
private program, the Waverly Neighborhood Rehabilitation and Protection Pilot Study, 
initiated by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation in 1938, to prevent the 
depreciation of value in an area where it owned property. While spearheaded by the 
HOLC, it consisted of a coalition of other federal agencies: the Federal Housing 
                                                        




Administration, Works Progress Administration, United States Housing Authority, along 
with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the parent organization of the HOLC. Joining 
them were municipal agencies, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City and the 
Baltimore City Parks Board. Each coalition agency sent members to the project’s main 
committee, which Mowbray chaired. The committee identified and brought on board 
local Baltimore stakeholders. Mowbray helped steer the Waverly project from its 
inception in 1938 until the HOLC published the final project report in 1940. 
Mowbray selected the Waverly neighborhood of Baltimore for the project site, 
which the HOLC approved because it owned property in the area. Located two miles 
from downtown along Greenmount and York Road, Waverly lay between two Roland 
Park Company developments: Guilford to the west and the brand new Northwood to the 
northeast. Like these areas, Waverly also consisted primarily of single family owner-
occupied homes. Demographically, project organizers noted that the selected project site 
contained a native-born “wholly white population.” To the south, however, lay a poor 
“mixed race” area that “definitely threatened” the project site.2 The HOLC considered the 
race of residents a prominent and central explanatory factor to why Waverly needed 
“protection.” Though race was only one of several criteria, the agency listed it first in its 
list of “dominant factors in Waverly.”3 Along with the final published report of the 
Waverly study, the HOLC included a drawing of showing nearby “white and colored 
occupancy.”4 By the late 1930s, the various agencies involved with the project considered 
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racial heterogeneity a mark against an area and a social sign of property value 
depreciation. 
 This chapter examines how suburban developers negotiated a role in the federal 
apparatus and how government agencies, in turn, behaved in capitalist ways. The 
Waverly project originated in the office of the HOLC, but was actually the product of a 
longer relationship between specific government officials, John Mowbray, and the 
National Association of Real Estate Boards. In 1932, six years before the Waverly 
project, NAREB first advanced model legislation on “neighborhood rehabilitation” that 
empowered small groups of property owners to seek municipal, state, and federal 
assistance to fix up properties in a designated area. The same year, NAREB also 
celebrated the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the parent agency for the 
HOLC. From the agency’s inception the following year, 1933, the HOLC worked with 
NAREB to develop the appraising and lending standards that allowed it to identify 
“distressed” homeowners and directly refinance their mortgages. NAREB, in particular, 
continued to evolve neighborhood rehabilitation, with Mowbray taking the lead once he 
joined the association’s Housing Committee.  
NAREB sought allies and consultants in the HOLC on neighborhood renewal and 
turned to Donald McNeal. McNeal proved a strong ally as head of the HOLC 
Reconditioning Department, made direct home improvement loans to property owners 
holding agency mortgages. The department extended home improvement loans to 
mortgagees with HOLC-refinanced mortgages so that the homes did not fall into despair, 
fall in value, and likely cause owners to default, leaving the HOLC with the house.5  
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McNeal and NAREB thus shared a common interest in neighborhood rehabilitation. By 
1938 McNeal became Deputy General Manager of the HOLC. Based on his work with 
reconditioning and his consultation on NAREB neighborhood rehabilitation, he contacted 
Mowbray for the HOLC pilot program.  
Mowbray tapped into state power right at a moment when the federal state greatly 
expanded under the New Deal. Mowbray and other developers like him, in turn, 
influenced how it grew and operated. Key to that process was a shared language of 
property investment. Both McNeal and Mowbray sought to predict and control future 
property values in order to profit—Mowbray as president of the Roland Park Company 
and McNeal as beholden to HOLC shareholders. Within the broader context of both men, 
NAREB and the federal agencies involved in the project couched their activities in the 
language of doing business. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, for instance, compared 
the HOLC’s operations to those of banks.6 
Furthermore, The Waverly Project provides a window into how suburban 
developers like consolidated power through influencing federal housing policy during the 
1930s. Mowbray and the federal agencies involved recognized their roles in shaping 
property appraisal and shared both personnel and literature that helped unite them in 
promoting similar “common sense” notions of real estate value. These, namely, consisted 
of codifying into policy the very ideas promulgated by the Roland Park Company and its 
peers in the 1890s and institutionalized in NAREB by the 1920s. The official study 
concluded that Waverly’s fate rested in making it more like a planned suburb. 
Specifically, it called for deed restrictions to control occupant race and income as well as 
                                                        




use of the property. It also recommended landscaped master-planned streets designed to 
“preserve” and raise property value.7 Mowbray may have chosen the site and directed the 
project but these measures had already been part and parcel of the federal plan for a pilot 
study in neighborhood protection. Through the New Deal, developer power had grown 
well beyond discrete individuals to become common sense. Nevertheless, individuals like 
Mowbray and McNeal shepherded the ideas into practice. 
The Waverly Study was also remarkable for the sheer laundry list of coalition 
members beyond the HOLC, all of whom were united in trying to protect Waverly’s 
property values. After Mowbray selected the project site at the behest of the HOLC, the 
agency began to build the government coalition. It brought on board the Housing 
Authority of Baltimore City as project sponsor. As a result, the federal United States 
Housing Authority decided on the legality of each subsequent aspect of the program. The 
study consisted of two aspects: researching every property in the designated project area 
and generating support from local stakeholders. For the former, the Works Progress 
Administration conducted a field survey where it inspected each property and questioned 
occupants. It supplemented the survey with research about titles, liens, taxes, and 
mortgages. The HOLC, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and Federal Housing 
Administration provided additional data. For publicity, the HOLC and Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board provided a public relations apparatus and constructed an educational 
campaign in which officials, including Mowbray in his capacity as director, gave 
speeches and formed alliances with particular neighborhood groups. 
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 The stakeholders the coalition brought aboard comprised mainly of white property 
owners, civic groups, developers, and lending institutions. The project prioritized 
ownership over occupancy, renters, though in a minority in Waverly, held no defined 
role. On the contrary, project officials generated support from Waverly residents and in 
the press by tying property ownership to citizenship. Waverly, they repeated, was worthy 
of federal protection because area property owners could put up a unified effort and 
possess similar ideas about the future of the neighborhood. 
As part of bringing developer power into the federal state, the coalition located a 
small area and diverted federal and municipal resources at the expense of other places 
more in need. Ultimately, the coalition published a comprehensive master plan “for the 
physical, economic, and social conservation” of Waverly based on the survey, appraisal, 
and inspections of each property in the project area. As a final step, the coalition 
organized private stakeholders into a neighborhood association and charged it with the 
long-term implementation of the master plan. Before ending its involvement in 1940, the 
HOLC passed on to the association all its data and secured assurances from both local 
lending institutions and Baltimore City government to provide assistance in the coming 
years. 
Officials offered lofty reasons for experimenting with neighborhood protection: it 
would keep people in their homes, stave off the need for future demolition, and 
potentially improve Baltimore as a whole as increased property values meant more taxes 
in city coffers.8 Neighborhood protection, however, had a corollary: Mowbray identified 
with Waverly because he thought it could be saved. But other areas were already beyond 




saving. Those, like Southern Waverly, were too racially mixed, too poor, or too 
heterogeneous. Waverly, by contrast, was trending downward but still had hope: its 
homogeneity, its single family homes, its white residents, its high percentage property 
ownership, its mostly single-use residential blocks. Just as the federal government 
deemed area property-owners worthy of protection, it dismissed the area to the south, 
which it could not make more white and more suburban. Regardless of the good 
intentions project officials had in protecting Waverly, they assumed that Waverly needed 
to be protected from the presence of poor black renters.   
 Through the Waverly project, John Mowbray came to embody how the 
development companies of the 1890s experimented with local ideas, institutionalized 
them through the national platform of NAREB, and then helped codify them into federal 
policy. He joined the company in 1911 and spent the next two and a half decades 
working his way up from clerk to one of the chief enforcers of the Exclusion Files as 
head of the Sales Department and then to Roland Park Company Vice President. In 1935 
John Mowbray became President of the Roland Park Company upon Edward Bouton’s 
retirement. When Mowbray guided the Waverly project, he acted on behalf of the federal 
government. By 1940, the Roland Park Company and the federal government literally 
spoke with a single voice to endorse a narrow vision of the segregated suburb. 
 
Origins 
The Neighborhood Rehabilitation and Protection pilot program began in the office 
of Donald McNeal, who had moved from Director of Reconditioning at the HOLC to 
Deputy General Manager. During his time in the Recondition Division, McNeal oversaw 
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renovation and repair loans made to homeowners with HOLC-financed mortgages.9 The 
HOLC wanted to conduct a demonstration on the value of renovating and restoring an 
entire neighborhood’s properties as a way to increase value, keep current owners in their 
homes, and prevent foreclosure of properties where owners held HOLC mortgages. 
McNeal sought a pilot area where the HOLC had a concentrated presence. From his 
office in Washington D.C. he selected Baltimore, close enough to Washington to allow 
for easy travel to the project site.10  
McNeal approached John Mowbray in July,1938. McNeal considered Mowbray 
the ideal Baltimorean to direct such a project. McNeal knew he wanted a Realtor at the 
helm. He did not offer a specific reason, but the HOLC had a long relationship with 
NAREB, who supplied real estate knowledge and personnel from the HOLC’s founding 
in 1933.11 Mowbray chaired the powerful national Housing Committee and served stints 
as president of the Real Estate Board of Baltimore. Most importantly to McNeal, 
Mowbray had spent the past three years serving as unofficial spokesman for NAREB 
neighborhood rehabilitation ideas.12 Mowbray attributed the Waverly plan’s ideas to 
NAREB and described it as a chance to “put into practical effect some of the theories that 
our National Association [of Real Estate Boards] has advanced.”13  
 NAREB only developed positions on housing rehabilitation through consultation 
with the federal government. In fact, Mowbray and McNeal had already worked together 
to promote neighborhood rehabilitation. McNeal had been one of several federal officials, 
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worked with NAREB to create a model statute in 1935 that they intended as a blueprint 
for municipal governments to fund efforts of property owners to re-plan the 
neighborhoods where that property was located, to supply funds to renovate houses, and 
to enforce stricter land-use controls such as restrictive covenants and/or zoning changes.14 
NAREB disseminated the statute to all real estate boards with the expectation that local 
Realtors would lobby municipal and state officials for its passage. The NAREB general 
secretary penned an acknowledgment section that included Mowbray and McNeal. It also 
listed along with members of two other Federal officials who later participated in the 
Waverly study in 1938: Miles Colean of the Federal Housing Administration and Arthur 
Holden, housing advisor to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.15 
 Prior to Mowbray collaborating with McNeal, Colean, and Holden, NAREB 
became one of the chief lobbyists for the passage of the National Housing Act in 1934, 
the act that created the FHA. NAREB became heavily involved with developing the 
National Housing Act to the point where the association received a dedicated conference 
room in the Senate during hearings for the bill. 16 NAREB President and Houston 
suburban developer Hugh Potter stayed in Washington for extended periods of time.17 
When not there he "continued close contact by wire and phone with the Dalger 
committee which is steering this legislation." 18 By contrast, legislators allowed little 
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input from “organized labor, housing reformers, civil rights activists, or inter-racial 
housing advocates."19 
 NAREB helped write and re-write the National Housing Act, succeeding in 
getting whole provisions altered or removed. One wide-ranging revision NAREB secured 
was striking a provision from Title II of the Act which would have required those seeking 
Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance to live in the property they owned.20 
NAREB Secretary Hebert U. Nelson explained to members that the association worked to 
eliminate the owner-occupancy requirement in order to “broaden the measure.” Many 
homeowners, he continued, had to rent properties “due to reduced incomes” during the 
Great Depression.21 NAREB framed its actions as protecting distressed individual 
property owners. With the measure’s erasure from the National Housing Act, however, 
NAREB empowered absentee landlords, institutional investors, and corporations to avail 
themselves to federal mortgage insurance. NAREB and the federal government endorsed 
a vision of entitlement, indeed of citizenship, based, above all, on property ownership22 
As with the model neighborhood rehabilitation statute, key members of the new 
federal housing apparatus and the older Community Builders who led NAREB found a 
shared interest in prioritizing property owners in their vision of economic recovery from 
the Great Depression. Such language often appeared racially neutral on paper, as was the 
case of striking “owner-occupied” from Title II. NAREB even argued that its revision 
made the National Housing Act more inclusive. In practice, however, the same NAREB 
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leaders and federal housing officials deployed the language of property ownership and 
property rights to protect, and even bolster, white investment. 
 Protecting Waverly was good for Mowbray’s business. The Waverly project area 
formed a buffer zone between the Roland Park Company district to the north and a 
mixed-race and working class area to the south. Mowbray, McNeal, and members of the 
HOLC parent organization, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board agreed that if residents 
from the south moved into the project area, it would "seriously impair property values in 
the choice sections adjacent thereto."23 As a buffer zone not only was Waverly's own fate 
at stake, but that of the Roland Park Company District. In particular, the Roland Park 
Company’s established Guilford and its brand new subdivision of Northwood 
immediately to the east. The company was having trouble developing Northwood, which 
it began at the height of the Depression in 1933. Depreciating real estate values would 
only hurt the company further. 
 The HOLC agreed with Mowbray’s selection of Waverly because the site also 
proved good for its business. It dispensed mortgages in the area as well as owning some 
property outright through foreclosure. It held 122 mortgages in the project area or seven 
and a half percent of the total properties, including five vacant homes, out of the project 
area's total of 1,610.24 Of the 122 mortgages, ten percent had been in default for twelve 
months or more.25 It was not unusual that the HOLC owned property in Waverly. 
Between 1936 and 1940, the HOLC owned and then resold roughly two percent of the 
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owner-occupied nonfarm dwellings in the United States.26 The HOLC had already been 
renovating the houses it owned through foreclosure before attempting to resell them. By 
the start of the Waverly rehabilitation program, it "spent or directed the expenditure of 
approximately $120 million for the repair of more than 640,000 properties."27 
The HOLC and its parent, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board conceived of and 
conducted mortgage operations as a business. The FHLBB compared the HOLC 
Reconditioning Division, which served as the HOLC’s main proponent for the Waverly 
project, to a building and loan institution.28 Both had “a practical interest in the security 
behind so large a percentage of the business on their books.” Furthermore, both the 
HOLC and private lenders needed reconditioning “done efficiently and at the least 
expense.” If carried out well, however, the FHLBB concluded in its official organ that 
“efficient reconditioning protects the institution’s investment and ensures a satisfied 
borrower.”29 Though it was referring to the HOLC the statement applied equally well to a 
building and loan enterprise. 
With its focus on property investment—and role as property owners—the HOLC 
took a keen interest in current and future real estate values, which they closely monitored 
through in-house appraisal. The HOLC knew that its appraisals fundamentally affected 
lending standards throughout the United States.30 It also realized that its effects would 
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likely be long term due to the sheer volume of its operations compared to that of other 
lenders—it held ten percent of all non-farm mortgages in the United States when the 
Waverly project began in 193731 The HOLC sought to parlay its “responsibilities to 
protect housing investments and values” into the opportunity to set “sane and permanent” 
standardized appraisal principles. 
The HOLC and NAREB worked together to draw up the “appraisal forms and 
regulations” HOLC appraisers used.32 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board and NAREB 
both promoted the collaboration to their members. 33 In addition, the FHLBB published 
HOLC appraisal forms to give “private home-financing institutions” access to them. 
<Figure 5.1> HOLC Appraisers had to fill in 98 lines, an HOLC office worker another 
six, and a manager an additional five, concluding with “CORPORATION VALUE.” The 
HOLC continued two core NAREB principles: that the value of a single property was 
affected by all surrounding properties and that the characteristics of occupants affected 
value along with a property’s physical characteristics. The forms included sections to 
describe the building and any improvements made on it. It also contained a section called 
“district” with a line for “residents in neighborhood.” The appraiser had to fill in four 
lines recording the percentage of area residents “American,” “Foreign,” “Negro,” and 
“Oriental.”34 Because the HOLC wanted to determine the future of the neighborhood to 
protect any investment it made there, it included two lines in the district section about 
trajectory: “Trends” with the choices “Static,” “Up,” and “Down” and “Transition” where 
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the appraiser had to determine the rate at which a district was moving “To Business,” “To 
Apartments” and “To Industry.”35  
The HOLC continued the NAREB assumption that developers like the Roland 
Park Company helped establish: that the most valuable type of residential property was 
white-owned, white-occupied single family house on a planned street. The HOLC 
incorporated this assumption into the trend and transition questions: if a district 
transitioned, it would be downward to a denser, more mixed use, or more mixed-race 
character.36 This line of thinking provided the entire impetus for the Waverly project: to 
stop Waverly from transitioning into a slum like the mixed-race, renter-heavy section to 
its south with buildings in various states of repair. In other words, the HOLC’s appraisal 
ideology echoed the words of suburban developer John Demarest from the 1919 
Conference for Developers of High-Class Residential Property, “When you open the 
door, it’s gone.”37  
The HOLC adapted these appraisal forms to construct “security maps” that graded 
sections of American metropolitan areas. In making the maps the HOLC and the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board sought to identify and describe the level of risk different parts of 
cities posed so that the HOLC could better decide where to make loans. The maps 
contained four grades corresponding to color. A, colored green, was the highest grade. B 
(blue) and C (yellow) signaled increased risk. D (red) had the lowest property values and 
highest risk. To construct the map, HOLC appraisers switched from using a form 
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evaluating a single property to one that covered an entire district. The HOLC then 
compiled these “area descriptions,” each of which was clearly marked at the top with the 
area’s assigned number and the appraiser’s letter grade. <Figure 5.2> This form was 
significantly shorter, containing only fifteen lines compared to one hundred and nine…. It 
greatly expanded, however, the questions on the social and racial traits of residents. The 
new forms kept the “trend” question, but instead of “transition,” the area descriptions 
contained a question about “infiltration.” The form expanded this question in the 
directions to appraisers on the reverse side as “any threat of infiltration from foreign-
born, negro, or lower grade population.” If so, appraisers were to “indicate these by 
nationality and rate of infiltration like this: ‘Negro-rapid.’”38 The area study form rolled 
older question about transition into the broad question “Detrimental Influences” where 
the appraiser was instructed to again mention “infiltration from lower grade population or 
different racial groups.” Whereas appraisers only devoted one portion of the form to the 
future of a district’s uses that portion shared space with reiterating information about 
class and race.  
In Baltimore City and County, federal appraisers followed suit, creating area 
descriptions based on the principles of NAREB filtered through the HOLC. Appraisers 
described the Baltimore County seat of Towson, for example as having among its 
favorable features a “desirable suburban residential section.” By contract, Towson’s 
detrimental features were “some very obsolete property” and “negroes.” 39 Unlike 
Baltimore City, which appraisers divided into areas for its map, the HOLC left Towson 
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undivided and rated it overall “still desirable.” Nevertheless, appraisers clarified that 
there was only one “concentration of negroes.” They referred to East Towson, an enclave 
that was, like Cross Keys, settled by freed slaves from nearby plantations in the 
nineteenth century.40 Towson was not the only section where appraisers noted blacks 
living in or near suburban settings. Of Baltimore’s 23 B-rated areas, a “small percentage” 
of blacks lived in area B-14, also outside the city limits in Baltimore County.41 In a 
contradictory fashion appraisers labeled it a “quiet suburban section of homogenous 
character.”42  With no infiltration and no relief families or foreign-born residents, B-14 
trended “static to upwards.”43 Of Baltimore’s twenty-two C-rated areas, blacks lived in 
six, but always comprised under ten percent of the population. Blacks lived in each of 
Baltimore’s redlined D areas, generally making up over twenty percent over the 
population.44 In other words, the HOLC considered any area of Baltimore a high credit 
risk if more than ten percent of the population was black. 
The Waverly project site fell in an area the HOLC rated A, B, and C.  A-2 
consisted of a mixture of detached brick and frame homes and rowhouses no more than 
ten years old, listed no foreign-born or black population, no infiltration, and no “relief 
families.” The HOLC appraiser described it as “a fairly new suburban area of 
homogenous character. Well planned development.” Its population “type” consisted of a 
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“substantial middle class.” B-8, a “good residential area” “holding up in value,” was 
home to “a few” relief families but no foreign born or black residents. C-9, which 
primarily hugged York Road/Greenmount Avenue received low marks because of its 
heavily commercial nature.45 
Just to the south of the Waverly project area, the HOLC rated a so-called "slum," 
area D-6. For residents of D-6 the HOLC’s D rating eliminating the chances for residents 
securing federal credit to renovate or move elsewhere. <Figure 5.3> D-6 contained “35% 
foreign born” and 35% negroes” with “infiltration” from each group. Houses averaged 
thirty-five years old, the same as Waverly’s B and C-rated sections. The appraiser listed 
the buildings as being in predominantly poor condition. Residents consisted 
overwhelmingly of renters. Rental demand remained fair while sales demand poor. The 
one “favorable influence” of D-6 was proximity to “desirable properties.” On the other 
hand, that “desirable property” lay near D-6 raised the concerns by appraisers. Mowbray 
and McNeal shared these concerns and officials repeated them in speeches and published 
reports.46 This was the area from which they wanted to protect Waverly. 
The HOLC did not make security maps alone. In each city they employed 
consultants to work with appraisers in the local office.47 In Baltimore’s case, the security 
map consultants from 1937 point to the blurry line that existed between entrepreneurs and 
the state. The map consultants consisted of nine real estate brokers, each of whom did 
business in a different section of Baltimore City or County. One, a brokerage company, 
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Piper and Hill, operated in Homeland and Roland Park. Another map consultant was a 
former Roland Park Company employee, Paisley Lemmon, who had become chief 
evaluator of the Federal Housing Administration by this time. Two representatives from 
building and loans also consulted along with a professor at Goucher College and an 
HOLC official based in Towson.48 Four businessmen rounded out the list, two of whom 
had strong connections to the Roland Park Company: Theophilus White was Mowbray’s 
business partner for various enterprises while Guy T.O. Holliday headed the Roland Park 
Company sales force and, like Mowbray, enforced the Exclusion Files.49                    
When Mowbray signed on to direct the Waverly protection project in July, 1937 
he became an appointed official in the of the federal housing apparatus. But he still 
remained a developer. Likewise, when McNeal brought him on board, he had spent the 
decade conducting business for the HOLC and working with NAREB. They joined 
together out of a common interest: to protect the investment of their respective 
enterprises in Baltimore property.  
 
The Stakeholders and the Site 
 
After their initial meeting Mowbray, McNeal, and a Baltimore-based HOLC 
administrator drew up a proposal to take to a sponsoring agency, the Housing Authority 
of Baltimore City. In the proposal, they mapped out a program to “secure” property 
values by preventing an at-risk area from further socioeconomic or demographic 
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change.50 It consisted of two parallel operations: neighborhood organization and 
planning. An Advisory Committee, chaired by Mowbray, steered both. It consisted of 
twenty-five members of federal and local government. Each federal or municipal agency 
involved with the study had representatives on the board. They included The Housing 
Authority of Baltimore City and its parent agency the United States Housing Authority. 
HABC sponsored the program on the condition that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
approved the resulting plans as well as provided funds and supplies."51 The United States 
Housing Authority’s legal department, in turn, approved all the project decisions since it 
was the parent agency of the project’s official sponsor, the Baltimore City Housing 
Authority.52 Founded only a year earlier in 1937, HABC was in the midst of surveying 
property to demolish for public housing projects. The Housing Authority expressed 
particular interest in the Waverly plan’s field survey component and hoped it could be 
extended to the entire city. If done, it would gain data to help it better negotiate, buy, and 
option property in designated clearance areas.53 The HABC had also already been in 
contract with the HOLC when it bought several houses either owned by holders of HOLC 
mortgages or owned outright by the HOLC through foreclosure. Given that these 
properties were mainly located in D-grade areas, they only amounted to a handful of 
properties. Nevertheless, each transaction involved inter-agency negotiation.54 
The HOLC and its parent, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, also supplied data 
it had from prior studies on appraisals and local housing conditions as well as on the 
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properties it already held through foreclosure. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's 
public relations department handled the flow of information to the press in conjunction 
with Mowbray.55 The Works Progress Administration appropriated $25,000 and provided 
personnel for survey that served as the basis for re-planning the area.  
One member of the Advisory Committee represented the FHA. This was usually 
the state director though Paisley Lemmon, former Roland Park Company employee, 
HOLC map consultant, and chief appraiser for the Baltimore insuring office of the FHA 
attended instead.56 For Waverly, the FHA promoted Title I home improvement loans to 
area residents. They did so, in part, by recruiting various local painters, decorators, and 
related workers who would "make good salesmen" for the project.57  
Finally, the Baltimore City Board of Parks Commissioners played no official role 
in the study, but they “agreed to assist the program wherever possible.”58 Per request 
from the Advisory Committee, it conducted a study at its own expense of street layout 
and landscaping to be used by the HOLC when compiling the master plan for Waverly. 
Land in the project area, including the median of East Thirty Third Street already fell 
under Parks jurisdiction. The Board also ran nearby Municipal Stadium and met with 
members of the Advisory Committee to discuss issues related to game days.59 
Each agency involved in the Waverly project historically used state power to 
classify and segregate people based on race to determine resource distribution. This 
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included municipal agencies. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City and the Park 
Board ran segregated public housing complexes and recreational facilities. For federal 
agencies, The HOLC factored race into its color-coded maps that rated different areas of 
cities to illustrate how safe they were for long-term loans. The FHA adopted these maps, 
along with HOLC appraisal practices to guard access to its insured mortgages. Moreover, 
the HOLC and FHA operated through local field offices and, as with its Baltimore map 
consultants, through local people. 
Lending institutions sought to participate in the project since it would mean both a 
boom in low-risk government-backed lending and general publicity. The president of the 
regional Provident Savings Bank, met with an HOLC representative to stress the bank 
was “ready, willing, and able to cooperate” since it had a branch on Greenmount 
Avenue.60 Prior to the beginning of the Waverly project the bank opened a loan 
department, called “Friendliloan,” that made both personal loans and FHA Title I home 
improvement loans. Provident’s president felt that the bank could “be of assistance to 
both you [the HOLC] and the property owners who wish to benefit from the project.”61 
He stressed that project officials should not hesitate to call on the bank “for anything.”62 
Provident did not advertise Friendliloan in local newspapers as a source of home 
improvement loans. Rather, Friendliloan allowed for “quick cash” with or without 
collateral for any “worthy cause,” even for those who did not deposit in the bank.63 
Provident Savings Bank re-framed Friendliloan’s services to emphasize FHA-backed 
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home improvement loans specifically to facilitate the federal government channeling 
project area property owners through its doors. 
 The government coalition identified stakeholders and invited them to join the 
Advisory Committee. These stakeholders comprised twelve of the twenty-five members, 
allowing government officials a majority. They consisted of seven members of approved 
neighborhood associations, a member of the Board of Governors of the Women’s Civic 
League, real estate developer Edward J. Gallagher Jr, and a reverend. On the Women’s 
Civic League, Mowbray noted it shared the same aims as the Waverly Program through 
its “committees on traffic regulations, planning and zoning, and clean city.”64 Gallagher 
represented his company, E.J. Gallagher Realty, one of the largest residential builders in 
Baltimore. His company developed Ednor Gardens, an A-rated area immediately adjacent 
to Waverly project area, lying between the project area and a portion of the Roland Park 
Company’s Northwood. He also lived in Ednor Gardens, three blocks from Waverly.65 
Members of the government coalition also used personal connections to facilitate 
the Waverly project. In the case of Paisley Lemmon, Baltimore’s FHA chief appraiser 
and former Roland Park Company employee, these connections stemmed from his 
property ownership. In December, 1939 The HOLC asked Lemmon how to persuade the 
Baltimore City Forester to trim trees in the project area.66 The Baltimore City Forestry 
Division had no involvement with the Waverly project. The City Forester declined to take 
up the tree trimming because he did not have enough money in division’s budget to 
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devote time and resources to the job.67 The HOLC told Mowbray, who suggested that 
Lemmon be brought in. According to Mowbray, Lemmon had prior success “in getting 
some help in trimming trees and caring for diseased ones in the area south of 33rd Street, 
where he owns some property.”68 Though the full extent and nature of Lemmon’s 
property ownership in the area remains unclear, he was a landlord on Belle Terre Avenue, 
one block south of 33rd Street.69 Belle Terre itself was rated B by the HOLC, where 
Lemmon served as map consultant but it was part of two streets that extended in a thin 
blue line into a yellow C-rated area and lay and a mere two blocks from the red D-6.70 
Lemmon, who helped create the HOLC graded maps, managed to marshal city services 
on a favorably rated block where he owned property. <Figure 5.4> Mowbray, knowing 
this, thought Lemmon could be of use teaching project officials how to secure additional 
municipal resources for the Waverly project area north of 33rd Street.  
To carry out the neighborhood organization arm of the study, the Advisory 
Committee incorporated a non-profit group, The Waverly Conservation League on June 
13, 1940. It was would be led by the “central executive” of the league’s Operating 
Committee.71 The Waverly Project officials charged the Waverly Conservation League 
with the long-term implementation of the neighborhood conservation plan after the initial 
study phase spearheaded by the public-private coalition. The Advisory Committee 
selected nine of its ten members: six "District Chairmen" selected from around the project 
site, three women "to represent the feminine residents of Waverly," and one member 
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elected at large by the other nine.72 The Advisory Committee voted to furnish the 
Operating Committee with HOLC data, including surveys and residential security maps, 
to which the agency tightly controlled access.73 These local stakeholders received state 
resources, like access to HOLC appraisal data and technical assistance, normally off-
limits to neighborhood groups.74 In the event that the Waverly Conservation League 
faced difficulty coordinating stakeholders and enforcing the “protective ordinances” that 
might accompany the Waverly Study’s master plan, Mowbray wanted the Baltimore City 
government to pass legislation to compel cooperation from non-compliant parties.75 
Mowbray, then, saw the long-term potential for the city to assist in “neighborhood 
protection” by enforcing the developer-endorsed and state-funded practices of the 
Waverly study.  
 Other Baltimore interests did not have the same level of influence or access to the 
state as Mowbray and the Roland Park Company. While the agencies conducting the 
Waverly project promoted it as the city’s first project where residents came together to 
beautify a neighborhood, the Clean Block Campaign had been organized by Francis L. 
Murphy and the Afro-American newspaper a full five years earlier. In the Clean Block 
Campaign property owners and renters in Baltimore's segregated black neighborhoods 
improved the appearance of their streets and buildings. However, the reasons for the 
Clean Block Campaign differed from the Waverly pilot program. The former responded 
to a lack of government services in predominantly black neighborhoods while the pilot 
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program poured government resources into a white one. Mowbray knew about the Clean 
Block Campaign since the Roland Park Company's magazine published a feature on it, 
which sparked anger from Murphy and the Afro-American for its use of racial epithets to 
refer to women and children.76 That Mowbray and agency officials omitted mention of 
the Clean Block Campaign in any surviving documentation proved particularly 
egregious: Waverly had its own clean block campaign south of 33rd Street in the area 
they deemed a "slum” and omitted from the study area 77 The campaign was organized by 
a neighborhood group, The Waverly Improvement League, which was not one of the 
groups project the Advisory Committee recognized as a neighborhood stakeholder.   
The Waverly Study coalition defined the project site in addition to selecting 
stakeholders. They used similar criteria for both: seeking the part of Waverly with the 
greatest concentration of white property-owners. Mowbray and the HOLC played the 
largest roles in defining the site. <Figure 5.5> They delineated an area running from the 
Olmsted-designed parkway of 33rd Street north to 42nd Street and from the 
Greenmount/York Road corridor on the west to Pen Lucy Avenue (now Argonne Drive) 
and Ellerslie Avenue on the east. An early report in 1939 described a "selected residential 
area which, although not classified as a slum area, shows marked evidence of 
depreciation in usefulness and property values."78 For the moment, "at least, desirable 
neighbors are generally assured."79 In other words, while certain Waverly properties 
showed some physical deterioration, it still comprised a racially homogenous area. Given 
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the centrality of racial homogeneity to federal appraisals and to older notions of property 
value developers institutionalized in NAREB, that very homogeneity served as a hopeful 
sign for the area’s future. 
Officials also explained that Waverly's tentative but good condition lay in part 
with its property owners: Renters only made up twenty percent of its occupants and the 
vast majority of housing stock consisted of single-family dwellings with indoor 
plumbing, heating, and running water. Project officials also approved the character of 
residents, noting "considerable pride of ownership is apparent, social and cultural 
activities arc established."80 The selected area was ninety-eight percent residential, with 
most commercial activity limited to Greenmount/York and Old York Roads.81 As with 
racial homogeneity, the idea of single-use, single family home districts also gained 
widespread currency in part through developer practices in the 1890s. By the late 1930s it 
had already been enshrined through zoning laws and NAREB appraisal hierarches. 
 Officials reached these numbers and value judgements by selecting boundaries to 
the Waverly project site that actually left out the neighborhood's southern third, area D-6. 
Waverly always had porous and dynamic borders, but the chosen site even omitted 
Waverly's post office and old town hall, both of which lay south of 33rd Street. For the 
purposes of the study, the state-backed project redefined what constituted Waverly along 
hard borders. Whether deliberately or not, existing streetscape features reinforced the 
choices: 33rd street had a wide median. Almost immediately north of there, the Roland 
Park Company’s Guilford border Greenmount/York with dead-end streets and a stone 
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wall. To the east was Municipal Stadium, run by the Baltimore Parks Board, which was 
involved with the Waverly project.82  
 Project officials further redefined the geography of Waverly. Early reports 
described the project area's southern boundary as "making contact with one of the 
downtown districts." That contact exposed "it to infiltration of sub-standard influences."83 
Mowbray and others involved with the project referred to that area as a "slum" that 
"menaced [Waverly's] social and economic integrity."84 Waverly, and neighborhoods like 
it across the country, needed rehabilitation because "undesirable residents move into the 
neighborhood when the first of its homes is permitted to fall below the standard of 
maintenance set by adjoining properties and is consequently rented or sold at a price 
below that of the general community level."85 Regardless of the conditions to the project 
area's immediate south, Waverly and the so-called "slum" stretched from two and three 
miles north of the harbor, well-removed from the central business district and adjacent 
areas. <Figure 5.6> Nevertheless, officials placed it in the same imagined geography as 
predominantly black areas of East and West Baltimore. Whether or not the geographic 
description "downtown" fit the southern portion of Waverly it functioned as a social and 
aesthetic descriptor that linked a working class rental district to the other D areas closer 
to Baltimore’s old center. By contrast The HOLC appraised the Roland Park Company 
District and other A and B areas highly because they had “suburban” traits.    
 
Protecting Waverly 
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Once the HOLC delineated the site with Mowbray’s assistance and assembled a 
coalition of government agencies and white property owners, it began the planning phase 
of the project, consisting primarily of a WPA-led survey of both individual properties and 
the project area as a whole. WPA Survey workers went door to door to circulate two 
questionnaires to property owners over five months. Renters did not participate. One 
questionnaire gathered "social and economic factors bearing upon physical and functional 
characteristics of the area." The other asked about physical characteristics of the 
property.86 Additional workers collected municipal and court records on anything related 
to taxes, mortgage, sales information, and permit history. Still others talked to local 
HOLC workers and Realtors to ascertain area conditions. Together, survey workers sent 
the data to draftsmen to create maps. They also gave it to tabulators who created I.B.M 
punch cards for mechanized sorting.87 Once processed, architects and appraisers 
conducted reviews on each property and made recommendations for improvements with 
estimated costs. Property owners incurred these costs if they followed the 
recommendations. Officials turned to area planning after account for individual 
properties. They studied "installed utilities and present street and alley patterns, park 
facilities, playground provision, land use, block improvement schemes, and zoning 
ordinances" to determine how to re-plan the project area.88 The WPA then supplied the 
results to the Advisory Committee which gave it to personnel from the Housing 
Authority of Baltimore City to disseminate to “property owners” in the project area.89  
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McNeal and Mowbray initiated an “educational campaign” to garner support from 
area residents. Mowbray played up health, stability, and family life in his public 
speeches. Standing before one of the officially-recognized neighborhood groups, The 
York Road Improvement Association, he delivered a speech in hopes of attracting the 
support of members. His notes for the speech opened with "The thrill of returning home. 
Pleasure of going again to the old homestead. The home of your father. Place from which 
you went to Sunday school, then to public school, and from there to life's work."90 
Mowbray crafted a narrative of solidarity based on a shared, imagined domesticity and 
property ownership. He emphasized that vision by saying "Such an environment 
produces our real leaders in National [sic] life."91 By contrast, "the criminal element 
seldom buys a house."92 To support this statement, he cited "65% of the inmates of 
prisons come from houses, not homes," a meaningless statistic that played upon the fears 
of “slum-dwellers” moving into the area if existing residents did not stabilize their 
homes.93 The final published project report echoed Mowbray’s sentiment, attributing 
“social and civic pride” to residents’ shared whiteness and native-born status.94 
 After detailing the facts and operational structure of the project, he talked about 
"work still to be done" to stop "encroachment from the south."95 Among these tasks he 
included "Impose restrictions-Roland Park Company, Mount Royal Association."96 By 
citing the Roland Park Company and Mount Royal Association's deed restrictions, 
Mowbray linked the future of Waverly to both the Roland Park Company—which had 
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spent years erecting boundaries between it and Guilford—and to and to Mount Royal, the 
same area that gave the United States its first residential segregation ordinances twenty-
five years earlier.  
Mowbray also erased the contentious relationship between the Roland Park 
Company and Waverly. The company had long treated York Road like a buffer zone with 
views of Waverly and its residents as "eye sores" to be avoided. Now Waverly residents 
needed to model their own practices on those of their neighbors across York. Residents 
likely did not know that Mowbray chose Waverly for the project so it could be a buffer 
zone between the Roland Park Company district the poorer, more mixed-race areas to the 
southeast. Through creating an impression of shared history with Waverly's residents, 
Mowbray actually drew from older developer practices of policing boundaries to keep out 
undesirable neighbors, including the Roland Park Company’s boundaries along York 
Road and Greenmount Avenue. However, because Mowbray delivered his speech in his 
capacity as Waverly Project Director, blurring the line between the Roland Park 
Company, municipal, and federal government.97  
 While Mowbray conducted the education campaign by constructing historical 
narratives that encouraged community buy-in, McNeal talked about property value. In his 
address to The Chestnut Hill Association, another officially-recognized group. "Waverly 
is a community of substantial citizens; its property values are essentially sound," he 
assured them, attributing Waverly's stability to its property owners being good citizens.98 
The project would not fail those good citizens. Its aim, McNeal said, was to "preserve 
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good homes and protect the investments of their owners." He added that these 
investments represented "a good share of their lifetime savings."99 Such thrift and 
diligence should not go unnoticed and unrewarded. The HOLC and the other agencies 
involved in the project noticed. McNeal acknowledged Waverly residents' hard work and 
wanted to help them defeat "the encroaching blight" that "menaced Waverly" before their 
hard-earned equity "vanished."100 The education campaign proved successful. Project 
reports confirmed that "the average Waverly resident" resisted the project at first but 
gradually supported it once they better understood how it would help them.101 
Mowbray and McNeal faced limits, however, to generating support through an 
educational campaign. One, Dr. Simon Moser, led a recognized neighborhood group that 
objected to the project's boundaries. They wanted to include the area south of 33rd Street 
in the project. The group voiced one of the few critiques from residents that made it to the 
press, since the Federal Home Loan Bank Board tightly controlled publicity.102 Moser, 
being a member of the project's Advisory Committee and president of one of the 
officially-recognized neighborhood associations, attended meetings in which the Board's 
publicity agent ordered committee members and project area residents not to speak to 
journalists without Mowbray's approval.103 Moser spoke to The Sun anyway after his 
group lodged a complaint with the head of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City.  
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In his interview Moser differentiated between his Waverly and "the areas south of 
Waverly."104 He reasoned that if "the Government" included the southern portion within 
the project area then it could more closely control conditions there and "Waverly will be 
doubly protected."105 Moser and his group bought into the general logic of the study that 
the area to the south lowered everyone's property values because it was both slum area 
that was also a "slum-creating area."106 It was, he said, “cancer which [was] breaking 
down realty value more than anything else” lay south of the project area.107 This was no 
moment of inclusionary thinking for Moser, who did not express a desire to work with 
residents south of 33rd Street. Rather, to Moser, the project could serve multiple functions 
depending on the target. While he supported the state diverting technical assistance and 
capital to assist white property owners like himself, he envisioned a different role for the 
state when it came to the black renters south of the project area: the surveillance and 
education they would receive as unequal participants would help Moser protect his 
property value.  
Meanwhile, for Moser and other property owners of the Waverly area, the state 
worked to ensure access to credit on good terms. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
and the Federal Housing Administration reached agreements with lending institutions to 
increase any current mortgages of Waverly residents to finance the cost of renovations 
and repairs.108 The FHA also marked properties in the Waverly project area as eligible for 
Title I funds for renovation and Title II mortgage insurance.109 Though the FHA left 
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individual applications for such funds in the hands of lenders, the aforementioned 
assurances from local institutions all but guaranteed Waverly project area residents 
access to needed federally-backed finance. Unlike property owners in the project area, the 
renters to the south received no such assurances or easy paths to access federal funding to 
improve the houses in which they lived. Instead, like many redlined areas, federal and 
municipal government eyed southern Waverly for a different type of government-
sponsored project: later that decade much of area D-6 would be demolished for urban 
renewal. 
 At the conclusion of the Waverly test study, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
published a master plan to “restore and preserve the value” of the project area.110 The 
plan consisted of two parts: spot reconditioning and remodeling of individual properties 
as identified in the WPA survey. Part B called for adjustments to zoning regulations that 
would remove small industrial plants and “food distribution” stores in the portions of 
Waverly zoned residential, all of which already existed prior to the introduction of zoning 
in Baltimore City fourteen years earlier in 1926. The street pattern would also be adjusted 
under Part B through the cooperation of the Waverly Conservation League and city 
agencies. They would work together to effect strategic street closures, widenings, and 
changed traffic patterns. Taken together, the master plan would not only “stop future 
objectionable encroachments from the south” but “protect the city’s investment in 
Waverly’s infrastructure,” bolster the city and state tax base by preventing the 
depreciation of property value. Finally, the master plan would “protect the residential 
neighborhoods contiguous to [Waverly] on the north, east, and west. In other words, it 
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would protect Guilford and the Roland Park Company’s new neighborhood of 
Northwood.111 
In addition to the physical specifications, the final report of the Waverly study 
recommended the adoption of deed restrictions. While acknowledging that restrictions 
“cannot be easily established” in already built-up areas like Waverly, the neighborhood 
group should make an effort to get property owners to sign on to area-wide restrictions. 
The benefits of restrictions, according to the report, would be to effectively ward off 
“undesirable infiltration,” “improper land use,” and “unattractive street pictures.”112 
Overall, not only would they enhance property value, but they would protect “social 
values” that would reinforce the neighborhood’s long-term economic fortunes.113 As 
evidence, the report cited an unnamed section of Baltimore that had been imposing 
restrictions since it started construction in 1892 and where, as a result, property values 




As the public-private coalition wrapped up its phase of the Waverly protection 
project in 1940, the HOLC deemed it a success. The project doubled the number of loans 
repaid in full to the HOLC over a one-year period, the ratio of mortgage defaults dropped 
by half. The HOLC also considered the project a success because the number of rental 
opportunities in the area dropped by half as property owners no longer depended on 
boarders for extra income. Additionally, the agency accomplished its goal of moving 
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foreclosed properties off its books, reducing its housing stock by three quarters between 
1939 and 1940.115 Over the same period, the project sparked the construction of new 
homes in Waverly, which the agency attributed to “a growing confidence that the 
Waverly Conservation Program will exert a permanently stabilizing influence on the 
values and conditions of the district.”116 The project reinforced the ability of the federal 
government to assert control over the housing market by targeting resources into specific 
areas and operating with assumptions about property value, race, and home-ownership 
that it took to be common sense. Overall, as Waverly’s property value became more 
predictable and ceased to fall, it both became a safer place for the agency itself to invest 
and drew the interest of developers. 
Because coalition members achieved their aims, federal officials hoped that 
“hundreds of Waverlys” could be protected with similar projects.117 Not only did the 
HOLC anticipate long-term “stability” in Waverly,” but it also anticipated widespread 
demand from municipal governments and various local stakeholders to seek federal 
assistance. If “Baltimore can perfect an operation that is going to lift the level of a 
community and restore its value,” one HOLC official wrote, “there is not a city in the 
country that will not want to know about it”118 To the HOLC, Waverly represented a 
universal problem—that property value would fall because of the social and economic 
deterioration of American cities. Federal power could staunch the bleeding with wide-
spread application of neighborhood protection. To this end, the HOLC included in its 
                                                        
115 Goodwillie, 57-58. 
116 Goodwillie, 60. 
117 Light, 66. 
118 "Discussion by Mr. Howard Acton, Department of Public Relations, Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(From the Minutes of the Advisory Committee Meeting, Waverly Neighborhood Conservation Program, 
Baltimore, Md., December 1, 1939)" p2 RPC Box 222 Folder 4. 
203 
 
final report the NAREB neighborhood rehabilitation model legislation to help facilitate 
the new projects. As with Waverly, each depended on a coalition of local stakeholders 
along with government agencies. Each coalition would be different, but the logic would 
be the same. 
 According to that logic, an area could be protected if it already consisted of 
certain “desirable” traits: a homogenous white population, single family homes, few 
renters. From there, the federal government provided mortgage bailouts and access to 
credit. In addition, it would facilitate linkages to private lenders and additional municipal 
resources. And, finally, it would guide local stakeholders with technical assistance and 
sensitive appraisal data. Under this formula, property owners could then avoid, in 
language paralleling old Roland Park Company discussions, “undesirable” influences that 
would send the neighborhood spiraling. 
In considering the Waverly project successful, the federal government reinforced 
the supposed objectivity of the property appraisal process, on which it based predictions 
of property value. The ultimate recommendations of the Waverly Rehabilitation Project 
amounted to a state subsidy to make Waverly as much like the Roland Park Company 
District as possible: restrictive covenants; leafier, planned streets; an emphasis on 
homeownership, stronger boundaries with nearby “undesirable” areas. It also included 
restrictive covenants and, as much as possible, incorporating the aesthetic of a planned 
suburb into the re-planning and renovations of the area. This was no coincidence. 
Developers assumed a prominent role in shaping New Deal housing policy. From 
McNeal’s collaboration with NAREB to the realtors that served as HOLC security map 
consultants, from Mowbray chairing the project advisory committee to NAREB’s 
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involvement with the National Housing Act, developers found a multitude of ways to 
influence and benefit from an expanded federal state. 
At the conclusion of the Waverly project, Mowbray reconsidered how to best 
promote the Roland Park Company in Washington. He accepted the position on the 
NAREB executive committee. Thereafter, he ascended to Board of Directors and 





In 1956 John Mowbray wrote a short history of the Roland Park Company in 
Baltimore in response to an inquiry from a faculty member at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Institute for Urban Studies. The professor found out from friend at the 
Urban Land Institute—which Mowbray co-founded—that there used to be a 
“shantytown” near Roland Park.1 “Obviously,” he added, the company “overcame” the 
situation given its national prestigious reputation.2 Nevertheless, he requested Mowbray 
sketch a history of the company and the area to aid in a study on “successful residential 
development on land which originally may have some undesirable features.”3 Mowbray 
replied by writing about Cross Keys. “In Baltimore,” he began, “we have a rather heavy 
Negro population and our people depend largely on this group for domestic help.” 
Referring to Cross Keys he continued, “by careful planning, the fact that negroes are in 
the area has not depreciated the value of our property.”4 Mowbray conceived of success 
in terms of property value and linked it to the company’s ability to exercise social and 
aesthetic control over its subdivisions. To him, as it was to Edward Bouton five decades 
earlier, every planning decision that obscured views of black people and black-owned 
property was a calculation about value. Cross Keys residents could depreciate property 
value in the minds of white developers while their labor made the entire subdivision 
viable. The company’s used planning as a mode of social and aesthetic control to 
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generate profits. Sixty years after the company first sunk British capital onto the top of 
the hill next to Cross Keys, it still condoned the same tactics. 
Developers never exercised complete control over constructing the housing 
market at any point.5 However, the same developers who shaped NAREB 
professionalization began their corporate lives flush with investment capital. Turning to 
planning as a means to exercise tight control over the long-term investment, they 
experimented with ways to create the homogenous, healthy “suburb.” They gained 
advantages from this capital that they transformed over the years into access to the 
machinery of governance. It is why Baltimore City provided Roland Park with sewers 
before other areas, why NAREB got a special room in Capitol Hill to help craft the 
National Housing Act, and why John Mowbray could hand-pick only white stakeholders 
in the Waverly neighborhood protection project. Other groups, including consumers, tried 
to petition for sewer access, lobby Congress, and take care of their neighborhoods.6 In 
each case they achieved more limited victories, and without the same technical and 
financial support developers got from policymakers. 
The resulting segregated metropolises did not simply signal a failure of the New 
Deal State nor the work of a few racist individuals, but the very construction of and 
hardening of a housing market where white supremacy (often through quotidian forms) 
became the organizing logic to its institutions, culture, and politics thanks to the 
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asymmetric power of suburban developers.7 The Roland Park Company’s deed 
restrictions, the HOLC security maps, and the FHA underwriting standards were not 
racist anomalies to an otherwise well-functioning housing market. The relationships 
realtors shaped through their transactions, decisions, institutions, and political actions 
gave rise to a housing market that the state codified and fortified.  
Federal adoption of the hierarchy of property value as common sense allowed 
both developers and policymakers to mask practices as objective expressions of market 
forces. In fact, federal officials and Realtors deflected accusations of racial discrimination 
by blaming the market, allowing them to continue practicing segregation long after the 
Second World War.8 
 
Afterward 
The 1950s marked the rise of the post-war suburb along with the end of the 
Roland Park Company, which never financially recover from developing Northwood 
during the Great Depression. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s it tried to diversify 
operations, building shopping centers, managing apartment buildings, and offering 
landscaping services. 
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implicates both Realtors and government, broadly conceived, as players on constructing a discriminatory 
housing market. Neither more government or less government, neither more or less business holds an easily 
prescribed solution. Michael Katz, “The Existential Problem of Urban Studies,” Dissent (Fall, 2010):65. 
8 Andrew Highsmith, Demolition Means Progress: Flint, Michigan, and the Fate of the American 
Metropolis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 52; Paige Glotzer, "Exclusion in Arcadia: How 




Though the company forayed into projects bearing little resemblance to its 
planned subdivisions it never stopped using exclusionary tactics. Until the day the Roland 
Park Company went out of business in 1960, it stood by racial restrictions, even though 
the Supreme Court ruled them unenforceable in the 1948 case Shelley v. Kraemer. 
Meanwhile, the walls, hedges, and street patterns it created remained largely unchanged. 
In 1951 the banker and developer James Rouse, today known for Baltimore’s 
Harborplace and the racially integrated planned town of Columbia, obtained FHA 
financing for the Roland Park Company to build The Marylander Apartments just south 
of Guilford and for which he and the company jointly established a management 
subsidiary. Together they retained a strict Jewish quota and barred black rental. 
In 1950 the newly-formed Baltimore Redevelopment Commission selected that 
southern portion, which it also called "Waverly" as one of eight sites where it would 
"completely carve out and improve a blighted area."9 The commission designated areas as 
slums and cleared land for developers and worked with the Housing of Authority of 
Baltimore City, which relocated residents.10 Officials vacillated between calling the area 
"Waverly" and "South Waverly," a distinction first made during the Waverly 
neighborhood rehabilitation study. Indeed, "South Waverly" lined up with the area 
Mowbray and the coalition defined as the source of "encroachment" and "possible 
invasion" of the project area. Whereas the original neighborhood rehabilitation project 
area lay in areas the HOLC graded as A, B, and C (green, blue, and yellow,) the 
                                                        
9 Baltimore Redevelopment Commission, Redevelopment Project No. 1-A (Baltimore: 1950). Cornell 
University Department of Rare and Manuscript Collections Historical Planning Publications Folder 15-3-
3669. 
10 Baltimore Redevelopment Commission, "Where Do You Go From Here? Information for Persons Living 
on the Site of Redevelopment Project No. 1-A (Waverly)" (Baltimore: 1950):8; Rhonda Williams, The 
Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's Struggles Against Urban Inequality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004):97. 
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designated borders of South Waverly fell entirely within a redlined D-6 area just 
southeast of the Roland Park Company District. Of the eight sites the commission 
selected for redevelopment only Waverly did not border Baltimore's central commercial 
district. Government officials continued to include Waverly in discussions of 
"downtown" infiltration. The FHA financed a private company headed by Rouse to create 
a garden apartment rental complex. Most displaced relocated to public housing scattered 
throughout the city. 
 Rouse, along with Mowbray and former Roland Park Company sales manager 
Guy T.O. Hollyday spearhead The Baltimore Plan in 1951, as the Marylander opened 
near Guilford. Inspired by the Waverly neighborhood protection project, it sought to 
“conserve” existing buildings and improve the quality of life of residents on selective 
public health and housing code enforcement. Like the Waverly Plan, property owners 
received access to credit while black renters gained no protections or input. The 
Eisenhower administration, in which Hollyday headed the FHA and Rouse served on a 
housing subcommittee, adopted the Baltimore Plan model into the 1954 Housing Act. 
Much of Cross Keys also met the wrecking ball. Beginning in 1960, the City of 
Baltimore, flush with federal highway and urban renewal money, demolished half of the 
community to widen an approach road for the new Interstate 83. It also re-located two of 
Baltimore’s most prestigious public schools to a new complex occupying the west side of 
Falls Road. Many Cross Keys residents moved into Bare Hills, another long-time black 
enclave further north on Falls Road. 
Just beyond the demolished section of Cross Keys, on land formerly belonging 
the Roland Park Company’s Baltimore Country Club, Rouse opened a gated community 
210 
 
called The Village of Cross Keys in 1964. Restrictive covenants regulated land use but 
not race. Rouse, however, requested that the village share a zip code with Roland Park, 
creating a checkerboard map where the old Cross Keys shares a zip code with points 
north and west, but not the residential areas immediately bordering it.11 Inside Cross 
Key’s gates wind streets named for Edward Bouton, the Olmsted Brothers, and Roland 
Park. 
Though the Roland Park Company went out of business, the legacy of the 
developers from the 1890s endured. Nowhere was this more evident than in the race-
based appraisal standards that persisted in spite of Rouse's attempts at racially integrating 
town planning in Columbia. Newer developers carried forward the logic of race and 
property value into the post-war era. William Levitt, whose Levittowns became 
America’s most famous post-war suburbs, believe developers could either “solve a 
housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial problem. But we cannot combine the 
two.”12 
Additionally, the institutions early developers founded outlasted them as agents of 
change. The National Association of Real Estate Boards continued to grow and remained 
chief real estate professional organization in the United States. Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s it fought public housing, rent control, and Fair Housing legislation. It also 
continued to provide model restrictive covenants after the Supreme Court ruling.13 
Developers may have passed the torch to the next generation, but that generation 
                                                        
11 James Holecheck, Baltimore’s Two Cross Keys Villages: One Black, One White (Bloomington: 
iUniverse, 2003), 107. 
12 Craig Thompson, "Growing Pains of a Brand-New City," The Saturday Evening Post, August 7, 1954, 
72. 
13 “Housing-Racial Aspects” National Association of REALTORS® Library and Archives. 
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continued to profit from the techniques of its predecessors. NAREB, now the National 
Association of Realtors, still to lobbies Washington but since 1969 has done so through a 
political action committee. The association has also gone international in its mission: it 
has developed partnerships with real estate organizations in sixty countries.14 
*** 
On the corner of Greenmount Avenue and East Thirty-Third Street exists an 
alternative to Mowbray’s history of Baltimore. There, a mural covers the side of a 
building at what was once the southern border of the Waverly Neighborhood Protection 
study and a short distance from still-extent Guilford wall. Commissioned by the City of 
Baltimore in 2010, and completed by local artists and volunteers, it depicts a parade of 
Waverly residents, young and old, black and white, dancing through the street. Others sit 
in the public library. A child holds up a sign in front of the firehouse encouraging 
passers-by to vote. These figures people a neighborhood of small wood frame houses, in 
vivid colors, stylized to slant and bend at angles to the sidewalk. The streets fill with the 
joyous chaos of the crowd, old rowhouses mix first-floor businesses with apartments, 
and—in a nod to the now-demolished nearby Memorial Stadium—a man wears a 
Baltimore Orioles uniform bearing Cal Ripkin, Jr.’s retired number eight. The mural’s 
selections from Waverly’s past—especially its small colorful detached houses and 
rowhouses—become the spaces through which the artists express hope for the future; 
children fill the scene and a large bird soars above them all into the distance. The mural’s 
artists undermine suburban/urban dichotomy; single-family detached homes and 
Baltimore’s iconic rowhouses both compose the neighborhood’s built environment. At 
                                                        
14 “NAR’s Global Alliances” <http://www.realtor.org/global/global-alliances> Accessed February 8, 2016. 
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the very intersection where John Mowbray worked with city and federal officials to shore 
up the colorline in 1940, the city-sanctioned mural rebukes the possibility that developers 
ever fully constructed a housing market. 
To achieve that vision, we must fundamentally re-think American capitalism. If 
developers spent decades building suburban power through constructing the market, a 
start would be to undo the “common sense” assumptions that provide the foundations of 
that market: decouple race and class from property value. Under the status quo we will 
continue to live in hyper-segregated metropolises in which where a person lives affects 
























Figure 2.2 Black and white workers building Guilford's gateposts at York Road, one of the Roland 
Park Company's starkest borders with neighboring communities. Note how white workers dressed 
differently from black workers. The company maintained a segregated labor force and paid black 























Figure 3.2 The Municipal Factory Site Commission promotional image. "'Lord Baltimore' Pointing 






Figure 4.1 The seal of the Homebuilder and Subdivider Division of the National 
















Figure 4.4 Realtors depicted themselves as upstanding, civic-minded technocrats who embraced 







Figure 4.5 Sample of gendered appeals submitted by a Realtor and published in a National Association of 
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